U-BOAT WARNING IN 1911

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 183, 23 April 1918, Page 6

U-BOAT WARNING IN 1911

LORD FISHER'S FORECAST. Admiral Lord Jellicoe, on ' a Tecent visit to Hull spoke at the Pacific Exchange. He said that tho difficulties tlw Navy had to contend with were due simply iind solely to ono source, and that was the submarine. The methods uf the submarine were sprung upon the iiritish Navy in 'the way of a surprise, lie remembered Lord Fisher writing a memorandum when Lord Fisher and he were members of the Oil Fuel Committee in 1911, and ho remembered Lord Fisher in his memorandum to tho Admiralty saying that if Germany went to war with us—and Lord Fisher was always sure tiio Germans would do so—the Germans Vould use submarines against our nier- - chant ships, 110 (Lord Jellicoe) recollected that memorandum going to tho Board of Admiralty after he joined it as Second Sea Lord, and thero was nobody in ii responsible position who agreed that the Germany Navy would really do such thing as Lord Fisher expected. Lord Fisher was right, as he had been right in many ot.ier cases. (Cheers.) Of course tile Navy was unprepared to deal with tho' submarine, but that was not the fault of tho Navy, because, if Lord Fisher's words had been believed there would have been timo to adopt measures which would Jiave effectually stopped the submarines from getting out, and that was the only way to deal with them. Thoro was uo royal road for saving merchant ships once the submarines got out of harbour, and it was impossible to block them in; but since tho British Navy had been faced with the task before it, they had tried to do their best'. "I am afraid," t!oneluded Lord Jellicoe, "wo are in for a bad few months, but 1 have confidence. 1 have nothing to do with the business now, but I know what is ready and what is in preparation. I have confidence that by tho summer, the late summer—l will not put it too soon— by the late summer, about August, if the nation holds out till then ~and I hope it will (cheers)—l think by that time we really shall be able to say the submarine menace is killed. (Cheers.) I will not .say it until August, becauso I always notice that whenever optimistic speeches tiro made by the Primo Minister or any other high official, they result in a desperate disaster,. about the next day. (Laughter.) I havo told the Primo Minister that and have asked him • never to make optimistic speeches about i submarines, because the next morning 1 j have had to go down to the War Cabinet with a very long list of losses. I would like to ask them not to make optimistic speeches until August,. when : they can make as many as they like—but * not until then." (Cheers.)