The Dominion. TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PLANS AND OUR OWN

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 160, 26 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PLANS AND OUR OWN

To-day's news of tho mighty battle which Germany hopes to make the last of the war shows the enemy to bo still gaining -ground at certain points, more especially in the centre and southern areas of his attack, but is being; held at othors. At. the moment tho recital of what the enemy has gained tends to overshadow other features of the battle and of the possibilities it holds, but it would bo a very great mistake to accept tho events 'of these opening, days as a criterion of what is to follow. Germany admittedly has embarked upon her crowning effort in tho- war. Her last hope is to win a swift and overwhelming success, and she. has, laid her plans'and is shaping her efforts accordingly. The Allies have a totally different _ outlook. They count upon achieving victory not by taking the desperate risks of a pell-mell offensive, but by adhering to the dogged policy of cutting down the enemy's strength until time and tho relative expansion of their military resources have given them a decisive advantage; The result of this policy, while Eussia remained in the field, was to give tho Allies an ever-increasing margin of superiority over the enemy. It enabled them to retain the initiative and win a long succession of victories during a year of war in .which Russia was from the first a negligible factor, and was speedily reduced, not by the military action of the enemy, but by internal political disorders, to. complete collapse. The policy to which the Allies havo steadfastly adhered is now being subjected to _ a supremely searching test, but it is strictly in keeping with that policy to sacrifice ground so long as that course is consistent with wearing down the enemy's strength and subjecting him to disproportionate losses. To directly meet the enemy's (tremendously violent effort by a corresponding effort would ho to grant him the conditions he is seeking to enforce, and it may bo taken for granted that the Allies are working to a very different plan. At present, when tho oncmy_ seems tobe progressing towards hi 3 ends, it will assist a balanced judgment to reflect that the Allies aro holding enormous forces in reserve, and that a decisive couflict in the Western theatre will assuredly not be confined to the area between Arras and La Fere.

So far as the immediate outlook is concerned, reports in hand leave wido room for conjecture in regard to the, probable trend of events. The enemy has not yet been brought to a halt. The earlier messages appearing to-day showed that the British had fallen ba"k to the Sommc, in the southern part of the battle area, and that from Peronno the line .extended north with an eastward curve, covering Bapaumo by a considerable margin. _ This meant that the enemy had gained an elongated wedge of territory, with its point near Mon r hy le Prcux, east of Arras, and extending south for about '10 miles. At its widest, in tho southern battle area, below St. Quentin, tho wedge was about 13

miles broad. For the time this re-' presented the maximum British retirement, but later reports show that tho enemy has crossed the Soramc at several uoints south of Pcronnc, and has made a further • advance also immediately north of that place. The Germans claim that in tho southern part of the battle urea they are advancing westward of La Fere and have captured tbs junction of Chauny, seven or eight miles west t>£ the line on which tho Allies stood in this region when the battle opened. This means, if it is true,. that the French forces on the British rieht flank have now joined in the movement of retreat. In all, a large area of ground'which the British captured last year has again changed hands, but it does not by any means follow that the situation of the Allies is threatened or endangered to the extent which such an evacuation of territory ui.ght at first sight seem to imply. By far the greater part of the ground winch has thus far passed to tho enemy i s that which he abandoned, after having devastated it, in preparing to meet the Allied ofionsivo m the spring of last year. Iho devastation effected by the enemy, still far from being made ? ■ A su Pl?lj cs one obvious reason ior the British decision to evacuate lu "! face of the present offensive. , ihe evacuation of this territory in tho first place : by the Germans themselves and now by tho British forces affords proof that it does not lerm itself to the purposes of a de- . rensivo battle. Past events • certainly afford ample ground for a belief that if tho British aim had been to bring the' enemy as soon as possible to a halt he would have effected a very small part of the advance that now stands to his credit. In this connection it is of tho highest significance that the British Com-mander-in-Chief deliberately elected to conduct a fighting retreat instead of copying the tactics of eva,-., sion practised by the Germans in this same region last year. Sir Douglas Haig was undoubtedly well informed in regard to the' onemy's preparation.!), and presumably knew what they would entail. It is reasonablo to assume that ho decided to make a- fighting retreat, first and foremost in order to levy maximum toll upon tho enemy, but also with larger objects in view. These are matter's over which a veil is drawn for the time being, but that tho existing situation leaves 'vide scope for Allied coun-ter-action is not in doubt. The Germans, it is stated, have packed one half of their total forces in the Western theatre into the immediate battle area, but on tho Allied sido probably less than one-half of tho British strength and a very small proportion of the French havo yet been actively engaged. Certaini ly a very considerable British force, together with practically tho whole of tho French armies and the Americans and other Allied contingents on tho West front, are thus far in reserve and available for the execution of whatever plans tho Allies may liavo formed. It is noteworthy, also, r.hat the commanding ridges which originally constituted the backbone of tho enoray's line aro still in tho hands of tho Allies. Around Bapaumc. he is now attacking an area of considerable strategic importance, but Sir Douglas Haig's latest available report is to tho effect that in this region tho enemy is being held in check. In any case tho Allies now, as when the iluttlo opened, overlook tho enemy from the Flanders ridges, from tho Vimy Ridge, and other commanding elevations in Northern France, and from the Aisno Plateau and dominating heights in the Champagne. • In the broadest view the situation is that the enemy is extending tho forward bulgo of the great salient formed by his lino in France towards the region from, which he was driven back in 191617, but it is more dangerously threatened than ever on tho flanks, and tho Allies have great forces in reserve. Tho Allies' counter-move may prove quite as sensational as tho enemy's initial opening of this terrific battle, which may be expected to develop on lines of greater magnitude oven than the colossal struggle at Verdun.