THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Dominion, Volume 16, Issue 171, 7 April 1923, Page 7

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ITS TRIUMPHS AND ITS FAILURES SERIOUS LIMITATION OF ACTIVITIES ■ f UNITED STATES’ RESPONSIBILITY Mr. Lloyd George, in his fifteenth article, discusses the League of Nations and its chances of achieving the purpose for which it was constituted. FThe following and all Lloyd George articles copyright by United Press of America in all countries, copyright in Australasia by Australian Press, copyright in Britain by "Daily Chronicle/ Reproduction m full or ? in part prohibited.!

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(Rec. April 6, 5.5 p.m.) London, April 4. Mr. Lloyd George writes:— Is the League of Nations a success r It is impossible to answer, candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. J. mean, nevertheless, to attempt to answer, for much depends on a fearless examination of the progress made or missed. The League was founded three years ago. This is much too short a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic and complex, but very delicate and’ sensitive human machine, the League has, however, been long enough X In existence to reveal its strength, its weaknesses, its potentialities and Perils. It has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be proud, notably the restoration of Austria, stamping out of typhus, so preventing its spread westward, lhe Labour branch is also producing marked and important results. Great credit is due to it for alleviating distress in the famine-stricken areas m Europe and among the refugees from the horrors of Bolshevism and Turkish savagery in Asia Minor. THE CRUCIAL TEST But these humanitarian tasks were not the primary objects of the League p foundation. Its main purpose was averting future wars. Its failure or success as an experiment should be Judged by this test alone. How does it stand in this respect? It succeeded m effecting a settlement of the danger ous dispute between Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands. Here x the League’s methods, gave confidence in its complete impartiality. This cannot be said, unfortunately, of the Silesian award, which, although acted upon, is hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. Instead of following the Aaland' precedent in the choice of a tribunal, the League pursued a course, which engendered suspicion and intrigue, in the choice of the’tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. In the Aaland case no Great Power was particularly interested in influencing the decision, but here two Great Powers, France and I oland with authority in the League, were passionately engaged in securing a result adverse to Germany. The other party to the dispute had no friends, and," moreover, was not a member o the League. Britain stood for.fair play, but was not a protagonist of the German claims. In these circumstances the League ought to have exercised more scrupulous care as to freedom from bias. Had It chosen distinguished jurists from outside its own body all would have been well. The way that I olanc flouted the League over Vilna served to confirm the idea prevailing in Russia that France and Poland dominate the League. The Silesian award may be fust, but it will take a long sones of decisions which are bevond cavil to v establish German and Russian confidence in the League. THE GREAT WEAKNESS. The Vilna fiasco, the Armenian failure, the suspicions surrounding the Silesian award, the timidity which prevents it tackling the reparations problem, which is the one question disturbing Europe’s peace to-day, the futile conversations and committees on disarmament, which everyone knows wi)’ not succeed in scrapping one .fleet of aeroplanes or one company of infantry —all these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. The great weakness of the League comes from the fact that it represents only onehalf of the Great Powers of the world REJECTION BY ’AMERICA. The League, to be a reality, must represent the whole civilised worldthat is the original conception. To ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and barren controversy. I do not propose to express an opinion on the merits of the manoeuvres which led to the defeat of the Treaty in America

Whether the Senate should have honoured the signature of the American President given in the name of his country at the International Conference, or whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with American ideas to justify such sanction ; whether the amendments demanded as a condition of approval would have crippled the League and ought to have been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been accepted —these are issues which it would not serve any useful purpose to discuss. As to the effect of the American refusal to adhere to the Lbague. there is no doubt that it robbed it of all chance of a dominating success. It is true that three Great Powers—Britain, France, and Italy—remained The effect has been paralysing. Where these three Powers. disagree on important issues, nothing is done. No two Great Powers would take the responsibility of over-ruling the third, hence the reparations question has not been dealt with by the League. Had America been in, even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would have. been transformed. America and Britain, actins- in concert with an openly sympathetic Italy and a secretly assenting Belgium, would have brought such pressure to bear on France as to make it inevitable that the League should act. IMPOTENT TO DISCHARGE MAIN FUNCTION. No Great Power has so far. permitted any international question in which it has a vital interest to be submitted to the League for decision.. France resolutely declines to submit to the League the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out with Germany. Therefore France’s refusal has had the effect of hobbling the League, and so long as that attitude is maintained the League will be impotent to discharge its main function —restoring and keeping the peace. It is not impossible that the reparations dispute may end in the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. It is churning up deadly passions. If ever there was an occasion for intervention by the organisation created for the purpose, surely this is pre-eminently such a case France not only declines to put the League Covenant into operation, but intimates that she will treat any such proposal as an unfriendly act. The Constitution of the League stipulates that it is the friendly duty _o f any Power to move, and that any international dispute which threatens peace shall be referred to the League Nevertheless one leading . signatory rulbs out of the Covenant all questions vitally affecting its own interests. This is the Power which invaded the territory of another because the latter fail ed to carry out one of the Treaty provisions. This emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract has been acquiesced in by the other signatories. WHAT COULD BE DONE. This limitation of the League’s activities is the gravest check it has yet sustained in its career. I do not be lieve that it would have occurred /if America, with or without clause 10, had been an active member. A rational settlement of the reparations question by the League would have establishes! its authority throughout the world. Germany, Russia, and Turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust,/tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils; argument, debate, and intercession would be the recognised substitutes for shot, shell, and sword; wars would cease and the reign of law would be supreme. The'League, by developing the habit of nations debating their differences in the presence of the world, is gradually edcring out war as a settler of quarrels. Will it be allowed to render that service? If not, it will perish like many other laudable experiments. . If it dies the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried in its tomb. —Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.