THE NAVY'S "BIT"

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3191, 15 September 1917, Page 2

THE NAVY'S "BIT"

AN INTERVIEW WITH SIR JOHN

JELLICOE

THE TASK AND ITS ACHIEVE.

MENT

"Tho British Navy's control of the nervo system, of maritime. comiuuni:ations of the world at this juncture is more complete than tho control exercised by the army of the Central Powers on land," said Admiral Sir John 11. Jellicoe, First Sea Lord and Chief of tho Naval Stuff, in a recent interview with tho Associated Press, in which 'ho discussed the submarine menace ar.d tho naval situation at the on 3 of tho third year of tho war. '"That/' ho =aid, '"suggests perhaps a train of thought which American students of the war might pursue with interest and advantage to tho Allied cause. But lam content at this moment merely to emphasise the supremo importance of the work which the Grand Fleet is doing under tbo command of Sir David Beatty. You ask mo how it is that Gorman .lustrojers are able to- carry out raids from l;roo to time. Such missions are entrusted to the swiftest vessels under the German eusign and they aro carried out with every advantage on tho side of the Germans The North Son is a very big area of water. It is more than twice as largo as tho -whole TJnited Kingdom— En-land, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland— which is traversed by neaTly 24,000 miles of railway lines. Tho German destroyers wait for dark and then dash nit from one of the bases situated withm an ]:our or two of steaming of the British coast. Thev have tho choice of an objective acai'nst a coast line of great .pngth. There is hardly a point, but is undefended, advantago having been taken »f tho immunity from bombardment which international. law was believed before the war to confer.

Advantages With the Enemy. "Now, mark these points: The uicmy has the choice of nights when the weather and visibility are most suitable- for its purpose. He puts to sea clear of hie inine-neld. ■ uo can steam in a northerly, westerly, or southern direction. Aircraft are used for reconnaissance so as to gam information of the movement of the British patrol forces. The Germans have the further advantage of being able to fire at every craft .winch, cone, within sight the moment it » sighted. What is the position of the British patrol, whose vigilance has % oeen- subjected to three years of unceasing strain Officers have many duties to carry mt quite apart from punishing i these tipSndW raids. They never know when the enemy ships will break out or nhero they will speed at their highest speed, and in the darkness they have to discriminate between friend and neutralon the one hand and ioe on, the o.her hand before they fire. Despite the advantages which tho Germans enjoy, no raid has resulted in the elightest notary gain to Germany or loss to Ueat Britain. Such a policy cannot be pushed successfully unless tho enemy is piepared to support his destroyers, i ith stronger forces-m. other wn**i' ek some portion °f lus Seas and Urns tho menace of our Grand Meet operates. Wo deplore the to» of life amon"- non-combatants, out. arter all, wo aro engaged in a war whereon the freedom of the world depends, and we cannot; deflect our strategy from its main purpose. That is. *l»at the Germans hope to effect, and they have failed. At the same time perhaps I may add that since the exploit of the fewiit and Broko tho enemy hns attempted no raid on tho British coast. "ThUleads mo to say a fow words as to the'destroycr and submarine bases on the Belgian coast, which are in the occupation of the Germans. One » Ostend; the other is Zeebruggo. Tho Germa s havo applied to this length, of sandfringed coast tho same principle ot intensive fortification adopted higher up on tho North Sea and tho Island *t Heligoland. The coastline is studded with heavy guns, winch m thoinselvM constitute infinitesimal: -targets.-- at .a rango of inoro than twenty-.■thouaand varSs, on which any bombardment could bo carried out. Moreover, the enemy has not been slow to wake fullest use of aircraft and smoke screens by way of protection. Ostond offers the best tai. get but it caa only bo attacked at rare intervals when .a favourable ■■ombina. tion of wind, weather, and sea conditons can bo attained. Zcebrugge, m the real sense of tho word, is not a naval base, but moroly au exit from tho inland port of Bruges, with which it w connected by a wido, decp-watci- canal. There is little to hit at Zeobrngge. fet 1, I bom that tho problem which tho ]3e} ; gian coast presonts is not uusolvablc.

The General Situation. Turning to the general naval situation at thu end of tho third year ot thu great war, Admiral Jellicoo said:"The fourth your of the naval waropens this week, and only those who are familiar with German naval litoraturewhich preached the doclnno ot tho of-fensive-can ;appreciato tho signibcanco of naval ovents during the past tnrco years The German liigh Sous ilcot waa not created that it might remain inactivo month after month. It is » great war online: No greater mistake can be mado than to underestimate its strength'. It is far stronger,' for instance, tbau tho British fleet was ten years ago, and in years beforo the opening of the war it was submitted to a very thorough intensive-sys-tem of training. Tho British Grand I'leet has offered it a challenge to action which, has not been accepted, for, uu tho occasion of the battlo of Jutland tho Germans had no thought of a fight to a finish. For tho whole year now tiie High Seas Fleet has ventured only beyond its protected mine-fields on ono occasionAugust 21 last year, and then it speedily Bought shelter bnco more. Owing to tho attention which tlie novel and barbarous submarine warfare has attracted there is perhaps a tendency to forget that continued success of pur Grand Fleet in containing tho main German, forco on ■which tho success or failuro of the Allied cause is mainly dependent. Very little can bo'said as long as tho war lasts of tho work of tho Grand Fleet, but it 19 tho foundation whereon all tho efforts of tho Allies vest. "What has it done? .tor a. poriod or three years it has robbed tho Germans of all advantages which they expected to reap from tho possession of a strong battle fleet. That forco was to have sallied forth from time to time. The Germans calculated that they Mould strike at their selected moment, when their fleet would be at a maximum strength and that they would catch our Grand Fleet at a moment when, owing to the absenco of ships undergoing refits and repairs, the odds were little, if anything, against them. They have not been permitted to carry out that scheme, but wo havo always to be on our guard. Wo cannot permit them, for instance, to emulate the example of Villeneuve when ho eluded Nelson off Toulon and cruised to the West Indies and then got back to port again having suffered little injury as tlio result of Calder's action. No, we must not contemplato such a break-out on tho part of the Germans, particularly now that the American people are in tho war and require peace And. security in order to mobilise their enormous hunting power. "Tho carrying out of that purpose imposes a heavy responsibility on the Grand I'leet. s The Grand Fleet consists not only of battleships and battlecruisers, but includes also light cruisers and destroyers. If these destroyers were not working with the Grand Fleet they would be available for combating tne submarino menace. It is sometimes suggested that for this and other reasons we ought to adopt a more often.su« policy against the German High Seas Meet. We are face to face with he old uiob-lem-how to force a fleet which hides in a harbour to come out and fight. 1 1 is a very old problem. Our loreftttherb were familiar with it. For years it confronted them at the end ot tho eighteenth and the beginning ot the nineteenth centuries. A superior fleet can force an enemy fleet into poir, but if it is to be com polled to come out against its will, history suggests that compulsion must bo applied by the aimy noting against its base or bases. I need not say anv rnoro on that issue, except to suggest that naval power and military, power are complementary one to the other Tho navy alone cannot win a war, ns history has always shown, and tho army alone cannot triumph, as the (Wmajas haw learned;" ,