THE REVELATION

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 211, 25 May 1918, Page 2

THE REVELATION

GERMAN PRINCE INDICTS HIS COUNTRY EX-AMBASSADOR'S STORY OF INTRIGUE LICHNOWSKY'S MEMOIRS 11. [The following text of the Lichnow-.-ky pamphlet, jn which the German ex-Ambassador at London tells the story of how his country schemed for war, hiis been received by cable Jrom tho .Ministry of Tnfornialion, London, through Router's Agency Iho pamphlet is of /.■onsiderab'lo length, but is of suck comniandiu" importance as an authoritative indictment of (.iermaii dipiomatie trickcry before t| m Wi \r, and furnishes such a complete, answer to Germany's assertion that she was not responsible tor tho war. that it is doomed desirab 0 to publish it, by instalments, in till. The first instalment; appeared m J jiE Dominion yesterday.]

TUB CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS

Shortly after my arrival in London «t an inluriual conversation, tu prevent the "•'iKaii, v.-ar develop, into a European "if, alto wu j liu i nnfoituniiteJy, n-fiiH-th,. outbreak of the war, ton'™ u> tho .trench proposal of a doclariuiuii ot dismturtMtedness. Tim British statesman, lvoin the very beginning, took up tl'u position that inglmul hiu'l m> intorf»t ui Albania, and had no intention ol going to war over (his question. He greatly wished to mediate between tho iwu groups us an '•honest broker" and smooth over difficulties, lie therefore by n> means took -.-ides with the Entente, and during the eight mouths or so of the negotiations his good-will and his authoritative inilueiico contributed in no small degree- to the attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting n n aliiunit! similar ( 0 (he Knglish one, invariably took up tho position which was prescribed for us by Vienna, (.'on 111 ilensdorff wus the leader of (he Triple Alliance in London, and 1 was his "second.-" It was my duty to support his proposals. •Unit clever uml experienced man, Uunt Hzogyenyi, was conducting affairs m Borliu. His refrain was: "Tlien tho casus focdris' will aviso," iiikl \v!ien J once ventured to doubt lh e truth of (his conclusion 1 was severely reprimanded lor "Aiistrophobiii." It' was also snicl that 1 hud an "hereditary weiikne-y"-llio allusion being to my lather. On all questions wo took sides with Austria and Italy-about Albania, 11 Serbian port on tho Adriatic, Scutari, aud also about, the delimitation of tho frontiers of Albauiavlnlo Sir JMward Grey hardly ever supported the French or Russian claims. On ■tho contrary, ho mostly supported our group 11, order not to give a piretext Wee that a dead Archduko was to furnish inter on. Thus, with his assistance, it was possible to coax King Nikitam out of Scutari ngain. Otherwise this. question would already havo led to a world war, as wo should certainly not havo ventured to induco "our Ally" to give way. Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with, circumspection, calm, nli ' ™ 10 ', 1 !l , f , |Ut,6tio " threatened to l)cconio involved ho (sketched a forZi it Z , ftl;rewi, T t w h 'ol» was to tho point, 1( 1 was always accepted. jji s P rsonahty inspired equal confidence in al the nHi-licip,,«U. As a matter of f.ci, m hat again successfully emerged whiM, 0 "," 0, ,"'. 05e trillls 6treji|th hci characterise our policy. Hueeia lad been obliged to give way to i» on all points, as - s ] le , vas llover in a ; . tion to procure'success for tho Serbian aims Albania was established as a vassal State of Austria, and Serbia was pressed back Irom tho seas k Hence this conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Kussian self-esteem. \ s j u 1878 ami 111 IMS, we had opposed tho Eussian plans, although no "German" intertssls wore involved. Bismarck was c ' ov ? r enough to mitigate the mistake of the Congress by tho secret treaty and by his atlitudo in the Battenberg question; but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous path upon which wo had oncu nioro entered iu tlio UosJiiiiu .({iiestion, nor did we leavo it in time whpn it led to the precipice. The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown during tho conference by attacks in the- Itussian Press against my Russian colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his German descent and lionian Catholicism, his reputation as a' friend of Germany, and tho accident that he yes related both to Count Mensdorlf and to me.. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benckendorff was endowed with a number of qualifications that distinguish a good diplomat—tact, polished manners, exporieiico, courtesy, aud a natural eye for men and matters. Ho was always at pains to avoid a brosque attitude, and was supported in this by England and I'rnnct. Later 1 once remarked to him, "1 presume that Rusfooling is very anti-German?" Ha replied: "Thero are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, but in general the- people are anti-Austrian." It in hardly necessary to add that our friendship for Austria through thick and thin was hardly calculated to loosen tho Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!

THE BALKAN CONFERENCE

At the same time the Balkan Conierenco was sitting in Ixmdon, aud 1 had opportunities of coming into contact; with the leaders ol the Balkan States. ,U. Venizelos was certainly the inost distinguished personality. At that time ho was anything but anti-German and .visitid me several times. He was specially fond of wearing the ribbon of tlie Order of 'tlio J'ed Eiiglc—hu ovon wore it at tho French Kmbn.ssy. His lirepossessing charm and ways of a ni im of tho world secund him much sym, patliy. Next to him M. UanelV, at that time Bulgarian Premier, and conlidant of Count Berchtold, played u greatpart. Ho gave tho impression of an asuto aud ontrgetic man, and it is probably only due to the inlluenco of his Vienna and Budapest friends, of whose homago he sometimes made fun that ho was induced to commit the folly of entering upon tho second Balkan War, and of refusing Kussinn arbiration. if' Take Jonescu was also franieutly in London, Ttiid then visited inn rcgiilnvly I knew him from the timo when I wiis secretary at Bucharest. lln was also one of HeiT von Kiderlcu's friends. Jii ], OJI . don he was ondeavoiiring to obtain concessions to Rumania from M, .DanolV by moims of negotiations, in which he was assisted by the very able Itumnniiin •Vnibiissndor, Misu. .11 is kiiuwn tlml. Jiulgarmii oppostion brought about Hi,, failure of these negotiations Count Berciitold (ind we, of collide, with him were entirely on Bulgaria's side, otherwise Inputting pressure on M. .Danoff, wo nii K h'l have secured tlio desired ent.isfnol.iou for Ivumauia, and placed her under on obliRation to us. Sho was finally <vdnin"<><! from the Central I'owers by .A ii.sli-wi'k ■attitude during and after 'tli« sitdihl Balkan War.

The defeat of Bulgaria in I.lm second Balkan War and Hie victory of Kcrbm with the llmuaninn invasion milnrally constituted u hiimiluition for Ansf.riii. The. plan to rectify this liy ;ui (.xpeilitioti aptniusK Serbia seems in lmvo been evolved in Vienna soon after. • The Ihilian revelations provo this, and j| mn .. |>~ assumed that the Marquis Sun Ciuilinno, who dosenbed tho plan—most iiplly—us n pericolosksiina liiveiiliim, khvi'il" ii-i from beiiiff involved in u. worlil war us curly us the summer of lain. Owinc; In tho intimacy of lliiSMi-llnlinn ri'lnliniis thp Vioniiu plan ivus douhtlcw kninvii in Petroßrnd. Tn liny ense, 11. Snz'iiicilV openly dccliired a! ('nn'.liuizii, an M.'Tiilii.Toneson told me, that an Anslrian allai'l; on Serbia would ]jc a cusns belli \\n!Rusf=iti. When ono of my stair roliirnpil from leave, in Vinnnii in lhi> enritiß of 1014 lio Fiiid tlinl ITe.rr von Tscliir^c.hU v hnd dee.larod (lint I here wmilil soon lie. T.or. As I, however, wns nlirnyn left in ignorance übmit imporlanl i<voiitn, I considered tins pessimism l» lxi unfounded. A«. a matter of foot, it would appear

that ever einci? the pence of Bucharest Vienna was bent on securing n revision of the trwity by her own effort, and was apparently only wnitinjc lor .1 favourable protest. Vienna statesmen oould,_ of course, depend on our support. They wero invaro of Uml:, us tliey had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was pressing fov i "rehabilitation of Austria."

Whoa I returned to London in ])e----cemb 1013, from a lengthy lerj,.*, the Lillian von Sander.-? question hud li-d to ft fresh crisis in our relations with Husfia. Sir Edward Grey, not without concern, pointed out to mo the excitement them was in I'etrograd over it. "I havo never semi them bo excited." I received instructions iroui Berlin to request the Minister to osevt a restraining influence in Pelrograd, and to assist us in Settling the dispute. Sir Kdwiird gladly did 111 is, and his intervention contributed in no .small degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir Edward, and his great influence in Petrograd, wero reiieiitedly made use of in a similar milliner when wo wished to attain anything there, as our representative proved him-i-elf quits useless for such a .purpose. During the fateful days of July, 191-1, •Sir Kdward said to me, "When you want to obtain anytliiiw in Petrojrnul you always apply to me. but if 1 appeal t» you I'm' your influence in Vienna you refuse to suppui't me."

THE COLONIAL TREATY

Tho good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in establishing, not only with society and the most inIliieiitial people like. Kir Edward Grey and Mr. Asqnilh, I'lil also with the great public at public dinnere, produced a marked improvement in tho relations of the. two countries. Kir Edward honestly Ivied to confirm this, "rapprochement," aud his intentions wero most appareut on two questions—the colonial and. the Bagdad railway treaties. In 1893 Count liatzield and 31 r. lialfour had signed a awt agreement dividing tho Portuguese colonies into economic spheres o£ inlliience between us and England. As (lie Government of Portugal had neither tho power nor tho means to open up her ex'.ended possessions or to administer tliem properly, had already thought of selling them' before, and thus relieving her [imincial burdens. Aα agreement hail been come to between ua and England which defined tho interests of both parties, and which was of the greater vuiiio becwuso' Portugal is entirely dependent on iSngliiiid, us is generally known. On (ho lace of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity ami independence uf llto Portuguese .Suite, and uiovoly declared Aim intention of being ol' financial and economic assistance to tho Portuguese. Literally, therefore, it did not contravene the, ancient Aiiglu-Porlugiiesu Alliuiico of the tiltocnlli century, which was last renewed under Charles 11, and gavo a reciprocal territorial guarantee. In spileof this, owing to the endeavours of the Marquis iSovciid, who was prwuiuably aware of the Anglo-Gorman agreement, u new treaty—the so-called Treaty of Windsor—was concluded between England and Portugal in 1891), confirming the old agreements,' which had always remained in force. The object, of the negotiations between us and England, which had .commenced liefovc my arrival, \v«s to amend and improvo our agreement of 189$, as, it had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical delimitation. Thanks to tho accommodating attitiido of tho British Government 1 succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord with our wishes and interests. The whole of Angola up to tho twentieth degree of longitude was assigned to usi so that wo stretched up to the Congo Stalo from tho south. Wo also acquired (he -valuable islands of San Tiiomo mid Principe, which are north of the- equator, and. therefore- really in the I'rench sphere of. influence, a fact whicli caused my .French colleague to entor strong but unavuilin." protests. Further, -\ve, obtained tho northern part of Mozambique. The Lieango formed tho boundary.

A Tribute to Britain. The British Govornmeut showed the greatest consideration for our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill toward us, but he aiso wished to assist our colonial development as ii whole, as England hoped to divert tho German development of Htrcngth from the North Sea aud Western Europe to the ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to mo. Tho British Government originally suggested tho inclusion of the Congo State in tho agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and enabled us lo penetrate it economically. AVo refused this offer, alleging consideration for Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps ivo wished to bo economical of successes? . With regard also to the practical realisation of its real, though unexpressed, intention—the later actual partition of the Portuguese colomes-tho treaty in its now form ehowed marked improvenunts and advantages af compared with the old ones Cases had boon specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned to us llieso wero drafted in such wide terms that it was really left to us to decide when "vital" interests arose, so that with Portugal entirely dependent on I'Jigiand, it was only necessary to cultivate further good relations with England in order lo carry out our joint intentions at a later dnto with English assent. Sir Edward Grey showed, tho sincerity of tho British Government's desire to respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished lo invest capital, and asked for tho support of the British • Government in the districts assigned to us by tho now agreement, evon before this was complotod and signed, and by informing them that thoir ontcrpriso belonged to our sphere of inlluonco.

Tho agreement was practically completed lit the time of tho King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At Unit timo a conference took place in Berlin, under the presidency of tho Imperial Chancellor. ]n this conference 1 also tnuk part, and ecrtnin further wishes of ours wore defined. On my return to London 1 succeeded with the assistance of Councillor of tho Legation, Von Kuliim'aun, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker in having our last proposals incorporated, so Unit thu whole agreement could bo initialled !>y Sir IxUvard Urcy aud by mo in August lljli), before J wont oil louvo. But now fresh difficulties were to arise which prevented its being signed, ami I did not obtain the authorisation to conclude it till a year Inter—that is, shortly buforo tho outbreak of tho war. It wns, however, never signed. Sir, Edward Grey wns only willing to sign "if Ihe agreement wero published together with thoso of lli'JH and 18!)!)." Kngliuid had, as lie said, no other secret treaties besides these, and it whs. contrary to established principles to keep binding agreements secret. Tliorefori* h» could nut. make any agreement without publishing it. lie was, however, willing to accede lo our wishes wil.li regard lo tho limo and manner »f publication, provided Unit ouch publication took place, at liilo.il, within one year from tho ditto of .signature. Wrecking Iho Treaty, At our foreign Ullice, when: my London fiiicorauvj had caused increasing dissatiel'udion, iiinl where nn inllia-ntiiil persunago who acted the part of JJerr von llolsloin wanted the l.omlun post I'm- liiuiKull , , I wns ImWmcil tlml. tho jiu.bliciitioii would endanger mir interests in llm colonies, ii.i Ihn i'lirtuguimo would then mil. givi. , us liny muni eouu>s.-nuii.s. Tho fiillily ill' this objection is upparc>lll; from tin; roiiHidemtiou that the t'orl.iigmvie. in view nf llm closeness of :\ii|.'lii-l'(irl,ugui'--m rotations, worn imwt pniiiably jiirfL ii.-t vvi-il aware of the old agreement us <il' our ""w jirrnngimionU, ami Unit III" inHucnni which I'liigliuitl pusai'SMM ill Lisbon renders Iheiv UovI'l'iiiiieul riiinpli'li'l.v impotent in face ill' nn Aiinlo-tiii'iiuiu agreement, An,,l|,(.r iiiei.'.sl hud lli.-iolurc l,i lui I'miml for wi'i'ilini: Hi" li'i'iity. II whs .;|,,{i[|.;:|,.|| lli.il Hid pilhl ic:ll ilill lII' Hill Treat v "I' Windrfor, whicli hud licen ninrludeil dlli'iii(! tin.' lime "I -l*i*iiii*o llohi'll-liihf-Hiiiiigli il « lIH NII '.V ll I'i'iii'wii! of (!,,■ li-nily of Churl,■■■■ 11, which hnil alwiiys K'li'uiiiK'il in 1"! ,, ' 1 ' ■mi's"'!- I'lidnnger Ihn iiDiiliim ill' 11 ill vim Ili'lliiihiiin-lliill-wo" mi il prooi of Hrilinli hypocrisy mid licriiily 1 I poinlud out Unit llm pve•uiililo i>)' inir ctii'***** , ''! Hiu iiiinin thin;! us tlio Trenty ol' Wiiulnor, iiiul us oliii'i* nliniliii* Irt'iilli , !', nnmi'lj , , thai «•<• w.Hlld nrnlHtl Him. Hovcn'iij'ii righlN ill' I'lirliigiil iiml Iho iiiviiilahilil.v of its posscwioiiii. In a in ii 1 In dpiln of repealed disoiisaioiw with Sir Edward

tirey, at which ho made many fresh suggestioM for the publication, the Foreign Uiiice persisted in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir Edward Gosclieu that matters should bo left as they were! l.lio treaty, which oll'cml us extraordinary advantages, tho result of -inoro than 11 year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a public success for me. whim 1 mentioned tho subject to Air. Lewis Harcourt at a dinner at tho Lnibassy in the spring of 1!M, the Minister for the Colonies told me that ho was placed in a difficult - position, and uid not know hoiv to act. Tho present position was intolerable—he wisb.ed to Mteguard our interests, but was in doubt whether ho should proceed on the terms or tho old or the new treaty. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear up Hie situation, and to scttlo the matter, which had dragged on for such :i Jong tune. In reply to a dispnlcU in this sense I received instructions couched in terms which showed more alarm than civility, tolling; me to abstain from any further interference in the matter. I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my post at tho disposal of the monarch, and that 1 did not abandon the hope of arriving fit an understanding with tlinso in authority— a sinister mistake which was io bring its Nemesis in 11 few months Inter in such a. tragical way. However little I even then enjoyed the good-will of the highest oliidal of (ho Empire, as ho feared that I was aspiring to his post, yet I must in justice to him «ny that during our last interview before the. outbreak of war at (he end of June, 1 fill, to which I will refer later, ho gave me his assent for the signature and publication of (he treaty. In spito of (Ms it required repealed applications on my part', which were supported by Herr Dr. Soli in Berlin, before sanction was at last obtained, in July, 101-1. As Urn Serbian crisis at that lime already imperilled Ihe peace of Kuropo the completion of thi: treaty had to be postponed. ]t, also is onii of. the sacrifices of this war.