Secret History of the Great War.

Dominion, Volume 16, Issue 148, 10 March 1923, Page 11

Secret History of the Great War.

[Copyright] The Fatal Blunder at Coronel. In this, the thirteenth instalment of his War Memoirs, Mr. Winston Churchill illumines the official background of the British naval disaster off Coronel, when Rear- Admiral Cradock’s cruising squadron was practically annihilated by the German cruiser squadron under Admiral-von Spec.

A PERPLEXING SITUATION. SUDDENLY, ON OCTOBER 27, there arrived, a telegram from Admiral Cradock which threw me into perplexity:— Good Hope, October 26, 7 p.m. At sea.* With reference to Admiralty telegram received October 7 and to orders to search for enemy and our great desire for early success, I consider that it is impossible to find and destroy enemy’s squadron owing to slow speed of Canopus. Have therefore ordered Defence to join me, after calling for orders at Montevideo. Shall employ Canopus on necessary work of convoying colliers. The Admiralty telegram to which Admiral Cradock here referred was as follows: — October 5. —You must be prepared to meet Scharnhorst, Gneisenau. and Dresden in company. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth, and Otranto and should search and protect trade in combination. We were then in the throes of tho change in the office of First Sea Lord, and I was gravely preoccupied with the circumstances and oppositions attending the appointment of Lord Fisher. But for this fact I am sure I should have reacted much more violently. against tho ominous sentence: “Shall employ Canopus on necessary work of convoying colliers.” As it was I minuted to. the Naval Secretary (Admiral Oliver) as follows:— “This telegram is very obscure, and I do not understand what Admiral Cradock intends and wishes.” I was reassured by his reply on October 29: — Tho situation on the West Coast seems safe. If Gneisenau and Scharnhorst have gone north they will meet eventually Idzumo, Newcastle, and Hizen moving south, and will be forced south on Glasgow and Monmouth, who have good speed and can keep touch and draw them south on to Good ■ Hope and Canopus, who should keep within supporting distance of each . other. The half fear which had begun to grow in my mind that perhaps the Admiral vpuld go and fight without the Canopus, which I thought waa so improbable that I did not put it on paper, was allayed. It would, of course, be possible for him to manoeuvre forty or fifty miles ahead of the Canopus and still close her before fighting. To send the Defence to join Admiral Cradock would have left Admiral Stoddart in a hopeless inferiority. Tho Admiralty Staff had, however, already replied in accordance with all our decisions: — (Sent October 28, 1914, 6.45 p.m.) There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Defence is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart; This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes. Japanese battleship Hizen shortly expected on North American coast; she will join with Newcastle and Japanese Idzumo and move south towards Galapagos. But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral Cradock. He had taken his own decision. Without waiting for the Defence, even if wO had been able to send her. and leaving the Canopus behind to guard the colliers, he was already steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he left the inexpungable Canopus behind because she was too slow he took with him the helpless armed merchant cruiser Otranto, which was scarcely any taster. He was thus ill-fitted either to fight or run. He telegraphed to us from off Vallenar at 4 p.m. on October 27 (received November 1, 4.33 a.m.): — Your telegram 105 received. Have seized German mails. Monmouth, Good Hope, and Otranto at Vallenar coaling. Glasgow patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept German shipping, rejoining flag later on. After coaling I intend to proceed northward s-ci Iv with squadron and to keep out of sight of land. Until further notice continue telegraphing to Montevideo. \ ■ ■ And at noon on October 29 (received November 1, 7.40 a.m): — Mails for Rear-Admiral Cradock, Good Hope, Canopus, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto, should until further notice be forwarded to Valparaiso. Tho inclusion of the Canopus in tue middle of the. later message seemed to indicate the Admiral’s intention to work in combination with the Canopus, even if it not actually concentrated. These were the last messages received

from him. . ENTER LORD FISHER. On October 30 Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord. As soon as he entered tho Admiralty I took him to the war room and went over with him on the great map the positions and tasks of every vessel in our immense organisation It took more than two hours. The critical point was clearly in South American waters. Speaking of Admiral Cradock’s position, I said, “You don’t suppose he would try to fight them-w.Uioub the Canopus?” He did not give any decided reply. Early on November 3 wo got our first certain news of the Germans. Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Admiralty.' (Sent 5.20 p.m., November 2. Received 3.10 a.m., November 3.) Master of Chilean merchant vessel reports that on November 1, 1 p.m., five miles off Cape Carranza, about 62 miles north pf Talcahuano, he was stopped by Nurnberg. Officers remained on board 45 minutes. Two other German cruisers lay west, about ‘5 and 10 miles respectively. Master believes one of these was Scharnhorst. On October 26. 1 p.m.. Leipzig called at Mas-a-Fuera, having crew 456 and 10 guns, 18 days out from Galapagos. She was accompanied by another cruiser name unknown. They left same day, having bought oxen. An unknown warship was x on October 29 seen in lat. 33 south, long. 74 west, steaming towards Couimbo. Here at last was the vital message for which the Admiralty Staff had waited so long., Admiral von Spee’s squadron was definitely located on the West Coast of South America. He had not slipped past Admiral Cradock round the Horn, as had been possible. For the moment Admiral Stoddart was perfectly safe. With the long peninsula of South America between him and the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, there was no longer any need for him to keep tho Defence. She could join Cradock for what we must hope would be an early battle. After surveying the new situation we telegraphed to Admiral Stoddart as follows:— (Sent 6.20 p.m., November 3.) Defence to proceed to join Admiral Cradock on West Coast of America with all possible despatch. Acknowledge. This telegram was initialled by Admiral Sturdee, Lord Fisher, and myself. We also telegraphed to Admiral Cradock once more reiterating the instructions about the Canopus:— (Sent 6.55 p.m., November 3.) Defence has been ordered with all despatch to join your flag. Glasgow should find or in touch with tho enemy. You should keep touch with Glasgow concentrating the rest of your squadron including Canopus. It is important you should effect your junction with Defence at earliest possible moment, subject to keeping touch with Glasgow and enemy. Enemy Supposes you at Corcovados Bay. Acknowledge. But we were already talking to the void. When I opened my boxes nt 7 o’clock on the morning of November 4 1 read the following telegram:— * Possibly mutilated in transmission.

Maclean, Valparaiso, to Admiralty. (Sent November 3, 1914, 6.10 p.m.) Chilean Admiral has just informed mo that German Admiral states that on Sunday at sunset, in thick and wicked weather, his ships met Good Hope, Glasgow, Monmouth, and Otranto. Action was joined, and Monmouth turned over and sank after about an Imtir’s fighting. Good Hope, Glasgow, and Otr'anto drew off into darkness. _ Good Hope was on fire, an explosion was heard, and she is believed to have sunk. Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Nurnberg were among the German ships engaged. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. The story of what had happened, so far as it ever can be known, is now familiar, it is fully set out in the official History, and need only be summarised here. Arrived on the Chilean coast, having refuelled at a lonely island, and hearing that the British light-cruiser Glasgow was at Coronel, Admiral von Spec determined to make an attempt to cut her off, and with this intention steamed southward on November 1 with his whole squadron. By good fortune the Glasgow left harbour before it was too late. Almost at the same moment Admiral Cradock began his sweep northward, hoping to catch the Leipzig, whose wireless had been heard repeatedly by the Glasgow. He was rejoined by the Glasgow at half-past two; and the whole squadron proceed northward abreast about fifteen miles apart. At about halfpast four the smoke of several vessels was seen to the northward, and in another quarter of an hour the Glasgow was able to identify the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and a German light cruiser. The Canopus was nearly 300 miles away. Was there still time to refuse action? Undoubtedly there was. The Good Hope and Monmouth had normal speeds ot 23 knots and 22.4 respectively, and could certainly steam 21 knots in company that day. The Glasgow could' steam over US. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had nominal speeds of 23.2 and 23.5; but they had been long in southern seas and out of dock. On the knowledge he possessed at that moment Admiral Cradock would have been 'liberal in allowing them Rough weather would reduce speeds equally on both sides. Had he turned at once, and by standing out to sea ottered a stern chase to the enemy, he could only be overhauled one knot each hour. When the enemy was sighted by the Glasgow at 4.45, the nearest armoured ships were about 23 miles apart. There were scarcely two hours to sundown and less than three to darkness.

But the Otranto was a possible complication. She could only steam 18 knots, and against the head sea during the action she did, in fact, only steam 15 knots. As this weak, slow ship had been for some unexplained reason sent on ahead with the Glasgow, she was at the moment of sighting the enemy only 17 miles distant. Assuming that Admiral von Spee could steam 22 knots, less three for the head sea, i.e., 19, he would overhaul the Otranto four knots an hour. On this he might have brought her under longrange fire as darkness closed in. To that extent she reduced the speed of the British squadron and diminished their chances of safety. This may have weighed with Admiral Cradock. We now know, of course, that in spite of being cumbered with the Otranto he could as it happened easily and certainly have declined action had he attempted to do so. At the moment of being sighted Admiral von Spee had only steam for 14 knots, and had to light two more boilers to realise his full speed. Moreover the ships were dispersed. To concentrate and gain speed took an hour and a half off the brief daylight, during which the British ships would actually have been increasing their distance. Moreover, in the chase and battle of the Falklands the greatest speed ever developed by the Schujrnhorst and Gneisenau did not exceed 20 knots in favourable weather. There is therefore no doubt ho could have got away untouched. But nothing was farther from the mind of Admiral Cradock. He instantly decided to attack. As soon as the Glasgow had sighted the enemy, she had turned back'towards the flagship, proceded by the Monmouth and the Otranto, all returning at full speed. But Admiral Cradock at <5.10 ordered the squadron to concentrate not on his flagship the Good Hope, the farthest ship from the enemy, but on the Glasgow, which, through retreating rapidly, was still the nearest. At 6.18 he signalled to the distant Canopus: “I am now going to attack the enemy.” The decision to fight sealed his fate, and, more than that, the fate of the squadron.

.THE STORY OF THE ACTION. To quote the log of the Glasgow: “The British Squadron turned to port four points together towards the enemy with a view to closing them and forcing them to action before sunset, which if successful would have put them at a great disadvantage owing to tho British Squadron being between the enemy and the sun.” The German Admiral easily evaded this manoeuvre by turning away towards the land and keeping at a range of at least 18,000 yards. Both squadrons were now steaming southward on slightly converging courses —the British to seaward with the setting sun behind them, and the Germans nearer tho land. And now began the saddest naval action in the war. Of the officers and men in both squadrons that faced each other in these stormy seas so far from home nine out of ten were doomed to perish. The British were to die that night; tho Germans 3, month later. At 7 o’clock the sun sank beneath the horizon, and the German Admiral, no longer dazzled by its rays, opened fire. The British ships were silhouetted against the afterglow, while the Germans were hardly visible against the dark background of the Chilean coast. A complete reversal of advantage had taken place. The sea was high, and the main deck 6-inch guns both of the Monmouth and of the Good Hope must have been much affected by the dashing spray. The Gorman batteries all mounted modern fashion on the upper deck, suffered no corresponding disadvantage from tho rough weather. The unequal contest lasted less than an hour. One of the earliest German salvoes probably disabled the Good Hope’s forward 9.2-inch gun, which was not fired throughout the action. Both she and the Monmouth were soon on fire. Darkness came on and tho sea increased in violence, till the Good Hope, after a great explosion, became only a glowing speck, which was presently extinguished; and the Monmouth, absolutely helpless, but refusing to surrender, was destroyed by the Nurnberg, and foundered, like her consort, with her flag still flying. Tho Otranto, an unarmoured merchantman, quite incapable of taking part in the action, rightly held her distance and disappeared into the gloom. Only the little Glasgow, which miraculously escaped fatal damage among the heavy salvoes, continued the action until she was left alone in darkness on the stormy seas. There were no survivors from the two British ships; all perished from Admiral to seaman. The Germans had no loss of life. Quoth the Glasgow (Midnight, November 16): — . . . . Throughout the engagement tho conduct of officers and men was entirely admirable. Perfect discipline and coolness prevailed under trying circumstances of receiving considerable volume of fire without being able to make adequate return. The men behaved exactly as though at battle practice; there were no signs of wild fire, and when the target was invisible the gunlayers ceased firing of their own accord. Spirit of officers and ship s company of Glasgow is entirely. unimpaired by serious reverse in which they took part, and that the ship may be quickly restored to a condition 111 which she can taka part 111 further operations against the same enemy is the unanimous wish of us all.

This, as it happened, they were not to be denied.

On Monday—Cradock avenged: British victory at the Falklands.