NAVAL DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 78, 27 December 1918, Page 5

NAVAL DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

AUSTRALIAN PLANS TO BE REVISED

IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT

An important announcement of the Ministry's intentions in relation to the naval defence of the Commonwealth .was made by tho Acting-Brime Minister (Mr. Watt) in tho House of Representatives some days ago. The statement was supplied 111 committee upon the further consideration of the Loan Bill for J1,242,191. Mr. Watt Fftid that as a result of the recommendations of Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson in 1911 the Commonwealth Government had embarked upon a course 01 naval, ship, and base construction 011 the lines recommended by hiiu. Since the war had broken out that programing had fallen somewhat into arrear, both as to shipbuilding ond base construction. The viow had been strongly expressed throughout Australia, irrespective of party, that tho Commonwealth authority should pause during the war and not push 011 with any work involved in Admiral Henderson's scheme. (Ministerial cheers.) He was not responsible tor tho fact that other Ministers during the early period of the war had felt that it would be dangerous to yield to that call, but he did share the view that Australia should prepare until the lessons of the war were- more fully known. When ho became one upon whom responsibility fell as a member of the Ministry, he felt that wo should go on until wo had fuller light.

Advice from Admiralty. Tho Ministry' had' been endeavouring for tho past fifteen or sixteen months to seo whether the Admiralty authorities were ablo to adviso Australia as to

whether Admiral Henderson's programme should he modified. Various cable mes. sages had been exchanged through tho Naval Board with tho Lords of tho Admiralty upon this question, and tentative advice had been on several occasions ?i von ' l ""Stance of the advice was that the Lords of tho Admiralty and their export staff would not attempt a final opinion in this matter, in view of tho enormous pfesMfo upon them; but they gave for -the interim guidance of the Australian authorities cortain advice. That advice on more than ono occasion had been to the effect—(l) To push on with tho first stago of the Henderson base programme which the minister for Works (Mr. Groom) had rocentlv stated would cost about .£5,c00,000; (2)' to postpono at present nil operations for tho second stage of that baso work; (3) to completo tho Flinders basons at present designed uppn Admiral Henderson's ro. port. The completion of tho Flinders naval baso involved tho transfer of the naval depot at Willianistown to Flinders, and as tho work at tho baso was so nearly completed the Ministry had observed that programme and had pushed ?? " l 0 wol 'k' Broadly speaking, . t &..& vm " acnt llatl s P cllt between i..)C0,000 and .£"50,000 on tho base, and between .£150,000 find .£IOO,OOO would completo it, including provision for water. Ur tho former sum a large amount had been wasted, but ho would say no'more than that it had not been dono by those new in authority, Mr. Fowler (Nat., W.A.): It has been done by thoso m authority in tho face of frequent protest. Mr. Watt: The voice of conscience. Mr. l'owler: Tho voice of truth. ~M'r- Watt: One other mattor iu which tho Ministry was naturally interested was the extension of tho shipbuilding yards at Willianistown. That would be possible by tho removal of Jho naval depot to Minders. Tontativo advico renoivledilfrom the British Admiralty was that the main portion of the Sydnoy base should ba also 'completed. The experts of the Admiralty had rounded oil" their recommendations by a drag-net statement that all other propositions associated with the base portion of Admiral Henderson's prograiumo should bo suspended. Tho Ministry had not beon spending very much at Sydney, and he was not in a position to say how much niore would ba spent. He was making inquiries into that.

Lessons of the War. The Ministry had come lo the conclusion that it would not bo fair to asi thoso expert advisers of the British Government to .take their eyes away from the immediate scenß of the war to givo us any final advice. It had become perfectly plain, to the Ministry that the Admiralty experts were not prepared to commit themselves to the statement that this war had not taught thorn some naval lessons. His own impression of their view was that tlio under-water craft might cause a revision of some of what wero known as the capital base systems of tho British Empire. leather than proceed at full pace the Ministry had,' during the last tew months, placed the Minister for the Navy (Sir Joseph Cook) m touch with tho advisers of tho British Government on naval affairs. Sir Joseph Cook had been in closo contact with them, and his advice to the Commonwealth Ministry was that it should get from the British Admiralty a vigor, ous, 'bold, ami expert man to visit Australia—a man who was well versed in the teachings of this war and. the outlook from this as well as other portions of the Empire—to take another view of the naval base posiiton in Australia. The Ministry believed that Sir Joseph Cook would be able to arrange very shortly for the visit to Australia of one of the most eminent admirals of tho British Fleet. (Applause.) After leceiving that information from Sir Joseph Cook the Ministry had asked him to confer with tho authorities as to the advisability of suspending even the works it had determined to go on with. Sir Joseph Cook's advice, after consulting with thoso authorities, and ascertaining c-xactly the stage we had reached in every section of the main works, was to suspend all work at the Henderson naval base, except protective works to guard the dredging and reclamation work already done— what might in popular parlance be called salvage work—until the now adviser, was able to visit Australia.

Sir Joseph Cook' believed that the Flinders base should be finished. The Ministry had authorised him (Mr. Watt) to announce that it did not propose to do any work at tlio Henderson base other than that which was considered to be protective and necessary pending the further report. That would involve tho question whether the Ministry proposed lo revive the schedule to tho Bill before the committee. Ho could not say at that stage how much this would save, but ho could give tlio assurance that in preparing the schedule he had cut as deep as he could, and had given a more limited programme for the twelve months. Six months)' expenditure had been authorised, and five months of that period had already gono. Mr. M Williams (Nat.. T.) : It is the usual way we deal with exnenditure.

Mr. Watt: It would be imprudent to ask that an eminent authority from the British Admiralty should look only at tho base programme, because the base and fleot programmes were supposed to be coordinated. It would be ridiculous to cut down tho bases until they were insufficient for the fleet, or cut down tho fleet until it was below tho accommodation of the bases. The visiting expert would, of course, take into account the fleet and the base programmes.

Federal Arsenal. is to the arsenal, continued Mr. Watt, past Ministers had deeiucn it advisable lo prepare l'oi the equipment from tho standpoint of certain classes of arms and ammunition for our land forces. Tho difficulty for upwards of four years was to get somewhere in Australia the nucleus of ft great arsenal system. The. intention was not to establish at present an arsenal that would manufacture all that our held ibices might need, but to establish a centre that would bo capable of expansion to organisations outside in time of war. After inquiry by several committees, the Ministry had finally selected a site for the .arsenal at Tuggeranong. The ditiiculty, however, which tbe Ministry hail at tho tiino the site was selected was that it could not be sure that it had obtained tho very best expert ijflvice on the arsenal itself. Australia's knowledge of arsenals was largely hearsay. When the Commonwealth sent Home Mr. Lcighton to gather information ho was placed in a very high position in the Munitions Ministry in Great Britain, whero he had been ever since, doing work of the

utmost v;Jue to tho British Munitions Deportment. Mr. Leighton stood amongst tho first few men who had been discharging that important responsibility. Tho armistice enabled Australia now to get not only Sir. Leighton back, with his knowledgo and prestige, but also experts of every kind. They would advise the Ministry upon tho location, tho lay out, organisation, and capitalisation of tho arsenal, with all the light of war experience. Instead of having to lay out a large sum of money for machinery and equipment at war cost, the Ministry would bo able to get them at a very much more moderate price from tho munitions factories that were about to he scrapped in Great Britain. Those main considerations hnd caused the Ministry to pause at this stage of the arsenal and arsenal railway problem. Looking to tho Future. Last year lie (Mr. Watt) had committed himself to the statement that it was essential to push on with the arsenal/ and lie held tho same opinion now. Any dominion, whatever tho final peace terms might "be, that would stay in absolute unproparedness for the future, would bo living in a fool's paradise. A country separated from its Mother Country and iis natural allies by so many thousand leagues of ocean would act in defiance of experience if it did not propare for crises that might aviso in its future history. It would still be wise to push v 1 with arsenal preparations. This yanse was therefore not an abandonment of tho project. It was a cessation of operations and of expenditure until we could make sure that we were 'Ming along the right, linos according lo tho most modorn advico obtainable. They realised what unpreparedness had cost the Empire in the war from which I hey had just come, and they lyiew enough from the teachings of mankind that it might be repealed., They wauled to inako sure that afler the heavy load of debt when they were finished.'the war Hint the expenditure lo bo incurred for the future safety of tho country was prudently incurred. (Cheers.)