THE AMATEUR IN WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 288, 24 August 1918, Page 7

THE AMATEUR IN WAR

HIS DANGER FORETOLD

' . ! WHEN CIVILIAN CONTROL

BECOMES A MENACE

The London "Morning I'osl" some time ago, when the situation in tho \\ est was less promising than it is to-day, discanted on the dangers of civilian authority on tho conduct of the war:— The whole present situation, due to the intervention of the amateur 'n the conduct of war (says the "Morning Post"), was exactly anticipated some twenty years ago by' our foremost writer on military • affairs: In tho article "War" (contributed to th-5 "Encyclopaedia Britannioa Supplement," 1902, and afterwards reprinted-as tho first study4il.his posthumous and now classic volume "The Science-of: War"), Colonel G. F. K. Henderson tr.eated this tbpme exhaustively. There could'bo no greater authority. From the excerpts ■ that follow it Eill be seen that Colonel Henderson dovSlops his argument as if precisely the present, crisis were in his mind's eye. Events have confirmed his prescience completely. - - -- The Soldier a Specialist. ' Having shown that the preponderating influence, o.f the trained- mind was made manifest in 1866 and 1870, the writer .points out how, nei crtlnless, the ordinary layman failed to regard the soldier as, a specialist. Few Anglo-Saxons,, for example, he says:— ; "aro not secretly convinced that with some knowledge of drill they would bp most formidable rivals.to the officers of/ the German General Staff, and many of the fiercest critics of the professional soldier are in exactly the same case as tho Austrians of 18fi6 and the French of 1870. They believe that thev possess th<* r.'ilitary virtues, that they are fearless, cool, and resoluta, and they flatter .themselves that they are .fitted with sufficient eoio-mon-sense to. enable them to decide wisely. and promptly in critical moments." In a nation of sportsmen especially, lie continues,' there is in this a certain . amount of right, but it is forgotten that common sense, to be a useful, guide, must :s)e "trained common sense, fortified by knowledge and' increased by -practice." Moreover with strategy—the operations which lead up to battle, and those ».vhich follow "battle^—the. ordinary military virtues, that shine in encounters, are not directly, concerned; Blind People and Representatives. But the ; popular "idea that war is a mere matter of brute redeemed only by valour and discipline, ho goes on,' "is responsible tor . a greater evil than the complacency of the amateur. It blinds both the people and its representatives to their tounden duty." Wai', he says, is something more tlian a mere outgrowth of politics. "H : ar is abovo alt a practical art, and tho application of theory to practice is' not to Bo taught at a'-university or to be learned by those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in -the ranks.' Hut if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, tue importance of organisation, of training, of education, and of readiness would be more generally appreciated j- abuse's would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a- political catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming 1 , masters of every detail of their profession. ' Nor is this all. A nation that understood something about war would hardly sutfer.'the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the beatmeaning statesmen. And statesmen themselves would realise that-when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless." • And the importance of all this increases' Tvith time. The day is completely gone when Cabinets could direct strategical operations without bringing ruin on their respective countries.' Those were tunes when amateur was pitted against amateur. But the amateur "can no longer expect the good fortune to be pitted against foes of a capacity no higher than' his own. Tho operations of Continental '-armies -will - be'-'directed-• by soldiers 'of ■experience whoso training for war has been incessant, and who ■ will have at their command troops in the highest ■ state of efficiency and preparation. It is not difficult to imagine, under such conditions, with'what condign punishment mistakes will be visited." Minsters and Military. The argument then proceeds to show .wherein lies , the value of the civilian Minister of. sorno knowledge of war. However deeply' ho had studied the art of war he could not be expected to solve for himself, the strategic problems which eomo before him. ■ "His foresight, his prevision of the accideuts inevitable in war, would necessarily be far inferior to those of men who had spent their lives in applying strategical principles to concrete cases; 'and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would be as prolific of • strategical expedients as those familiar with their employment. : Nevertheless, although ho would -be more or less bound by expert advice! and although he might be siwaro ■that the attempt to control military operations, even,so far -as regards the preliminaries of a campaign, is a most dangerous proceeding, yet a knowledge of ,war could hardly -Hiil to serve him ingood stead." ' , And then, basing on Dr. Arnold's remarks (in "Lectures on _ Modern History") on unprofessional judgment .on a ,professional subject) Colonel Henderson' adopts their conclusion that the distinction between unprofessional judgment -.that is competent and unprofessional that is presumption and folly "lies originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing and that of, perceiving whether it is well done or not.'' Jt is. in a word, the detail of his practice that we understand least in the profession of another. -. • Frontier of Folly. And so the writer reaches the culmination, of his argument—its application of tlies'e principles to statecrtUt—which is so pertinent 10 the situation at this mo- . uient. "The point where civilian control of military operations becomes presumptuous," he says, "as well as the exlent of that control, may be easily defined." "In the first place, to frame a sound strategical plan, whether/'for defence or .invasion, requires not only an intimate 'acquaintance with innumerable details of which only a professional soldier can really judge, such as methods of supply and transport, the use of fortifications, the effects of climate, the maintciianco of the lines of connijunicntioii, the value of positions, the management of inarches, the moral, armament, organisation, tactics and resources of the opposing forces, but an intimate acquaintance with tho principle)? and stratagems of war. . It is hern that the amateur strategist fail'.. He may have read ei/jugh to give him a good knowledge of principles, but he -has no knowledge of the practical difficulties of war, and his criticism, as a general rule, is consequently of little value. All war is simple, but the simple is most difficult, and how difficult only those who have made.it, who.have wit r nessed with, their own eye 3 the turmoil, the confusion, tho friction, which, even in the host armies, attend the most ordinary operating, aro in a position 10. understand. Even a theoretical acquaintance. derived from 'historical study of the practice,! difficulties, is insufficient. Unless ho who prepares a strategical plan has before his mind's evn » eloir nature of all military operations, of lnarchii'K. riunrlerimr. sunnly, cutrninin?. and detraining, embarkation, and debarkation, and a nerson'al knowledge of the difficulties jwliich attend on war. his work will be of liflip value. It, is ewntial too that he should have a thorough' knowledge of 1 >o' h. officers and ni n n, of the pr'cil- - chnrade'-istio* of the Armv, and of th" system on which it works, of its eh-ong points, and its weak. A G»rnwn,' suddenly pined in'command of British soldiers, would b« much at. s»a. and v'ce versa. Every arinv Ins an individuality of its own. Tl- is a, livintr organism "f a very sonsifive IcmTiT.. and it can H"ith"r be properly controlled nor efficiently directed "xcenl Viv those who n\v in full sympathy wif'i il« pycrv impulse." The Conclusion. And here is the ultimate conclusion at Trfiich Colonel Henderson arrived sixteen, years ago—full of significance-'now when events so entirely- confirm it: fit would appeaj, then, that whiter a

statesman may bo competent to appreciato the general principles of the projects of operations laid before him, lie should never attempt; to frame a project for liimself. Still less, when once_ ho has approved of a plan nf campaign, should lie attempt to limit tho number of troops to oo employed, or lo assign the position of the necessary detachments. Nevertheless, a knowledge of' war may stilt be exceedingly useful to him. A Minister of War cannot divest, himself of his responsibility for Iho conduct of military oporivtions. In (ho first placo, he is directly responsible for plans of campaign to meet every possible contingency being worked out. in time of peace. In the second 'place, ho is directly responsible for the advice oil which ho acts being the bwt procurable. It is essential, Iherefove, that he should be capable of forming an independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may bo submitted to him, and also on tho merits of thoso who have to execute them."