The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1917. ADMIRALTY OF THE AIR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 25, 24 October 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1917. ADMIRALTY OF THE AIR

.From the German standpoint the history oi the war is very largely a record of lost and wasted opportunities. This observation nowhere holds greater force than as it applies to aerial warfare. Germany entered the war not only with stronger air forces at disposal than the Allies, but with a clearer general perception of the possibilities attending the effective use of these forces. She is the only country that prepared in pre-war days for a real assertion of air power. Fortunately for the Allies the plans she based upon the sound initial conception that aerial development dictated a bold departure from traditional methods of warfare were badly framed and broke down in working operation. The fact nevertheless stands iliat she perceived, and for a lime was alone in perceiving, the tremendous possibilities of air 1 power used as an independent force in war. It is amazing that with this perception as a startingpoint she threw away all the benefits it might have 'brought her, first by selecting the wrong weapon for an aerial offensive, and then/by persisting in its use long after its failure has been clearly demonstrated. The disasters which lately overtook an enemy airship squadron in France were not needed to demonstrate the titter failure of the Zeppelin as an offensive weapon, though they certainly strengthen conviction on this point. The failure of the Zeppelin is a costly matter for Germany, not only because the resources devoted to the production of the giant airships have been largely wasted, but because the same resources devotecl_ at the right time to the construction and organisation of a fleet of aeroplanes would very possibly have determined the fate of the war. It was the height of good fortune for the Allies that the enemy did not develop and use such a fleet during the long months in which they were making head as best they could against attack and fighting to gain time. In those days the margin which separated the Allies from disaster was narrow, and a wellplanned aerial aggression by the enemy would in all probability have wiped it out. Although she threw away this opportunity by squandering her resources in building Zeppelins and by wasting efforts in other directions that might have been effectively concentrated on a bid'for admiralty of the air, Germany has not yet been wholly _ deprived of the advantages she gained by her initial start over tho Allies in the matter nf aerial development. Tho justice of this observation is manifest when it is considered that tho Allies are only now, in the fourth year of war, in a nosition to grapple with the problem of directing a sustained aerial offensive against the enemy in his own territory. To what extent this long delay in making full use of a force which obviously holds unmeasured possibilities might have been shortened will only be known when the secret history of Hie war is laid hare. But there is a good deal to suggest that while Germany made

her bid for aerial supremacy on lines which invited failure, the Allies on their part have been needlessly slow in shaping an effective counter-programme. It is necessary at once to state certain reservations. Since the war began the Allies have striven very successfully to keep pace with tho necessities of the moment in aerial warfare. At an early stage of tho war French an'd British aviators in the Western theatre established an ascendancy over their adversaries which has since been maintained practically without interruption. At the present day this ascendancy, duo mainly to tho heroic qualities of the Allied airmen, is very pronounced. Enemy aircraft are largely confined to air over and behind their own lines, and are there constantly attacked and defeated with disproportionate loss. Allied airmen, on the other hand, aro continually raiding the enemy's depots and communications behind his lines. At tho same time aircraft arc allotted an, important role in the counter-offensive against the enomy submarines, and are detailed in considerable numbers also for tho defence of areas in! England and elsewhere exposed to enemy raids. Tho point which commands attention, however, is that the Allied aerial squadrons have hitherto been employed altfiost exclusively as auxiliaries of tho land and naval forces or in defence. Attacks upon the enemy in his own territory have hitherto been _ a somewhat _ infrequent exception. It isi manifest that only when they depart boldly from this state of affairs will the Allies be within measurable distance of a full assertion of air power. As an English aeronautical writer remarked recently, the question now to be determined is whether, in addition to the employment of aircraft in sufficient strength to enable us to keep tho upper hand in the air at the front, to deal even more effectively with submarines, and to provide for continual short-distance raids on the enemy's _ bases and communications, the time has not arrived for the employment of the now arm in a supreme degree as a striking force, to do a hundred-fold more vigorously, without ceasing and under sound military direction, what the onemy has been essaying in a very limited way by raids on England. The question seems to admit of only one answer. Tho effective use of aircraft is the one obvious method of carrying tho war into Germany and striking at her heart. Tho attacks on Saarbrucken and its neighbourhood reported during the last few days supply a hopeful indication that the British Government intends henceforth to _ shape its policy with an eyo to this cardinal fact. Assuming that tho Allies make good use of their opportunities and resources, thero is not the slightest doubt that they are capable of an aerial offensive which will shorten the war and hasten tho day of victory. The only reason for uneasiness, appears in tne fact that the Allies have been singularly slow in approaching a bold assertion of aerial power. In Britain the dangerously limited conception _ of the aerial arm as a mere auxiliary of the land and naval forces threatened until recently to become fixed. Moreover, until tho new Air Board was constituted _ early _ this year there was a serious failure to coordinate tho technical and industrial resources devoted to the ]ireduction of aircraft. The appointment of a central authority to control these activities was a step in the right direction, but an even more important and promising departure is involved in the prospective appointment of au Air Minister. This presumably_ means the creation of an authority empowered to take comprehensive stock of the possibilities of aerial warfare, to advise the War Cabinet accordingly,. and to call, if necessary _ for a readjustment of the national effort in order that demands of aerial warfare which cannot safely be neglected may be satisfied. Granted development on these lines it is certain that the work of the_ aerial arm will heavily, if not decisively, influence the future course of tho war. Germany is said to be concentrating upon extensive aerial preparations with a view to forestalling the offensive action of the Allies, but with tho existing drain on her resources she is far less able than Great Britain and Franceleaving out of account the powerful contribution of aerial force to be expected from America—to take adequate measures in developing aerial power. The Allies are unquestionably in a position to win decisive mastery of the air, with all the enormous benefits it would confer, and would only imperil their prospects of reaching this goal if they unduly restricted the scope of their aerial efforts and neglected the supremely important business of developing an overwhelming attack upon the enemy in his own territory. Such a policy would not only repeat the folly by which the Germans sacrificed the great opportunity that confronted them at an earlier stage of the war, but would enable the enemy to continue his raids on England, which serve their only military purpose in adversely affecting the disposition of British aerial strength. Tho way to defeat these raids and at tho same time achieve vastly more important results is to carry the war 1 into the enemy's country with all the force that can be assembled for that purpose.