The Dominion TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1932. NAVAL DEFENCE

Dominion, Volume 25, Issue 145, 15 March 1932, Page 8

The Dominion TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1932. NAVAL DEFENCE

In submitting the question whether as measure of economy New Zealand should revert to the system under which our annual payment was made to the Imperial Government for naval P r °^ cU oi, the National. Expenditure Commission has raised questions of P ° stated, the commissioners' suggestion is that it would be a cheaper proposition for the Admiralty to maintain the ships as a British fleet unit stationed in New Zealand waters, and send us the bill, than for us to do it ourselves. Such a method won d involve no additional expense on the British taxpayer while it would certainly be a relief to his New Zealand cousin The Admiralty understands the business of running a fleet much, better than we do. Comparative figures presented in the Commission s report show that while the percentage of New Zealand cost to Admiralty cost was .128 in 1914-15, it had risen in 1930-31 to .812. • •• • . j The present system is based oh the general pnncip es enunciated by Viscount Jellicoe in his report to the New Zealand Government in 1919 on the question of naval defence, but the discussion between the British Government and the Dominions generally actually dates back to 1909, when at an Imperial Defence Conference the Admiralty submitted that “if the problem of Imperial naval, defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single Navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command. In furtherance, then, o the simple strategical idea, the maximum of power would be gained if all parts of the Empire contributed, according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British Navy.’ The Admiralty recognised, however, that local policy and sentiment should also be taken into account, and in the case of a particular Dominion electing in preference to a rnonetarj' contribution to make a contribution in kind by laying the foundations of a navy of its own, it should be encouraged to do so. This country so elected. Owing to the increasing menace of German naval power, followed by the War, nothing was done until Viscount Jellicoe’s visit in 1919, and his subsequent suggestions for the gradual creation of a New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy which would automatically pass to the sole control of the Admiralty should war break out or even appear to .be imminent. The question whether as a matter of. financial expediency we should revert to a system which the Admiralty itself would have preferred to continue must therefore be considered in the light of local sentiment and policy. Here the question may be asked: Has the expenditure incurred in developing the idea of a New Zealand Ndyy returned a commensurate degree of naval morale., of conscious naval esprit in public opinion in this country? Since 1913 we have been training New Zealand youths voluntarily enlisted in our Naval Division, and have built up the Naval Reserve to a little over 1000. There would have been nothing to prevent similar enlistments in navy ships under Admiralty control, and the formation of a naval reserve, by special arrangements with the Imperial Government. '

As we do not yet own any ships it does not appear that we would' have a great deal to lose by reverting to Admiralty control. As we have not yet finished paying for the battle-cruiser New Zealand, scrapped after the Washington Conference of 1921, it seems that the present is a very good time to recov— our sense of proportion.