THE "NEXT TIME"

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 116, 2 February 1918, Page 10

THE "NEXT TIME"

GERMAN PLANS FOR FUTURE STRIFE AN AMAZING BOOK The London "Times," under tho heading, "Militarism Unabashed," quotes freely from a notable hook, "Deductions from the World War," bv Licutenant-Gcncral 'Baron von Frey-tag-Loringhoven, who was Quartermas-ter-General in the field when Falkenhayn was Chief of the German General Staff, and is now stationed in Berlin as Deputy-Chief of tho General Staff.

The following are comments by the "Times," together with passages from the book:—Froytag ssys thero can bo no reduction of the two years'—for some arms tlireo years'—service. Ho attaches value to the various schemes for training boys and for turning sport to military account, but says that those tilings cannot provide any substitute for "real schooling in soldiering." He proceeds:— It may be asked what is tho use of all this. Will not the general exhaustion _of Europo after the world-confla-gration of a certainty pnt the danger of a new war, to begin with, in the hackground, and does not this terrible murder of people point inevitably to the necessity of disarmament to pave the way to permanent peace? The reply to that is that nobody can undertake to guarantee a long period of peace, and that a lasting peace is guaranteed only by strong armaments. Moreover, world power is inconceivable without striving for expression of power in the world, and consequently for sea power. But that involves tho constant existence of a largo number of points of friction. Hence arises tho necessity for adequate armaments on land and sea. The world-war affords incontrovertible proof that Germany must for all time to come maintain her claim to sea power. We need not at present discuss hy what means this aim is to be nchieverl, Freytag goes on to declare emphatically that tho reason why Germany enjoyed peace for so long before the present war was not the strength of the movements for "fraternisation of the peoples" and the many "fine, speeches," but solely "the poirer of the German sword, which could jnot disnlav its true strength until the 'war broTw out." More interesting are Freytag's observation.': on the peculiarly economic character of the war. He says:— ■

Tbe consequences of. the blockade to which tbe Central Power 3 were subjected showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded in developing our war economics by our own strength, yet the unfavourable state of the world, economic situation has throughout tbe whole ;var been felt by us. That alono explains why our enemies found ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open to tlieni, and why victories which would onco have been absolutely decisive, aud the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not'bring us.nearer to peace. It is the sword which still decides in war, it is victory, on the battlefield that gives the decision, but the effect is far more dependent than it used to be upon worldeconomic factors. These factors run through the whole war of to^day. There are some interesting references to the spirit of the various armies. The Austrian,? are only mentioned once cr twice un the book, and then with a patronago verging on contempt. Freytag onco says outright that "the Germans were on several occasions threatened with the prospect of the AustroHungarian Army being defeated utterly by the far superior Russians." As regards the Germans, Freytag says that l: the want of officers made itself felt in an extraordinary way after the original heavy losses in the autumn 1914, and otherwise brave men occasionally failed when their leaders were taken away by enemy bullets." As regards air raids, Freytag is free from any considerable measure of hypocrisy., He 6ays Unfortified places of no military importance have had to suffer The bombardment of these places ;s in itself objectionable, but the limits of what is permitted are in this matter in many ways elastic. A new weapon opens up its own paths, as is shown for example, by the submarine, war. In any case, hi tiiis struggle" of tho peoples with its economic background, the war is turned more and more, against the enemy coun. tries, and the principle hitherto accepted tliat war is made only against the armed power of tho enemy is in this as in other sphores relegated to the background. . Freytag's chapter on "Leadership' is in many respect interesting. Having admitted the failure of the Marne, he discusses various aspects _ of the trench warfare, and he examines the Gorman substitution '_of /'breaks through." for the classical German strategy of outflanking. Ho argues that tho Germans could never outflank the Russians, because of the enormous area of the country aud of the length of the front, which was so great that oven a smashing blow at one wing did not affect other, sectors. As to "breaks through," Freytag makos remarks which are interesting in view of tho present, campaign in Italy. He says:—

The preliminary condition of success was always tho moral and tactical superiority on the sido of tho attacker, and a corresponding violence of a mass effect. The fact (Freytag makes only one casual reference to Verdun in tho whole course of his book) that we did not possess this moral and tactical superiority in sufficient measure in the West has always relegated to the background the idea of breaking through tho enemy front. What has to be done is not only 011 a comparatively limited front to break in upon the enemy, with concentrated masses—these massos will immediately bo exposed to outflanking on both sides—but to force in a more or less considerable part of the enemy front, and then to develop strategically the break-through which has succeeded tactically. Tho extent of tho success will in every caso oopend utwn the local conditions and tho stratogio situations. Throughout the lesson which I'reytag is most concerned to teach is that the new expcricncc does not displace, but must be grafted on to, old knowledge. He repeatedly declares that tho importanco of outflanking strategy has not been affected by the lessons of the war: what Germany must try to do is to obtain by "policy" a hotter start-ing-point for her futuro wars, rhc following passage may be taken as Freytag's real 'deduction from the world war": —

If, as we hope, policy succeeds in future in preventing tho recurrcnco of such a menacing situation, or at any rate in producing tho cffect that we shall have greater freedom for violent and decisive blows in ono direction, then the war will take a different shape and will be more like former wars. Our business, therefore, is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war as they lived in tho German Army up to the year 1014, to soak them in experiences m the present war, and'to m'akc. the fullest technical use of theso experiences —but to do all this without giving an entirely new direction to our thinking on strategy and tactics.