PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3185, 8 September 1917, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Available reports indicate that Austrian, attempts to counter and break the- force of the ltklian offensive, though developed on a formidable scale, have, up to the present at least ■ completely failed. Slimmed r.j), tho position 'disclosed is that the Italians have defeated the enemy's counter-attacks on tho southern section of the Carso front, and arc vigorously.continuing _ their offensive north-cast of Gonzia, where the enemy is struggling desperately to retain possession of Monte San Gabricllc. That tho enemy'.counter, stroke on the Southern Carso brake down after temporarily penetrating the Italian line at two points was made known yesterday. A detailed account of the Austrian effort which is given to-day by Mn. Pbbgival Hibbon, shows that it was made at very heavy cost, and that in spite of advantage of position enjoyed by 'the enemy at some points, it was most effectively met. Further abortive attacks by the enemy in the same quarter arc reported to-day. His local failure is emphasised by 'the fact that the Italian offensivo further north has continued without intermission. Austrian correspondents admit that'the Italians on several occasions reached the summit of Monte San'Gabrielle, though 1 they have not yet contrived to cap-

tiireand holrl it. Earlier reports that the mountain had boon captured are now shown to have been incorrect, litiL its fate is evidently in (.he balaucc. Tho situation ;is regards the further development of the Italian offensive in the near future is critical, but to the extent that übalance can bo struck at the moment it .is manifest that the Italians have tho upper hand. They have repelled all counter-attack, and coincidentally are attacking with some prospects of mastering a most important element in tho enemy's defensive organisatk •■ .

In' an interesting note on aerial operations, Mr. H. Warner Allen, the official Rritish correspondent at French Headquarters, remarks that the extent to which the French hold the command of the air is perhaps not fully appreciated in Great Britain. "It is not realised," ho adds,, "by the civilian public, of even-by the troops in the trenches. The poilw does not see the. combats that take place far more often" over German. territory than above his own head. The proof of the superiority of the French is given by the fallowing figures: In the Aisne battle no fewer than 1098 aerial duels'took place over tho German lines, and only 395 over, the French, lines. In this connection tha tactics adopted by tho enemy before the , Aisnc battle, which are still followed, .hayo a. special interest.' In the air the Gorman was purely on the- defensive. Sometimes, it is true, he would unite a force of thirty or forty machines, and for the time being drive back the French aeroplanes forming the permanent guard at a particular point of the front, but the raid was invariably a matter of an hour or two at the most, and. the enemy aeroplanes would disappear immediately whea the French aerial reinforcements arrived.. The general attitude of the enemy was that he must he 'prepared at any moment to receive, and repel an attack in force, that is to say, an offensive conducted by two hundred or even more machines.

"On the Aisne he had something over two hundred aeroplanes to opposo to such ail attempt to gain the command of the air. He seems to have known that he would be outnumberedfi,as well as out-manouvred,.by the French airmen, and all lookouts were . instructed to keep the sharpest watch for any sign of such, a general aerial attack. If such a sign was observed, every aviator in the. army was tc hold himself iii readiness to start at the shortest notice, but they were not to go up till the attack actually took place. Every aviator in the air was to return at once to his camp, refusing combat. All balloons were at once to be .lowered. The general .plan was one that could not be expected to' appeal to the German infantry, which is notoriously dissatisfied with its flying service?. The German aviators' were to make no attempt to repulse -the first French onslaught, and the infantry must expect nothing from them. It was left to the anti-aircra,ft guns to check the first assault.' Eventually, however, orders were to be given by the German command for its aeroplanes to take the air. Then, flying as low as possible, they were to fly away from the French to points of rendezvous at least twenty miles behind the front. Having reached this relative security, they were to rise to fighting altitude'and finally en masse, not less than three-quarters of an hour after taking the air, they were to circle round and offer battle. ' The aviators, however, were warned that they must fight over 'the German lines and not pursue the enemy within reach of the French anticraft'guns. Such tactics are in themselves an admission of great inferiority. Their caution is evident proof that the German command had no hope of inspiring its airmen with that spirit of reckless daring which, as both. French and British have- -shown, is ( half the battle in aerial combat. _