THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

Dominion, Volume 18, Issue 55, 29 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL’S WAR MEMOIRS i WORK AT THE ADMIRALTY SUMMED UP “THE FLEET WAS READY!” / In the twenty-first article of his war memoirs Mr. Winston Churchill brings us to his last day at the Admiralty. He discusses his relations with Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener and Sir Arthur Wilson and briefly summarises his work at the Admiralty,

(Exclusive to “The Dominion.”)

X was greatly disturbed, and now found it very hard indeed to leave the Admiralty. In the . midst of general condemnation, violent newspaper censures, angry lobbies, reproachful colleagues here at any rate was a judge —competent, instructed, impartial—who pronounced by action stronger than words .not merely an acquittal, but a vindication. I knew well the profound l impression which Sir Arthur Wilson’s action, had it been made public, would have produced upon the Naval Service. It would instantly have restored the confidence which Press attacks, impos' Bible .to answer, had undermined. In no other way could the persistent accusations of rash, ignorant, interference by the civilian Minister in the naval conduct of the war is decisively I felt myself strong enough with this endorsement to carry forward to eventual success the great operations to which we were committed. I felt that working with Wilson and Oliver, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff, linked together as they were, we should again have re-estab-lished that unity, comradeship, and authority at the summ it of the Admiralty with which alone the risks could bo run and the exertions made which are indispensable to victory. The information which had reached! me was confidential and could not then be disclosed to the'public by me. It was not disclosed by the Prime Minister. • RELATIONS WITH MR. ASQUITH In judging my relations with Mr. Asquith at this time it must be remembered that every action of mine in opening and pressing the operations at the Dardanelles had been ' taken with his full knowledge, approval. and support. There was no question of reluctant assent or inadvertent acquiescence obtained from a partially-informed chief by a scheming subordniate. In fact, as , has been shown, the supreme decision which Lord Fisher resented so violently had been given personally by the Prime Minister, and could only have been given by him; and apart from this, Mr. Asquith was always and has always remained a convinced, believer in the policy of the attack , upon the Dardanelles. I do not -write this in any spirit of personal reproach. I knew only too well at the time what were Mr. As- . quith’s own difficulties. Ho had up till then, diuring the many years of . our association, treated me with the utmost kindness; and I know well that if he had had the power he would have ruled the event far differently. The emergencies of the time were too * grave and! the forces and pressures operating upon individuals too violent . for ordinary conditions to apply. Therefore there never was and never has been the slightest personal recrimination Upon the subject. My criticism is on general and public grounds L am confident that had the Prime Minister, instead of submitting to the demand of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to form a Coalition Government. laid the broad outlines of his case, both naval and military, before both Houses of Parliament in secret session, he and the policy he was committed to would have been supported by large majorities. The impressive recital of all that the War Office had achieved under Lord Kitchener would greatly have mitigated the complaints on what had been neglected. I am sure I could have vindicated the Admiralty policy. More- , t oyer, on May 23, towering over domestic matters, came the Italian declaration of war against Austria. The Prime Minister’s personal share in this event was a tremendous fact. I am certain that had he fought he would have won; and had he won, he could then, with dignity and with ~ real authority have invited the Opposition to come not to his rescue, but to his aid. On such a basis of confidence, comradeship and respect a true national coalition, could have been formed to carry on the war, and Mr. Asquith would have been spared that interlude of distrustful colleagues, of 'divided or more often mutually paralysing counsels and on squandered opportunities, which reached its end in December, 1916. MAJESTIC KITCHENER The formation of the new Government proceeded haltingly. It was during this interval that I had the honour of receiving a visit of ceremony from Lord Kitchener. I was not at first aware of what it was about. We had differed strongly and on a broad front at the last meeting of the War Council. Moreover, no decision of any importance on naval or military affairs could be taken during the hiatus. We talked about the situation. After some general remarks he asked me whether it was nettled that I should leave the Admiralty. I said it was. He asked what I was going to do. I said I had no idea.: nothing was settled. ’He spoke very kindiv about our work together. He evidently had no idea how narrowly he had escaped my fate. As he got ’tip to go he turned and said, in the impressive and almost majestic manner 'which .was natural to him, “Well there is one thing at any rate they cannot take from yon. The fleet was ready.” After that he was gone. During the months, that we were still to serve together in the new Cabinet I was condemned often to differ from him, to oppose him and to criticise him. But I cannot forget the rugged kindness and warm-hearted courtesy which led him to pay me this visit. By the 21st it was decided that Mr. Balfour was to come to tno Admiralty. In accordance with what I knew were the Prime Minister’s wishes, I endeavoured to persuade Sir Arthur Wilson to serve under him. He remained obdurate. No arguments would move Mm. He was at some pains to explain that bis decision arose out of jfto personal consideration for roe,

but solely because he felt he could not undertake the burden without my aid. All the same there seemed to be a quite unwonted element of friendliness in his demeanour, and this was proved a year later during the Parliamentary inquiry into the Dardanelles. On the evening of the 21st I reported to the Prime Minister: —_ “I have tried very hard but without success to persuade Sir Arthur Wilson to hold himself at Mr. Balfour’s disposition. In these circumstances I would advise Sir Henry Jackson.” This proposal was adopted, and meanwhile the process of Cabinetmaking gradually completed itself. Mr. Asquith was good enough to offer me the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster. This office is a sinecure of much dignity. I should certainly not have felt able to accept it but’Tor the fact that he coupled with it the premise that I should be a member of the War Council, or War Committee, of the Cabinet. I felt that thus situated I should be able to bring whatever knowledge I had! acquired to the service of tho Dardanelles expedition, and that it was my duty to aid and succour it by any" effective means '’Will left to me. I remained in the new Government as long as this condition was observed.

Early on the mornhig of the £6thmy last at the Admiralty—arrived the sinister news that the Triumph had been torpedoed and sunk at the Dardanelles by a German submarine. However, my task was over. SEA COMMAND COMPLETE Thus ended my administration of the Admiralty. For thirty-four months of preparation and ten months of war. I had borne the prime responsibility and had wielded the main executive .power. ■

The reader who has persevered thus far in this account will realise the difficulties that were coped with, the hazards that were encountered!, the mistakes that were made. and_ the work that was done. Dubious "days, many misfortunes, enormous toils, bitter disappointments, still lay before the Royal Navy. But I am entitled at this point of the story to place on record the situation aqd condition in which the mighty instrument of our sea power and of our salvation passed into ■ the hands of my successors. At no moment during all the wars of Britain had our command of the seas been more ' complete, and in no previous war had that command been asserted more'rapidly or with so little loss. Not only had the surface ships of the enemy been extirpated from the oceans of the world: not only in the North Sea had his fleets ’and squadrons been beaten, cowed and driven into port; but even the new and barbarous submarine warfare had been curbed and checked. For more than a year to-come the German High Seas Fleet scarcely quitted its harbours, and even when they did so, it was with no intention of fighting a battle and in the misplaced hope that they could return unperceived or unmolested". For eighteen months their submarine campaign was virtually suspended. In spite <f modern complications which have been explained, the economic blockade of Germany was established and maintained, so far as it rested with the Navy, with the utmost strictness; scarcely any ship that the Navy had authority to touch ever passed our far-spread cordons. Tlie maintenance of the armies in France and in the East proceeded every month on a vaster scale, without the slightest substantial hindrance upon their communications becoming apparent to our commanders at the front. The mercantile fleets of Britain and of her Allies moved with freedom in all directions about the seas and oceans; nad an insurance rate of 1 per cent, left a substantial profit to the Government fund. ’These conditions lasted during all the year 1915 and up to the last quarter of the year 1916. There never was in all the history of war_s_uch an unchallenged reign of seq, power.— Sydney “Sun” Copyright. TO-MORROW. Position at the Dardanelles: “hopeful and dangerous” ; only four miles to go.