The Dominion. SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 1918. A KNOTTY PROBLEM

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 241, 29 June 1918, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 1918. A KNOTTY PROBLEM

The news of the last clay or two makes it fairly plain that some more effective policy is demanded of the Allies- in reference to Russia than continued watchful waiting. _ A great deal is left to the imagination; but one point at least is very clearly emphasised: Germany is actively working to extend tier influence in Russia, and, if .she fan, to make it permanent. Ycstcrclay_ it was reported that the Bolsheviki were receiving direct aid from Germany in their campaign against the Czechoslovaks and Siberians. This report, like all others from and concerning- Russia which have come through for months 'paSt, rests' upon no very certain authority, but there is undoubtedly a serious danger that Germany, if she is not prevented, may organise a considerable section of the Russian population for her • own ..ends.. - It. therefore .puts no strain' on faith-to be. told that matters are actually taking - this course. The pretence , of assisting the Bolsheviki against the • Siberian and Uzecho-Slovak forces which, as re-' ports stand, have gained control of a considerable part of Siberia, would serve Germany as well as another in her object of gaining the fullest' possible domination over Russia, There is nothing in the known character or record of the Bolsheviki or their leaders to suggest either that thev will refuse direct assistance from Germany or that, having accepted it, they will escape becoming the instruments of German' ambition. It is bad enough that Russia should be, as Mr. ' Lloyd Geoi:ge declared the other day, in a state of chaos, with governments existing ai' over the place and the situation changing every, hour. But even these calamitous conditions would give place to others infinitely worse if Germany wore enabled cheaply and at. a slight expenditure of effort to organise for her own purposes a considerable part of Russia east of the invaded zone; . With a growing number of people in Russia prepared to- welcome almost any alternative to the chaos reigning, and the Bolsheviki, if they are not traduced, accepting German military aid in their struggle against forces that are both, antiBolshevik and anti-German, there is a very distinct danger that Germany may see such an opportunity open before her,-and may hastfin to turn it to. account. .. Her . partnership with the Bolsheviki, if it has been , entered, into, will, of course, serve | merely as a cloak to cover her real activities. These may be expected to divide under two broad heads. She .will no doubt seek to exploit Russia as a recruiting ground, and, whatever her jiuccess may be in that direction, she will fertainly make every effort to extend her influence as widely as possible and make it permanent. The .first of these activities is probably not that which must be regarded as the most dangerous from the point of view of Russia and that of the Allies. It seems unlikely that even the most successful recruiting in Russia will enable Germany to augment her existing military resources, in time to greatly influence the titanic struggle which is under way in Western Europe, and promises to turn decisively one way. or the other before next winter. But the interests of Russia and the Allies would bo seriously, if not fatally, compromised if the end of the war, whether it comes next year or later, should find Germany not only in military occupation of the western provinces of Russia, but in osten ; sible alliance with one or more of the factions contending for supremacy in the remaining area of the country. Such a state of affairs might easily present problems which would defy either military or political solution, and not only make it impossible to reconstitute Russia as a free and independent nation, but preclude the possibility of enforcing the just and stable peace which isthe goal of Allied hopes. It is an essential condition of a really safe and satisfactory peace that Russia, ! except in so far as she- is affected I by the rcconstitution of an indc- i pendent Poland, shall be fully resfcor- i ed and relieved in all respects of the I curse of German influence and domination. This at best will be difficult on account of the disintegration of what used to be the Russian Empire. It will be ten times, more difficult if Germany is

enabled to conclude an effective partnership with the Bolsheviki or with other Russian factions. Tha developments now reported make it more than ever imperative that the Allies should abandon the standpoint of mere onlookers and devise some means of saving Russia an\.l protecting their own interests. Unfortunately the Allies seem still be undecided in face of this _ gigantic _ problem. There is nothing meantime to show that they have advanced beyond the position indicated by Mu. Lloyd George a day or two ago when he said that - it would be to our interests, and also just and equitable, that wo should stand by .Russia if she desired it. The Allies are willing and anxious to help 1? assia. and in helping her to help themselves, but are puzzled how to d-> it. Some people find in their attitude a repetition of the hesitancy and indecision which have mors than once cost them dear in the East. It has further been suggested that mistrust of Japan, particularly where America is concerned, is a serious obstacle to action, and much emphasis has been . laid also upon the practical difficulties to be overcome should intervention be decided upon. Withoutontircly discarding these explanations, it seems'safe to conclude that the greatest difficulty of all arises from the-extraordinary complexity of the Russian situation and the difficulty of. obtaining anything like a coherent expression of. opinion from the Russian people. M. Kerbnsky, who is row in London, is strongly in favour of united Allied intervention, but it is evident that he has no claim to be regarded as bearing a mandate from any large section of the Russian people. It is quite evident that the most serious obstacle to action is the. disintegration of Russia which has made national expression impossible, and that other obstacles and difficulties, though they exist, are relatively less important. Japan has so fine a record as a loyal and faithful Ally that it is impossible to believe that distrust of her intentions on the part of America or any Entente country accounts for the iniiction of the Allies. As to the military difficulties to be overcome they can hardly be regarded as serious from the point of view of the magnitude of the effort involved. The immediate problem —though not necessarily tuc problem in its total scope—is to restore order in Russia and to defeat such activities as Germany may undertake with the very limited, forces she is now able to spare for'service in the East. The_ Allies have no thought of invading Russia and subjugating its people by military force. Neither aie they called upon in existing conditions to cope with any large German force in Russia; certainly not in Siberia, which is their one practicable avenue of approach to European Russia. The practical question raised meantime is whether the landing in Siberia of a few divisions—a force which Japan, could easily furnish and. transport—might not provide a nucleus around which a great part of the population would gladly rally, with a, view to restoring oi-- ■ derly conditions. > Military action of this scope is almost certainly essential in the first instance if the oeonomic aid Amcrica and other Powers are anxious to render Russia is to be of any avail. Some of the later reports relating !o - the operations of the Czechoslovaks and other forces in Siberia distinctly suggest that hopes of this kind are. reasonable. Current events in Siberia, together with the alleged alliance between Germany and the Bolsheviki, may.; give the Allies the guidance they need and supply the final incentive to a decision in favour of intervention. Whether or not loyal Russian forces are beginning to make effective head against anarchy,, it, is evident that the danger of leaving events to take tKcir course in Russia is extreme. Those who profess to speak with knowledge of Pkesident Wilson's attitude in tho matter say that ho considers it better that Russia should save her own integrity than that- the work of salvation should be undertaken from outside. No doubt the same opinion is general in all Allied countries, but unless reports now under review are strangely misleading, the real question.confronting the Allies is whether or not they- are to passively watch Russia "falling' into hopeless thraldom to Germany. It is admitted that if intervention is decided upon the enterprise can only be undertaken and developed if it carries the good will of at 'least a considerable .majority of the Russian people. But a decision to defer action pending such an invitation from the Russian people as could lie called coherent and representative would for practical purposes imply that all thought of- intervention had been given up. The right policy for the Allies;scems to be to boldly test the possibilities of the situation.