The Dominion MONDAY, MARCH 4, 1918. THE MASTERY OF THE AIR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 141, 4 March 1918, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, MARCH 4, 1918. THE MASTERY OF THE AIR

Along the whole West front, in Italy as well as in France and Flanders, Allied airmen have given a splendid account of themselves in recent weeks, and ono which is full of .promise as it bears upon the great part they are destined to play this year. ' A British official report issued a few days ago stated that in tho first twenty-two dayß of February the British brought down 178 German aeroplanes in the Western theatre (including Italy), as against a loss of 36 British machines. This is perhaps the finest record yet established in aerial fighting, and available information goes to show that the British aerial achievement in these critical- days, on the immediate eve of what promises to be the. culminating struggle of the war, is broadly typical of that of the Allies in general. Some idea of what the Allies are doing in the air on the West front may be gathered from a message published this morning showing that between December 1 and February 15 no fewer than 22,518 flights were made over the enemy's lines. Probably the inferiority of the enemy in the domain of aerial warfare has never been more clearly demonstrated than in recent months. This state of affairs is'not to be explained on any assumption that the enemy is husbanding his aerial resources with an eye to tho titanic contest in proßpcct. In a very real sense, so far as war in the air is concerned, the struggle has already opened. The Allies have demonstrated their superiority partly in a series of enterprising and successful attacks upon German establishments along the Ehine and between that river and the Western front—attacks which in magnitude and importance and in other respects very completely overshadow the enemy's raids on London. But a great deal of the air fighting in which British and other Allied airmen have lately given such conclusive proofs of their superiority has occurred over or in the comparatively near neighbourhood of the battle lines, and aerial defeat under these conditions means only less to the enemy at the present moment than it will mean in the near future when great battles are in progress. Existing conditions mean amongst other things that the Allies are enabled to freely observe the enemy's dispositions while the latter is very seriously hampered in observing the dispositions of the Allies. Between December 1 and February 15, 21,300 photographs were taken by our airmen behind the enemy's lines. This is not a state of affairs which the cDcmy would tolerate at the present stago if it were in his power to alter it to his advantage. The superiority established by the Allies is therefore not only important in itself, but of good promise as it bears upon the future.

The possibilities' of aerial warfaro this year from the Allied standpoint arc interestingly stated in an article jointly contributed to tho current Fortnightly Review by Messrs. Claude Grahame-White and 11. Harper. This war being more than any other a war of communications, the authors point out, away should present itself this year, if tho Allies have had the foresight to prepare for.it, of first rendering untenable the enemy's positions in _ the war zone and then of converting an orderly retreat into a disorderly rout. These results can be attained if suitable aircraft are provided and manned in sufficient numbors. Hitherto a shortago of suitable aeroplanes and pilots has made it impossible to

carry out raids on anything like an adequate scale, or to repeat them with sufficient frequency. The de mand made in aerial warfare, as in other forms of warfare, is that things should be done upon the grand scale. The possibilities of an air offensive developed in adequate force are summed up in the following passage:— In the spring, with the increase in Ino speed and range of large bombing machines, wo shall be able to do something even more drastic titan the interruption of tho enemy's supplies while they aro on their way to the front, effective and disconcerting though this should be. Wnat we shall bo able to do, in addition, is to penetrate so far behind nis lines and strike bo deeply into his home territory, that we can attack and destroy tho actual factories in which war munitions are being made. Such a power has never been wielded by a belligerent in any previous war; therefore, tho results to be obtained! from air attacks, when they can be delivered vigorously and constantly .against the very sources of the enemy's supply, may bo found to havo nn importance which, at.the present moment, it is almost impossible to calculatp. But tho possibility, at any rate, is now sufficiently apparent—tho possibility of raiding the enemy by air, not merely throughout his battie-zone.and along.his linos of communication, but to attack also tho teeming hosts who are at work upon munitions, and endeavour to cut off, so say, at the very main the stream, ol food and materials of war which is the life-blood of his armies in the held.

lb is a fairly safe conclusion that when the Allies have developed an attack on this scale Germany's doom will bo accomplished. The great questions raised—whether the Allies have made their preparations on an adequate scale to develop such an attack and to what extent the enemy hag succeeded in countering their preparations—will only be answered by events. But the tests thus far 'applied show encouraging results. The enemy has failed signally to ' maintain ijhat equality or superiority of air force on the battlefronts which is vital to successful operations on land. He has completely failed also to check or defeat the raids in which Allied squadrons have now on many occasions ranged as_ far afield as the Rhine. This failure is the more noteworthy and significant since the Allies carry out these _ raids under a much heavier handicap than the enemy labours under in raiding London. German aeroplanes are able at almost any time to make a concealed approach to tho English coast. A swift dash at a great height places them over an enormous target, and then, having unloaded their bombs, they have every facility for beating an equally swift retreat. Allied machines raiding German territory cross tho battlefront going out and coming home, and often traverse considerably more than a hundred miles of country in enemy occupation. More-, over, they carefully seek out defined objectives, a thing the enemy has not evon begun to do in his raids on London, let Allied raiding squadrons very often return,. after having reached and attacked their objectives, unscathed and without loss. Equally in the conditions now obtaining on the battlefronts and in tho circumstances attending the Allied raids into Germany, there is to bo read at least very suggestive evidonce of the enemy's inferiority, both in aerial equipment and in the elements of human skill and daring which count perhaps for more in aerial warfare than in any other form of military conflict. The main question still open, but soon to be answered, is whether the Allies have developed their air forces on such a scale as to make possible an uerial offensive not merely damaging but crushing in its effect. Tho Allied airmen unquestionably are capable of meeting every demand, and in its present-day development the aeroplane is a splendidly effective weapon. It only remains' to bo seen whether the Allies have trained pilots and built machines in sufficient numbers to make air-power, as it should be, the decisive factor in the war. ■