POLITICAL ACTION.

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 8, 4 October 1919, Page 4

POLITICAL ACTION.

BY RETURNED SOLDIERS

THE CASE EXAMINED

The proposal that the New Zealand Returned Soldiers' Association should bocomo a political body, which was solidly rejected by the Christchuroh conference of tho association in Alny last, is again to be brought forward at tho Dominion conference of tho association in tho middle of October. In this article, which has been contributed by a returned soldier, tho proposal has been critically examined. " Tho Case for Political Action. A close examination of the newspaper reports of the debate on political action at .the Christchurch conference of tho K.Z.R.S.A. in May last disclosed tho somewhat startling fact that tho case for the proposed action was as remarkable in its weakness as the case advanced by those who opposed it. The fact that an important conference should have wasted so much time in listening to illogical assertion and monotonous reiteration is not a creditable record for a ■ conference whoso work on other questions was remarkable. ' Vioiled down tho arguments for political action were as follow:— (a)The assertion that the R.S.A. had failed ignoininiously in its work, and, without the submission of a shred of further evidence, tho contention that political- action would succeed. The reply to this argument is simple. Firstly, it is illogical, because thcro is no necessary connection between the first isserlion and the second. Tho vital importance, of thio logical connecting link was lost sight of by both parties in tho emotional enumeration of ''injustices" by the partisans of the new policy. No evidence was adduced to show that political action was not merely a bold plunge into extinction.Secondly, the first assertion is obviously false. Only those who are incurably biassed, or 'hopelessly ignorant of>'the experiences of tiro returned soldier during tlio past three years, csin fail to recognieo the valuo of the work of tho R.S.A., of which a recently' published summary of R.S.A. operations, not to mention the recent concessions by tho Minister Defence of the R;S.A. claims, aro conclusive evidence. It is also note-' worthy, as a commentary on the suggestion that' even a thrwit oi pclirical action- would be likely to force tho hand of tho Government, that the recent concessions of tlio Government to the claims of the R.S.A. took place after tho proposal for political action had been thrown out decisively at the Christchurch conferenco. (b) The argument that the Returned Soldiers' Association could command 160,003 votes. This is obviously fallacious, as aW is the deduction from it, that thosa votes could be relied upon in support of a ■ particular platform. It must be remembered that to finance whatever proposals the R.S.A. puts forward someono must find the money, and among tho people who do very many will bo returned soldiers. 'In tho case of tho gratuity, for instance, in many cases the eoldier will simply lio transferring his 'money out of ono pocket into another. In' other cases, if ho is wealthy, he will bo paying out more money than lie receives. The fact? that the returned soldier as a . citizen must find his share of the futuro annual charge to the i-ountixVu'isihir ,-ut of war liabilities is not to lie. obviated by political action, but rather emphasised, ft will rather cause him to examine R.S.A. doinands more closely and critically. While tho supporters of political action will abuse siuy l/viP'ieu — iuj- - i.i thinks in this way, the votes of these men cannot be ignored by those who profess to calculate their voting strength.' Tho undoubted effect of political organisation within the association would be to tempt the supporters of each existing political party to influence the choice of the association in favour of their party candidate. Tho tendency would be for many of those whoso representatives failed to secure selection 'in ■•etn- - " <o \«ie for the candidate selected. This is a human weakness which is obvious to all but those whose faith in political action : has-minded them to realities. -'.When it, is further considered that many will re- ■ sent any attempt by an organisation to influence, their vote, it will be realised that any effort to capture and direct tho voting of returned soldiers is likely to result in much less support for a given policy than the association's present policy of Heaving the returned soldier alone to make his personal and privato decision. It is ridiculous to suppose that oven ( a large proportion of such a cosmopolitan group as SO.OOO returned soldiers could be induced to vote en bloc on any issue whatever—much less on cucli issues as aro involved in the generafduestion of a square deal for tho soldier. It is further to be vowml'pred tli:>'- fi-»rv w>l" Ic*is a double loss in effect, because if oxercissd for the. opposition it neutralises a further R.S.A. vote. When to these considerations is added the fact that returned soldiers aro so evenly distributed throughout New.Zealand that they would everywhere or nowhere, it will be realised what an illusion is tho case for political action. ■(c) The assumption by tho advocates of political action that seats in Parliament aro the seats » of the mighty, and that the pos- ' session of a majority of such scats is sufficient to runrnntee the passing of any legislation that may be desired. In tiiis assumption there . is some room for more than a suspicion that their visions are coloured by the anticipation of themselves as occupants, but a rudimentary knowledge, of political machinery would <i:spbl their illusion. What is generally described ns traitorous conduct en the part of the member to his electors is due \ny frequenf.lv to his discovery that his power in Parliament is only a vestige of what he had anticipated. The advocates of political-action, who frequently denounce all politicians ns corrupt, have been confronted with the pertinent remark that these are the people to whom they propose to commit the destinies of the R.S.A. Their reply that they will secure signed pledges, anil that tho.oav of "scraps of paper" is pas', will readily be recognised, as .typical of the claptrap of the venal politician.-. Tho Case Against Political Action. If, will bo seen that the case for political action has been based on grounds which havo been shown to be false, and it remains to be considered what reason.-; can be advanced, against it. These may bo summarised as follows:— 1. The development of an orgauisation for political purposes requires :— , (a) Time.—lf the proposals are adopted at the forthcoming R.S.A. conferenco just six weeks will be left for this purpose. It, is notablo that one of tho arguments urged at the Christchurch conference months ago in support of political action was that it was then a case of "Now or never." (b) Internal Organisation.—The inlcrnal organisation of- local returned soldiers' associations has not been framed for political purposes, and is uniformly unreadv for tho work, the extent anil complexity of which is entirely unrealised. (c) Money,—Tho amount necessary for fighting SI) elections, at £iOO cuh, is £18,000. All scats need not bo contested, and others will bo contested by candidates who will privately find the necessary funds, but failing these tho association must either sell its vote to other organisations or find its own money. Neither course is an attractive one. (d) Leadership.—The leadership necessary must be strong, clear thinking, nt a. character to command publio confidence, nnd experienced in political warfare. It is for returned soldiers to judge to what extent the association is likely to secure such leadership, which can be looked for only among tho advocates of political action. 2. No political organisation which is going to bo effectivo can afford' to remain non-party. The very fact of its ! being called into existonco implies Wmt an issue has to bo fought, nnd this in turn implies opposition. Whether the new organisation attaches itself to an existing party, or whether its policy creates new party divisions, _ is immaterial—the party principle is undeniable. The "non-party" political proposal is a figment of lino imagination, nnd can only carry weight with those who fail to.

comprehend the real Issues and \vhos«< thinking on the point is shallow. It is noteworthy that tho Auckland R.S.A., which for somo time insisted strictly on its "non-parly" proposals, finally realised their futility, confessed its own selfish aim in tlib programme which it had laid down, and camouflaged the said selfishness in a so-called "national" programme, tihe chief merit of which apparently was that it was calculated to attract additional support for tlio strictly returned soldier planks of the platform. _ il. Even if political action should gaira immediate ends, it cannot secure then ■'future position. What is won hy tho political sword must he hold by tho political sword. In m far as immediate cash payments to tho soldier are concorned, tiliey are not recoverable if a. rival party comes into power. But tho eamo is not truo of pensions, repatriation and land settlement. Particularly in regard to tho last-named any concessions wrung by political action from & reluctant country will bo revoked or nullified so soon as the inevitable sway of tho political pendulum returns flia next party to power. If a break in prices takes place in ths> near future, failing n benevolent administration which will in necessitous cases revise capital values and defer, capitalise, or wipe off inteiest due, tho returned soldier settled under the Discharged Soldieus'. Settlement or Repatriation Acts will be facing bankruptcy. It is then that'the returned soldier who has not been able to "dig in" will be, mora than ever before, in need of sympathetic treatment from a public which will ho much.more likely to say: "You despised our assistance and appealed to the (political machine—you can now stand the racket just the"same as everybody else." Nw-hpro is tiliis (prospective publio •hostility more likely to work to the detriment of the returner] soldier than im the ease of pensions. Tho present standard of nrospnritv in New Zealand is unlikely to continue for ever. If taxation becomes burdensome relief will be looked for and may be expected from two sources Hi) Increased production; (2) retrenchment. Both conditions pointdirectly to soldiers' pensions. A generous pension scale tends to discourage irwn work, than is necessary, and tho taxation necessary to produce it will baft largo annual item. When the war has been practically forgotten, and all classes are feeling tho burden, cases will be cited of soldiers with a pension .large enough to subsist, on who could do something, but aro doing nothing A reduction in tho pension scale will relieve taxation, and will bo calculated ,to encourage production. . How can a diminishing soldier vote stem the popular move,- in this direction? Even if it were, possible to develop a political machine of the typo proposed U would not survive more than a limited ponod. Even the rosy, estimates of its voting strength by its advocates do not .contemplate more than the E.S.A, holding the balance of power. Tho voting strength 'of the E.S.A. will be continually, decreasing by deaths of members and continuous losses as tlio particular E.S.A. objects diminish in importance in comparison with future problems. No voting reinforcements aro forthcoming. On _ the other hand, the problem of the incapacitated man and of dependants will be a very important one for many years to come., Owing to war serv'ce many .>x-*oldiers, though relatively fit now, will break down in health at i* much earlier ago and perhaps much mora suddenly than they otherwise would. New aspects of. dependency and incapacity questions, will .arise, and it is then, that tho soldier will need the support; of the well-informed, and sympathetic public opinion which the work .of the R.S.A. has already been successful in so largely developing, and which the advocates of political action do r.otjiesitato to jettison for the sake of temporary and largely illusory advantages. <1. By Press and public, political action by the R.S.A. has been uniformly condemned. This fact, however, docs not deter its partisans. They demand for themselves recognition as the only genuine friends of tho soldier. Criticism of their proposals, and warnings of their probable- fate, can (according to them) originate only in questionable motives. In their viow the condition .of tho exsoldier is so desperate .that they areprepared to risk all in'one heroic and 'spectacular frontal attack to secure justice.for. him.. .(It,:,is. noteworthy.-.that they must have employed moro discreot methods on service at tho front.) But no ouo who has studied the facts will agree with them, either 'in ; their diagnoses of the case, or In the remedy they suggest. 'While there remains much for tlio R.S.A. to do, much has already been, done, and nothing than an appeal to the political' sword will destroy moro quickly tho confidence? with . which the public has come to regard tho work of iho R.S.A., and on the basis of which the future can be confidently faced.