DEAD TREATIES

Dominion, Volume 16, Issue 169, 5 April 1923, Page 11

DEAD TREATIES

VISCOUNT GREY ON FRANCE REASONS FOR FRENCH ACTION

In view of tjjo consideration urged in defence that French policy in "Europe is not to be regarded as dictated simply by desire for aggrandisement at the expense of Germany, but primarily by the desire for guarantee of security, the speech delivered by Viscount Grey in the House of Lords on December 14 is of interest. Viscount Grey—Foreign Secretary of Mr. Asquith’s pre-war Cabinet —spoke on the eve of that conference at which the British and French Premiers finally registered their difference of, opinion, and after which-France prepared to occupy the Ruhr independently; After referring to the debts owed to Britain by the Allies, Viscount Grey turned to the need for maintaining peace. The strengthening of the League of Nations (he said) was the best means of restoring the peace of Europe. The League had done exceedingly well, the work it had to do, but,-unless it became more comprehensive, Europe would again' drift into two armed eamps. When the reparations question was settled Germany should declare herself willing to enter, and other Powers should declare themselves willing to see Germany admitted to the League of Nations. One. of the things which weighed upon the economic, conditions of Europe, as well as the sense, of political security, was the expenditure on armaments. or, rather, the feeling that there was no certainty that there would not again crop up in Europe a competition in expenditure on armaments. The Washington Treaty at the present moment Was the one thing which stood between the world and renewed competition. in expenditure on naval armaments.

He had read continued Viscount Grey recently in a French newspaper—-which ho felt sure did not represent the view of the French Government —that not only would France not ratify that treaty, but . that, after having declared qhe would ratify it, she wojild declare that she intended to build a new kind of navy on modern lines more formidable than a navy of capital ships. That opened a prospect not only of the falurc. as to ratification of the Washington Treaty, but of future competition in naval armaments. It would be too crude and too pro-’ vocative -to the French Government to sa.y that we could not. consider tho question of remitting inter-Allied debts unless they w«ue prepared to ratify the Washington Treaty.

Franco and Security. One of the cljief causes of the political trouble since the Armistice was the fact that there were two treaties most important to France in the peace settlement which were not parts of the Treaty of Versailles, but were as much parts of the peace settlement as the Treaty of Versailles itself-—the FrancoBritish Treaty and the Franco-Ameri-can Treaty . guaranteeing to"" France that should there be any German aggression against Eer she would have in her support tho whole strength of the British Empire and of the United States.

These treaties had absolutely disappeared, and he would ask the people who were apt to criticise France as having been restless -and aggressive, and inclined to take separate action, Co bear in mind what their feelings would be had they been Frenchman regarding these two treaties as an integral part: of the peace, and legating it as the great object 'of. France that she should have security against the terrible position in which she was placed for many years before the war. The disappearance of those treaties accounted for a great deal of what was spoken of as the aggressive spirit in France, and to a great extent for- the risk of France taking measures criticised as inadvisable/ Dead Treaties. e These treaties could not be revived, but had they remained the United Btates, ourselves, and Erajice, would have been partners in policy. There would not only have been no chance of aggressive action by France towards Germany, but there would have been no cause for it. They would have found by common agreement tho amount Germany should and could pay, and then would have taken' steps to stabilise the German exchange and to prevent the collapse of the mark. The result would have been that today Germany would have paid to France far more than she had yet paid, because the. amounts would have been reduced to the possible limit and the whole condition of Europe would have been very different. He did not believe we could get security in Europe by making exclusive agreements with particular parties, but by making use of the Le-ague of Nations. ’ If the Government found the French Government difficult to deal with on tho question of reparations and too easily disposed to take fjtrong measures, and to occupy mure German -territory, he believed the real reason was, though perhaps the French would not admit it themselves, not to get cash, from Germany in payment for reparations, but to get security for the future, which they thought they woulcl have by occupying more German territory. Viscount Grey concluded by saying that he did not believe that in the long run any nation made itself more secure by occupying large tracts of territory inhabited by different people. This was a very big question, and he felt that he would like to make what contribution he could, in the hope that out of a general consultation some belter way might be found of saving Europe from tho course in which it was now going than had yet been discovered.