PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 63, 7 December 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Statements that the enemy contemplates a retreat in Italy if ho fails to pierce the line on which the Italians arc now firmly established with French and British support in themsolvcs wear an air of probability, and they gain colour from the tone taken by some German newspapers. It is stated that they are predicting the suspension of the offensive in Italy, "as the main object of throwing the Italians back from the- Austrian frontier has been achieved." The motive which may induce the enemy to retreat is, of course, that in this way ho may reduce the vulnerability of his front and the demands it makes upon his resources. He could retreat without sacrificing any part of the advantago he enjoys in holding the mountain frontier on the north, while, on the other hand, his line would include a shorter length of coast dominated by the Allies from the sea.

o * » Reviewing events on tho Cambrai front tho liigh military authority quoted to-day concerns himself mainly with the tactical position and the extent to which it has been changed. Ludendouff, he considers, planned to break through the British line and force a manoeuvre battle. The- enemy's actual achievement, a very cosfc]y one, is a limited invasion of the southern flank of tho British salient. His attacks on the northern section of the battlefronfc and on the centre failed completely, but his penetration of tho lino further south has made it more difficult to supply the forward positions in the salient, and may, according to the authority, necessitate a slight withdrawal of the northern front. To say, as does the authority, that the enemy may fairly claim to have checked the British advance is really to emphasise his defeat. He aimed undoubtedly not at merely checking) the British advance, but at restoring his line as it stood prior to the British offensive of November 20. Towards this achievement he has taken as yet only a short initial step. If we accept the theory that the enemy was intent not on a mere restoration of' his defensive line, but on forcing a decisive battle, the contrast between what ho hoped to accomplish and did accomplish is so much the greater. AVhatover his,

actual intentions may have been thoro ia not the slightest reason to suppose that in this battle the enemy at any time had prospects of overwhelming success. J3ut at tho height of the struggle on tho southern section of the battlcfront possession of the salient thrust forward towards Cambrai was no doubt in the balance.

One ■.message to-day states that fresh German divisions are still being transferred to the Cambrai front, but in their total effect correspondents' reports indicate a general belief that tho enemy assault has passed its point of maximum vigour. If this opinion is well founded and the battle is now declining into n struggle for detail positions, it has afforded even more definite proof than was afforded at Verdun of tho futility of massed attacks in faco of tho tactics and fire superiority of tho Allies. Mr. Philip Gibds gives somo further examples to-day of the butchery to which the Germans were- exposed in their vain attempts to smash tho British resistance

Mr. Gibbs mentions incidentally that many enemy guns were put out of action by the British artillery. Counter-battery work is, of courso, practised by both sides, but tho British havo long enjoyed a pronounced superiority in this departmont of warfare. This fact was emphasised by a correspondent who recently gave an interesting' description of conditions on the Flanders front: "Various ruses," he wrote, "are adopted by tho enemy to save his guns from our artillery; he slinks guns up at night, fires a few rounds, and withdraws again; and ho tries to_ disposo his guns, regardless of efficiency, in formations which we may find it difficult to reach. He is fighting a defensive fight, and it is not surprising that he should be in terror of our artillery. "With the help of our aeroplanes we do, roughly, nowadays, just about ten times the destruction of enemy batteries that tho Germans do to us. While wo aro continuously edging forward and our guns seeking out his batteries in each new hidingplace, tho majority of the enemy's heavyguns are now far withdrawn, only isolated field guns remaining in forward positions. In spite of all his endeavours we find and concentrate daily on many new enemy batteries at various parts of the front; and when we do seriously concentrate on one of his batteries there is littlo chance of much of it surviving."

.** * » It is _ again reported to-day that the- British army in Mesopotamia 16 in touch with Russian forces, and that the assistance of the latter shows that there is still a portion of the Russian Army willing and able to fight. Continued Russian co-operation would very greatly ease the problems by which the British are faced in Mesopotamia, but it is to be recognised that this cooperation will be difficult to maintain. It is likely enough that the Cossacks and other Russian troops opposed to the Turks are largely untouched by tho disorders' which threaten to put the Russian main armies completely out of action, and that a more stable political authority has been set up in the Caucasus than exists at present in most other parts of Russia. But the grand difficulty to bo overcome is that of providing the Russian troops opposed to tho Turks with necessary supplies. Unless their local depots are remarkably well stocked, only a free flow of supplies from the interior of Russia would enable tho armies facing the Turks on tho Armenian front to take effective ac-

tion, either offensive or detensivo. On the other hand it is possible- that sufficient supplies of military material may be transmitted to the Russians by way of Mesopotamia to enable them to co-operate usefully in preventing a Turkish outflanking movement through Persia. Entirely deprived of Russian assistance, the British would be left with an exposed and vulnerable ifank to defend on the side of Persia, so that no effort is likely to bo spared that will keep even a section of tho Russian forces in the field and in effective fighting trim.