THE ROAD TO PEACE

Dominion, Volume 22, Issue 175, 20 April 1929, Page 23

THE ROAD TO PEACE

SIR FREDERICK MAURICE ON DISARMAMENT NAVAL REDUCTION I A LINE OF AGREEMENT Major - General Sir Frederick Maurice, vice-president of the British Legion, and Director of Military Operations Imperial General • Staff during the great part of the war, spoke recently on “The Road to Peace.” Sir Frederick said it should not be unusual for men like him to come forward in favour of limitation of armaments. Literal disarmament, he declared to be not a practical possibility. The term was even unfortunate. It alienated those who knew literal disarmament to be impracticable, and was apt to enlist the support of . rather vague-minded idealists who had not got their feet upon the ground. But advocacy of limitation of armaments was perfectly logical in one who had spent most of his life as a regular soldier iji the British Army.

"I am not suggesting that we should proceed to limit our armaments before other people limit theirs,” Sir Frederick proceeded. “The very first proposition that the League of Nations 'laid down when it started the examination of this problem in 1920 was that tins reduction of armaments to be effected must be general, and that I regard as a fundamental truth. If limitation of armaments is local, you are likely to increase, rather than diminish the dan, ger of war.” Sir Frederick Maurice recalled that on February 14, ten years ago, he was present when President Wilson read out in the Great Hall of the French Foreign Office to an assembly of the leading statesmen of the Allies, the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations. “I heard him,” he proceeded, “read article 8 of the Covenant, which reelted th’nt the members of the League pledged themselves to a reduction of armaments to the lowest terms compatible with full safety, and the fulfilment of international obligations. It is ten years since we put our name to that pledge. It is very nearly ten years since we put our signature ■ to the treaties of peace with all our former enemies, and upon each of those former enemies there was imposed a very drastic reduction of armaments; and the clauses cletini''" in great detail the form that reduction should take were prefaced by the words that these reductions were to be the prelude to a general reduction of armaments.” In the interval, with the exception of the Washington 'Conference, there had been nothing worthy of a place on the principal pages of the newspapers. But despair would not produce results. Faith and confidence were not only needed, but despair was not \varranted. Between 1922 and 1927 the numbers of men in the armies of Europe had been reduced from 4,411,000 to 2,742,000 —a reduction of something like 75 per cent, of the present strength of the armed forces of Europe. That was not a negligible fafet. And between. ■1921, the year of the Washington Conference, and 1926, the total tonnage of the world’s navies had been reduced from 4,988,000 tons to 4,110,000 tons—a reduction equivalent to about 85 per cent, of the tonnage of the British navy of to-day. Movement had been slow, but enought had surely been done to give us confidence that with faith and intelligence and earnestness, this'problem was soluble. (Applause.) . 'The Line of Progress. Sir Frederick examined the methods by which these reductions had been brought about, emphasising that it was not by agreement on general problems, but by dealing with localised problems in the Locarno Pact for Western , Europe that success had been attained. He did not, he said, expect that the , forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission and of the Armaments Commission of the League would pro- t duee any very startling results. It was in the progress made by the Locarno ( Pact that he saw, the indications of ( the right line towards further progress. “The whole experience of the last ten j vears,” he said, “shows that if you are . to get progress, you must have adequate political preparation before-hand.” , In addition to the reductions he had ( mentioned, there had been going on the ( more important process of reducing the numbers of men in training under the ( system of conscription on the Contin-

ent, and modifying the periods during which the men were trajned. In the ease of France, that meant that her power to mobilise her forces quickly, and to act aggressively, had been enormously reduced. It was the best method by which the limitation of armaments could be applied to conscript armies. All recent experience, he suggested. showed that an attempt to draft an all-embracing treaty was not politically practicable, owing to the complication and variation of conditions in the various countries. It did show, however, that it was politically practicable to tackle one at a time if necessary, the various problems which caused uneasiness and friction between nations. Sir Frederick proceeded to advocate the consideration of a Locarno Pact for Eastern Europe, the evacuation of the Rhineland, and the final 'settlement of the question of reparations as measures more important for the general limitation of armaments than the counting of heads and machine-guns, and battleship tonnages. Neutral Rights at Sea. Turning to the subject of the limitation of naval armaments, Sir Frederick said that everything hung upon the problem of the freedom of the seas — neutral rights .at sea. That, he said, was the one subject which united the whole political opinion of the United States of America. Until it was tackled there could be no progress in naval limitation. This was not a question for Ihe lawyers or for the sailors: it was n question for statesmen. “The only way to tackle the problem.” Sir Frederick declared, “is to deal with it in a broad and statesmanlike way. I suggest that we should go to the United States, and say to them, We

are one of the constituent members of the League of Nations. We suggest to you that if ever, at the request of the League, we have to carry out a blockade against a country which has broken its pledges to the League, and has been declared an outlaw nation, you should agree not to interfen 1 with the blockade. If you will give that pledge, we will give you a pledge that if you are ever engaged in a war at sea. we shall not interfere with your shipping, except under the old and well-established rules of close blockade at sea.’ There is the broad genera) programme of policy which seems to me likely to produce definite results, and also to remove what is now, I think. I lie only possible cause of friction between ourselves and that great neople on the other side of the Atlantic. It is worth everything that wo all can do to bring about a

settlement with that counry. There is nothing more likely to conduce to the establishment of the permanent peace of the world. “Armies,” said Sir Frederick, in conclusion, “do not spring up when the dragon’s' teeth are sown. They are the result of political conditions, and it is by examining these scientifically and carefully, and proceeding to settle them at the points where there is friction, or liability to friction, between ■ nathat you will get limitation of armaments and permanent peace.” (Apnlause.)