TRENCHANT WAR-TIME NOTES

Dominion, Volume 21, Issue 12, 8 October 1927, Page 11

TRENCHANT WAR-TIME NOTES

BY THE LATE FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON THE 1918 CRISIS ATTITUDE OF THE EMPIRE’S LEADING STATESMEN Two volumes of notes made in his war-time diary by the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson contain interesting references to the Imperial war discussions in 1918 and comment on the views of the Empire’s leading statesmen on the critical situation.

By Telegraph.—Press Association.—Copyright.

(Rec. October 7, 7 p.m.) London, October 6. Two volumes of trenchant notes made in his war-time diary by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, just published, contain reference to the Imperial war discussions in 1918, when Sir Henry was urging that things were so bad that there must be the fullest sacrifice. When referring to conscription in Ireland, he said: “I am not sure that Mr. Lloyd George can see the gravity of the situation. General Smuts talked much academic nons'ense. Mr. Winston Churchill is the real gun in the crisis.” BRITISH STRATEGY CRITICISED Dealing with the Imperial Ministers’ meetings beginning June 11, 1918, Sir Henry said: ‘‘Sir Robert Borden made very open remarks on our strategy, tactics, corps commanders, and Staff, and Mr. Massey agreed, so I must answer as best I can on Tuesday.” On the Tuesday Sir Henry Wilson gave the Premiers a seventy minutes’ lecture®on the military situation, for which he was congratulated. Then on June 20 the Imperial War Cabinet discussed intervention in Siberia, also the transferring of troops from Palestine to the Western front. Sir Henrv Wilson says: “Then Mr. Hughes wanted to'know about the conduct of the war, the promotion of new Army officers in the future, etc. We had an interesting talk. Mr. Hughes said he was out for fighting on even if we were driven from France.” VIEWS ON 1919 CAMPAIGN. Referring to the Prime Minister’s meeting on July 31, to which Sir Henry Wilson sent a memorandum on the probable course of the 1919 campaign, he savs: “Lord Milner is clear that we will never thrash the Bosches. He suggests holding them on the West with or 36 British and French divisions and Americans, and sending ten British divisions to other theatres.; Mr. Hughes thought we must smash the Germans in France. General Smuts agreed with Lord Milner. Mr. Hughes dissented, and said we must lick the Bosches on the West. General Smuts thought we would never beat the Bosches.” ' Of the speeches at the next few days’ meetings Sir Henry Wilson says: “All the Prime Ministers, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Hughes, General Smuts, Mr. Massey, and Lord Milner, were of opinion that we cannot beat the Bosches on the Western front, and so they went wandering looking for laurels' Mr. Hughes sees more clearly than the others. He sees that we must beat the Bosche army if we want real War Cabinet on August 13,' Sir Robert Borden proposed to hand over the captured colonies to the United States. Sir Henry Wilson adds: “Mr. Hughes was straining at the leash, but the discussion was postponed. Mr. Massey is also opposed to Sir Robert Borden’s suggestion of handing over the colonies. Mr Hughes said : ‘lf you want to shift us, come and do it.’ He claimed the right to help shape our foreign policy, adding that we had none.’ PROPHECY CONCERNING FOCH. Earlier chapters mention Sir Henry Wilson’s prophecy in 1910 concerning Marshal Foch when he said: “This fellow is going to command the Allies, armies when the big war comes.” Of the first Council in 1914, at which Dominion contingents were discussed, Sir Henry Wilson says: “It was a historic meeting of men mostly entirely ignorant of their subject.” [Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson was shot dead on June 22, 1922, outside his house in London, by two Irishmen, John O’Brien and James Connolly, who were afterwards sentenced to death and executed.] DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN ALLEGATIONS IN WAR OFFICE HISTORY DENIED BY AUSTRALIAN CORRESPONDENT London, October 6. A cable from Canberra appears in the “Dailv Express” stating that Mr. C. E. Bean, Australian official war correspondent, convened a conference of generals at Sydney to refute the allegations contained in a proof copv of the War Office History of the Dardanelles Campaign, to the effect that the Anzacs were ill-trained and badly led. and herded together on the beach, while- a few adventurous spirits braved the heights. A distimiirished officer. in_ Mosely associated ; with Hie" preparation of the liistorv of Gaflinoli, states that it is absurd 'and mischievous to suggest that there is any ill-feeling or misunderstanding between the Australian and Home authorities. The

proofs were sent to Australia and New Zealand early in the summer. I\ew Zealand replied that the account was fair and admirable. Australia suggested that one part be deleted. This was done on consultation with the High Commissioner. AUSTRALIAN OPINIONS ANZACS COMPARED WITH BRITISH TROOPS ’ (Rcc. October 7, 10.55 p.m.) Sydney, October 7. The cabled statement with reference to the Anzacs at Gallipoli arose out of the receipt at Canberra of proof sheets of the British Official History of the Gallipoli operations, wherein it is stated that Australian troops who landed at Anzac were herded together on the beach and allowed other men to storm the heights.. This aroused a storm of indignation in all the States.' , Mr. Hughes, speaking at Canberra, said the man who wrote the statement was guilty of an infamous libel on the courage of soldiers, whose deeds would live for ever.

General Monash, at Melbourne, said: “There were no other 'people at the Anzac beach to do the fighting but the Australians and New Zealanders. They were the only troops there for weeks, so it is impossible that others fought for them while they were hud-dled-on the beach There is no question that the landing was a magnificent and unparalleled feat of arms.” General Monash added: “If there could be any comparisons drawn between the Dominion and English troops on Gallipoli I may say that the Dominion generals were unfortunately compelled to form a very poor opinion of the British troops, with , the exception of the Twenty-ninth division at Cape Helles, which was a magnificent formation of veteran regiments of the British Army. I refer particularly to the British troops which attempted to land at Snvla on August 6, 1916, and to such troops as territorials. None of these were comparable in efficiency, discipline, or leadership with the Australians and New Zealanders. T have the best reason for knowing these facts, as I had many of these British units under my command at various times.” Mr. Bruce stated that he had not yet seen the manuscript, but would make inquiries as to its nature. He said it was deplorable that .after thirteen years argument should arise, as to what the Australians did on landing at Anzac. The Returned Sailors and Soldiers’ Imperial League announced that tlie statements were libellous, and they would immediately cable Earl Haig asking to have the grossly untrue statements eliminated from the official history. WELL-KEPT WAR SECRET AMERICANS “OVER THE TOP” WITHOUT ORDERS (Rec. October 7, 7.40 p.m.) London, October 7. Earl Haig, presiding at the American Legion gathering, disclosed a well-kept war secret of how, on Independence Day, July 4, 1918, the American unit went into'battle without orders alongside General Monash’s Australians in the Hamel sector Interviewed later, Earl Haig explained that the Americans, mostly from Chicago, under General Abel Davis, were ordered to occupy the front line trenches, when it was discovered that American headquarters had not been consulted, and said by 'phone that the men were not to go into action. British Headquarters, therefore, ordered their withdrawal. When the Americans in the trenches heard of the decision they said they would not be doing their share if thev withdrew, and before they could be stopped they went over the top for their baptism of fire, suffering fifteen killed and seventy-five wounded. Reporting the capture of Hamel later, Earl Haig me.relv added: “Some detachments of Americans assisted the Australians.”