GALLIPOLI HISTORY

Dominion, Volume 25, Issue 163, 6 April 1932, Page 9

GALLIPOLI HISTORY

The Official Record BATTLE OF JUNE 4 Efforts to Secure Victory VITAL DECISION TOO LATE By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright. London, April 4. The second instalment of the summary of the • final volume of the Official History of the , Gallipoli Campaign presents the position on the Peninsula at the end of May, 1915. Sir lan Hamilton still had no news of the Government’s intentions. As the Turkish defences were dally becoming stronger, there being now 80,000 to 100,000 Turks on Gallipoli, General Hamilton decided on a general action in the Helles zone on June 4. Meanwhile, he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener calling attention to the fact that his cable of May 17 was unanswered. At Home the newly-organised Dardanelles Committee had not yet assembled. Even Lord Kitchener could not make up his mind on which side of the scale his weighty influence should bo cast. Historians, describing the battle of June 4, state that the attack on the French front was almost a complete failure. Though the corps was brilliantly staffed and commanded, the proportion of French infantrymen was insufficient to Ipaven the lump of coloured troops which formed the bulk of the infantry rank and file, and whose conduct under heavy artillery Arc again proved Unreliable. Heavy Meagre Results. Referring to the general battle, the historians are of opinion that the Initial attack of June 4 succeeded, but the casualties were very heavy. This was • the first tifne the' Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was engaged in definite trench warfare. The broad principle of using reserves to exploit success rather than redeem failures had not yet been established. Both corps commanders unfortunately determined on a second attempt to capture the trenches which ’* had defied the first assault, and nothing was done to reinforce the section where all was going well. By nightfall the greater part of the ground gained by the 42nd Division was given up. The day’s fighting resulted only in a gain of 250 to 500 yards on a front of a mile. The meagre results cost the Sth Corps 4500 officers and men out of 16,000. The'French losses were 2000. Neither British nor French had the power to renew the attack for many days, and the Turks again had time to organise a new line. On June 7 the new Dardanelles Committee assembled to discuss whether the operations should continue or be abandoned. Lord Kitchener argued that the consequences of withdrawal would be disastrous. Germany would gain Constantinople, and Britain would be abandoning most Important strategic positions, which Australian and New Zealand contingents had helped to win at a heavy cost. Mr. Winston Churchill also made an urgent plea that General Hamilton should be supplied with al) the troops needed for early success on Gallipoli, arguing,that the capture of Kilid Bahr would open the Straits, and the destruction of the Turco-German fleet would follow. The whole of the Balkans would then join the Entente, and the Gallipoli forces could then concentrate on the Western Front. The historians say that had the artillery received howitzers and ammunition in the proportion then available to the British formation in France, they could long since have opened the Narrows.

Reinforcements Provided. The Committee decided to send the three remaining divisions of the Ist New Army with a view to an assault in the second week in July. The Government’s policy veered more and more toward Gallipoli, till by the end of July, when it was too lute, it was ready to offer General Hamilton every man and gun he could use. The last of the reinforcements could not assemble till August 20. six weeks later than it was intended, owing to difficulties with transport. The Government agreed to allow General Hamilton to ask .Sir John Maxwell for 15,000 British and Indian troops, but neither General Hamilton nor General Maxwell was informed until the end of July. It is 'difficult, say the historians, to estimate the weight of the bunleu resting on Lord Kitchener in deciding the rival claims of the Western and Eastern theatres. The promise to co-operate in the French offensive at the end of August naturally affected the amount of ammunition which could be spared for Gallipoli. Moreover, the Austro-German offensive launched on July 13 added a terrible page to Russia’s disasters. This situation led the British Government to strain every nerve to bring tlie Gallipoli campaign to a speedy victorious conclusion, but tlie decision to use a large, force there .came too late. The united strength of the fresh troops could not. be exerted until the second week in August, and General Hamilton was unable to postpone all the operations until reinforcements arrived, so the lamp of victory, rekindled in the first week of July by troops already on the Peninsula, was again to flicker out. for want of oil, and the enemy again given time to recover bis ba la nee. The last half of July witnessed the dispatch of heavy reinforcements for the Turks, while there was a steady wasting of British and French troops from casualties and disease. Then, in August, thirteen divisions, more than twice the nominal strength of the original British Expeditionary Force to France, missed by a narrow margin the accomplishment of a task which a month earlier would have offered only half the difficulty. [Crown copyright—Published by arrangement with the Stationery Ollice.J