The Dominion. THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 1918. A HESITATING PARTNER

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 280, 15 August 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 1918. A HESITATING PARTNER

Few nations engaged in this war have a/ worse record than Bulgaria. She entered the arena under the influence of a bribe—the cession of a coveted tract of Turkish territory —and frankly bent on plunder. If at this stage the possibility of detaching Bulgaria- from her present allegiance is commanding some ■attention, it is assuredly not because there is any moral sympathy between her and the Allies. What does attract notice is that there is a good deal in the existing state of affairs which is well calculated to? make Bulgaria seriously reconsider the policy to which she has adhered since she joined tho Central Empires in an attack on Serbia. She has no hope of gaining any more plunder, and is troubled by uneasy doubts about being allowed to retain what she already holds. Taking account, further, of the warweariness of her population, accentuated by shortage of food and in other ways, it cannot be doubted that she would gladly get out of tho war if a way of escape presented itself. Whether it is possible to detach her from the,' Germanic Alliance- on terms acceptable to the' Entente is, of course, another question. The' Allies aro pledged to exact all possible reparation for Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, and can mako no arrangement with Bulgaria that would conflict with duty and obligation to their _ Balkan partners. _ An understanding with Bulgaria is thus opposed by "formidably difficulties, but it is not necessarily impossible of attainment. There is every reason to believe that Bulgaria, actuated by motives of self-interest, is restive in. her present vassalage, and much inclined to break away... .In thesecircumstances it should not'be beyond the resources of Allied diplomacy to detach her from the Central Empires, and this without injustico to\Serbia, Rumania, or Greece Tire incentive to _ turn opportunities in this direction to account is evidently powerful. Owing to her geographical situation the adhesion of Bulgaria to one side or the other in the war has an importance much more than proportionate to her standing as a military power. Her defection would at once make Turkey's position hopeless. Indeed, fear of seeing Turkey forestall her in making submission to the Entente may easily supply Bulgaria with an additional reason for seeking terms before it is too late. In its direct and indirect results such action would probably enable the Allies to send naval forces into tho Black Sea, and it would givo them much improved prospects of bringing an effectivo pressure of attack to bear on Austria byway of the Balkans.

In light of the broad facto just outlined,' tho fragmentary reports .in regard to internal conditions in Bulgaria which have been coming through during the last few weeks take on a significance they would otherwise lack. In their total effect these reports suggest, at least, that popular unrest and a desire for peace have upon the wholo increased since the Cabinet crisis of two months ago which culminated in the fall of the Radoslavoff Ministry. _ This event was attributed at the time to M. Radoslavofp's failure to get for Bulgaria the wholo of the Dobruja and to dispose finally of Turkey's demand for the return of the strip of Thracian territory With which she bribed. Bulgaria to enter the war. Even German comments, however, mako it plain that this does not cover all 'tho ground. M. Eadoslavoff and his colleagues from first to last adhered obediently to the policy under which King Ferdinand * made his country the servilo instrument of Austro-Gcrman ambitions. They were defeated by a combination of Opposition parties. The now Premier, M. Malinoff, was formerly of decidedly - Russophil sympathies. Before Bulgaria became a belligerent he urged the King to preserve neutrality, "but if fight he must to fight on tho side of the Allies." M. ■Mamnoff is supported not only by those who share his views, but by tho Stambulovists, who take a midway position between the Eadoslavoff party and its extreme opponents. It is, of course, recognised that the collapse of Russia and the course of the war generally have greatly modified the attitud'o of ,the political 'party in* Bulgaria which formerly took its cue from Russia. Nevertheless,'the very insistence with which German commentators maintain that the change of Government in Bulgaria implies no change of policy betrays anxiety. For instance, the Berliner Zeitunp am Millar/ wrote on the subject that The foreign policy of any [Bulgarian] Government composed of persons belonging to the present Opposition Ti.e., the followers of M. Malinoff and the Stambulovists] will continue in the direction which has been given to it by the King and M. Radoslavoff since the beginning of tho war, mid which has led to such brilliant results. Tho Russophil parties iu Bulgaria have long since seen and have openly admitted the enormous value of Bulgaria's alliance with the Central Powers. It is considered possible that M. Radoslavoff will be unanimously elected President of the Sobrnnje in testimony to Bulgaria's fidelity to the Central Powers and to tho continuity of her foreign policy. The obvious weakness of the position here stated is tho reliance placed on past events as an influence in maintaining future stability. ■ It is no doubt true that the Russophil parties in Bulgaria were for &• timo silenced, if they were not converted outright to tho 'rjolicy of the King and M. Radoslavoff. But it is precisely because the "brilliant _ results" of which the German writer makes so much seem as time goes on less likc-

ly to endure that these parties have an evident incentive to revert to their former attitude, or, at all events, to look for a way of cscano from Austro-Cerman toils. • The change of Government has led to no immediate change in Bulgarian policy. That it portends no such ■change seems much less certain. It has heen said that King Ferdinand is the master who dictates Bulgaria's foreign policy, .and that his Ministers are merely, servants and mouthpieces. This is probably true so far as the past is concerned. Moreover, it is most unlikely that

Ferdinand will voluntarily consent to any change of policy. He owns great estates in Hungary, and the danger of losing them and the revenues they produced would no doubt in itself make him averse to a break with the Central Empires. Any move in that direction in Bulgaria might well be anti-dynastic as well a3 This aspect of the matter lends interest to a message which appears to-day to the effect that the German Press reports that a Republican movement 1 is on foot in Bulgaria. Explicit statements of this kind, however, in regard to a situation which is in fact somewhat ill-defined must be regarded with sonic suspicion. Ferdinand, a wily old schemer, has been accused of conniving at the return of the Opposition parties to .power as a means of inducing his German and Austrian taskmasters to grant better terms in regard to the Dobruja and Thrace. It may be that the Germans are countering his tactics by emphasising the possibility of an anti-dynastic revolt. But while all such details are obscure, there is' no doubt that the broad trend of tho war gives the Bulgars excellent reasons for breaking away from the Germanic Alliance before they are- involved in the ruin with which it is now visibly threatened. A popular movement hostile to Xing Fekdinand and in favour of peace with the Entente is by no means impossible. _ A sympathetic understanding /with Bulgaria is hardly in question, but her people have always had a keen eye to the main chance. For that reason her darkening prospects as a vassal of the Central Empires would seem to confront Allied diplomacy with an opportunity it would bo unwise to neglect.