SINGAPORE AND THE NAVAL SITUATION

Dominion, Volume 18, Issue 150, 19 March 1924, Page 12

SINGAPORE AND THE NAVAL SITUATION

Sir, —The Singapore question is a difficult one. If the British Navy is to defend the British Empire and its commerce, and to uphold .British prestige, that British advice will not be despised in the East, it is hard to see why it should be denied even one efficient base beyond Home waters. On the other hand, the abandonment of the Singapore improvements might be a superb gesture worth making if it would really mean a better understanding with Japan. At the same time it is hard to believe that war can come in the Pacific if Britain and.the United States can agree on the main questions there, be reasonably strong at sea, and reasonably unaggressive in policy, though ready to speak and act should necessity arise. At Singapore and at Bombay there appear to be dry docks already capable of taking about 14 out of our 22 largo warships, and they would not have to be enlarged very much to accommodate the Hood. Recent articles make the mere geography of war an obsession. But geographical "positions do not fight, i Wars (and we should be able to avoid them) are decided by “arms and the man.” Between 1894 and 1904 Japan had built or purchased six modern battleships and eight armoured cruisers. In 1901 Russia had at J’oit Arthur seven battleships and one armoured cruiser, with three more armoured cruisers isolated at Vladivostok. These ships had only to drive away or defeat the Japanese ships to make it impossible for Japan to turn Russia out of Manchuria. The two best Russian battleships were suddenly damaged by torpedo hits, and the one -dry dock at Port Arthur was too small to receive either of them. They were repaired, however, by the use of coffer dams, and had a second chance on August 10, 1904: six Russian battleships, then, against four Japanese, supported by the eight Japanese armoured cruisers. The Rusians were defeated. The Baltic fleet, including five modern battleships ai d nine older armoured ships, then set out. It had no coaling bases whatever, and its finest ships had bunkers about half as roomy as in British warships of the same size, and only inferior German coal to put into them, yet this fleet reached Tsushima neither short of coal nor over-loaded, and Russia had a. third chance of victory. The Russian ships were practically annihilated—by the Japanese ships, not by a geographical position. Tho Bolsheviks in Russia became troublesome and Russia. had to sue for peace. Russia in 1904 was aggressive, but Weak. Her fleet was divided, her ships were inferior in guns and speed, , and their officers and men hopelessly untrained in practical seamanship and gunnery. With mi efficient fleet concentrated in the Baltic at the start, Rtissia would, have won Tsushima and the war. As it is, we wish to preserve peace in the Pacific, sc let us never forget Russia’s qplendid example of “how not to do it.” let us reverse her then policy, as far as possible.—l am, etc., R. H. FITZ-HERBERT. Havelock North, March 17, 1924.