The Dominion FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1917. THE PROMISE OF VICTORY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 15, 12 October 1917, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1917. THE PROMISE OF VICTORY

A particularly clca-r and informative account of the position reached' in the- Wear is .given to-day on the authority of the French Commission which is now visiting England. The Commission adds to our knowledgo of facts chiefly in the statement that for the first time since the beginning , of the. war a, clear decrease in tho total strength or the German forces is recorded, i Thero is no reason to doubt the acj'curacy of this statement. The ! French Government throughout tho war has made a point of obtaining reliable information regarding the enemy's available strength and reserves, and at intervals has made public disclosures on tho subject. Accepted as accurate, the statement that tho total strength of tho German forces is declining, in spite of what has been done in tho way of prematurely calling up young classes of recruits, is evidently momentous. It means that Germany has visibly and unmistakably entered the final phaso of the war—a phase in which she can expect nothing else than disaster and decisive defeat. In order to realise what it means to Germany to'faco her enemies in declining strength while the margin of superiority enjoyed by tho Allies is still capable of being heavily increased by the addition o£ the American armies, it is necessary in tho first plaeo to consider what has been accomplished since the Allies definitely took tho offensive in the Western theatre, and more especially during the last year. The achievement of tho Allies is summed up by tho French Commission in its statement that, in spite of the Russian upheaval, tho continuity and intensity of the AngloFrench offensive has prevented Germany from getting the benefit of her valuable reserves. This is a concrete presentation of the essential fact, but a slight elaboration will emphasise its significance. A little over a year ago, to look no further back, the enemy held, and had heavily fortified with a view to defending them as long as might be necessary to give him victory, all the best observation points which the occupied ;wea between the North Sea and Verdun affords. The vulnerability of his supposedly impregnable front Ead been demonstrated on tho Somme, but his defensive ichain was in essentials unbroken. As one commentator put it recently: "He overlooked tho French from the heights above Verdun, from Moronvillers (the commanding, "heights in the Champagne), from the Aisnc Eidge, and from the heights south of Peronnc. He overlooked the British from the ndge west of Bapaume, from the Vimy Ridge, from tho Ridgo' of Messincs." To make the statement complete, it must be added that the enemy also overlooked the Allies from other high ground in Flanders, east and north-east of Ypres, though some of these elevations lay, a year ago, well behind his line. To-day these elevations which formerly constituted the backbone of the enemy's defensive lino aro all in tho hands of tho Allies, with the exception of some of the hills near Reims and tho small area of high ground still opposed as an obstacle to an Allied drive into the Flanders Plain. Most of these positions, tho loss of which has so terribly weakened tho enemy's defensive organisation, were won in swift, decisive blows, and some at least were gained at lighter cost to the attacking troops than to tho armies which had hoped "to find I ho fortified' elevations uf Franco, and Flanders a secure rampart ou which they could fight indefinitely an economical holding campaign. Tho process of laying open tho enemy's line, and the still more important ta&k of cutting down his effective strength which it facilitates and expedites, aro being actively continued at the present momont. We do uoU know

how far the brilliantly successful Flaxders offensive will bo carried before winter compels a halt, but even at its present stage it represents the culminating point for tho 1 tinio being of an achievement which has scaled Germany's fate in this war. At a price the Germans may prevent an extended development of the Flanders offensive this year. They .arc. making every effort, and, sparing no- sacrifice, to that end.' But even if they prevail to this extent, the,conquest at all vital points of the positions on which their defensivo organisation was based goes hand-in-hand with the decline in their effective strength, which is now reported in determining their fate. That the enemv is under no delusion as to what is entailed in the loss of his elaborately dc-' fensivo positions and observation points is proved not only by his present tactics of desperation in Flanders, but by his policy throughout the summer and autumn. Since May he has exhausted scores of divisions in vain attempts to recover his lost vantage points, particularly on the Aisne Plateau and in the Cliampagne. At times he. gained local successes, but these were in every case temporary. The cost to the enemy of his abortive efforts to recover Ids lost strongholds is indicated in tho statement of the French Commission that in spite of the Russian upheaval the continuity and intensity of the, Anglo-French offensive has prevented Germany from getting the benefit of her valuable reserves. At most the immolation of these reserves has served to in some degree delay ..the development of the Allied offensive. From any other point of view they are a dead loss, and the enterprise in which they were expended has utterly failed. To the all-important fact that the strength of the German armies, formidable .as it still is, will from this timo forward decline, we must add that Gerriiany stands, and will stand, iu more desperate need of men than at any past stage of tho war. Even if little further progress is made in Flanders this year, the moment for action next spring (if the enemy does not retire beforehand) will find the Allies commandingly posted, on both flanks of a desperately-weakened defensive line. At the eastern end of tho Aisne Plateau, and in the Champagne, the French overlook a wide extent of open .country leading into the heart of tho enemy's communications. The most important artery in tho whole system of German communications, the main railway which runs through Lille, is still more dangerously threatened by the Allied drive in Flanders and by tho conquest of the enemy strongholds in Northern France. It is no distortion of tho facts to hold up the state of affairs in tho Western theatre as determining the course of the war. So , far as the central issue of the war is concerned we need look to other war-areas only as their events are likely to modify or influence- developments in this decisive theatre. Assuming as wo fairly may that the .bonds uniting the Allies wei'e never more firmly knit than at the present hour, it may be said that the only cloud on tho horizon is the possibility, not at present threatened, of an unfavourable change in the Russian situation. There is every reason to believe that the Russian military failure resulting from tho Revolution robbed tho Allies 'of victory this year It released largo numbers of enemy troops, and tho effect has been felt both by the Western Allies and by Italy. Available information is that tho Austro-bor-mans arc now holding their lino in the Eastern theatre in minimum force, and so long as Russia, remains in the field, even if she abstains from attack, nothing that happens on tho East front is likely ■to materially modify tho preset and prospective situation m the Western theatre as it has been outlined. It is indeed doubtful whether even the complete withdrawal of Russia from the war-an event not visibly threatened—would enable Germany to bear up for any length of timo against the Allied attack which will develop in; the Western theatre next year. While Germany's hopes of obtaining relief in Russia are poor, her prospects of bettering her position by .action in; any other theatre may fairly Dβ described as negligible. _ The action of tho Italian armies is a highly important contribution to the common effort of tho Allies, and it is not improbable that events m the Ottoman Empire and tho Balkans may hasten' the decision for which they are fighting. At sea not a ray of hope for the enemy appears, even if we ignore tho interesting and suggestive disclosures of disatfection amongst his naval forces whioh aro made to-day The submarine is no longer * decisive -actor in tho war, and it is not at. all unlikely that the decisive superiority of tho Allies in naval force- may. b B brought oven more heavily to bear than at present before the wai is over. To look further afield is in fact to realise that the state of affairs disclosed in the Western thea£o is a true index of the- course of the war. In itself this state of affairs conveys an assured promise of Allied victory, and suggests, though he X of course, a certain margra must be loft for possibilities, that tno victory will not be very much I longer delayed.