PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3139, 18 July 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A London message to-day states that Dolina has been captured by the Russians, but this is not officially confirmed at time of writing. The latest Russian communique in hand at the moment deals with fighting ou the west bank of tho River Lomniea, nearly ton miles east of Dolina, and indicates that in .this locality 'tho enemy is offering an exceedingly stubborn resistance. The occupation of Dolina would be a highly-important development in the Russian offensive, and one that would go far to determine tho fate of Lcmberg. Dolina is a small railway junction standing on an outlying spur of the Carpathians at a distance of 35 miles from Stanislau, which approximately, marks the starbJag-ppinfc ft! .tfeo .present Rus-

sian offensive. As a secondary railway junction, Dolina lias some immediate importance, but its capture would bo chiefly significant as indicating that the Russians were making rapid headway towards the main railway which runs south from Lembcrg into Hungary, and has a vital place in the enemy's system of communications. Beaching Dolina, the Russians would have covored two-thirds of the distance by which they were separated from this railway when their offonsivo opened. For the time being, however, the report that they have advanced so far awaits confirmation;

The Russians officially admit a slight retirement at one point in the country west of the Lomnioa, but it apparently amounted to nothing more serious than the evacuation of part of a captured village. The incident assumes some importance, however, from the fact that tho retirement was occasioned in part by great losses of Russian officers. It was remarked by a correspondent yesterday that the self-sacrificing example set by the Russian commanding officers and subalterns on the south-western front was greatly inspiring tho men, and that the Army committees marched heroically at tho head of tho attacking waves. Inspiring as it is, this policy may lead to serious consequences, particularly in view of the fact that the Revolution had already to some extent reduced tho number of trained officers available in Russia. A disproportionate loss of officers is, of course, calculated to materially impair tho efficiency of any army. The prominence- given to the matter in to-day's communique possibly means that steps are being taken to modify the policy _ under Thich such losses havo been invited in the course of the Russian operations in Galicia..

In permitting comparatively little dotail news of the development of their offensive to escape the Russians are not adopting a new policy. Their communiques havo never been outspoken since the earliest days of the war, and were markedly reticent on tho occasion of General Brubiloiht's great offensive last year. Mr. Stanley Washburn, the special correspondent of the London Times, was with the Russian armies in Volhynia at that time, and in his book The Russian Offensive he devotes a chapter to the secrecy of modern strategy. "So. vast," he writes, "have become the operations on the. Eastern front, and so innumerable and complex are the objectives, that with eaoh day that passes there aro fewer and fewer persons in Russia who know what really is the strategy of the campaign which is being worked out so successfully on tho Kovel front. . . . It is this secrooy as to tho real aims of the great brain at General Headquarters which has to a great extent been responsible for the chaos which the Russian offensive has brought to the strategy of the whole onemv line, from the Baltic to Bukowina. . . . It was known generallv, of course, that tho Russians planned a groat offensive, but other than orders for all fronts to be in readiness by a certain date I question if many men over there know exactly which would move first or what it would do when it did move."

Observing a policy of secrecy last year tho Russians were able on a number of occasions to reap some of tho advantages of surprise, and no doubt they arc ' intent upon doing tho samo in their present offensive. Now as then their objectives arc numerous and complex and owing to tho reduction of the enemy's effoctivo strength they have bettor prospects in their present oampaign than they had last year of profiting by surprise attack. The enemy has hitherto enjoyed an aerial ascendancy on the Eastern front, but this factor does not tell with tho same decisive effect as it does in tho Western theatre. The Russians aro possessed of a considerable numorical superiority, their cavalry in particular very greatly outnumbering that of tho enemy, and convincing proof was given last year and has been again given in the present offensive that they are ablo to strike an effective surprise blow in spite of their inferiority in the air. It is probable that by the importation of aeroplanes from abroad, and in othor ways this inferiority has been greatly modified as compared with the conditions of last year. Further testimony is borne to-day to. the fact that the technical equipment of the Russians, particularly in the factor of artillery, is bettor now than at any past period of the war. Whether the curtain will next lift to . show that tho Austro-Ger-mans have contrived for the time to patch their menaced lino in Galicia or to show the Russians sweeping on to now victories is at the moment an open question. It is already abundantly clear, howevor, that tho armies of the Republic aro making a highly important contribution to the Alliod ooncerted offensive. _ Convincing evidence on 'the point is supplied in the return of captures during the first fortnight of the offensive which appears to-day. It includes nearly 37,000 officers and men, 93 guns, largo numbers of mortars and machine-guns, and great quantities of other war material. Biggor captures were made _ in the first fortnight, of tho , offensive in Southern Russia and Galicia last year, but tho onemy was in many respecte bettor prepared on this occasion, and tho armies opposed to the Russians are composed in much larger proportion of Gorman troops than was the case in the first months of the 1916 offensive. It is possible that tho enemy is now massing forces for a direct counter-stroke, amd that the Russians are halting to meet it. Such a development is more likely to bo witnessed than the German offensive on the Baltic front, which has again been mentioned as a possibility during the last day or two. Tho onemy will be hard put to it m any case to assemble troops for an offensive stroke, but. whilo an offensive in tho north offers, at bost dubious prospects of advantage tho threat to his southern line males a call upon his energies which he cannot afford to ignore. Already his front in tho south has been lengthened and weakened, and if the Russians reach any such vital point as Lomberg or Kovcl ho will have to fall back on a very much longer and more vulnerable lino than he holds at prosent. Much as he must be disin-1 clined to concentrate on tho East front he is, therefore, practically compelled to vigorously defend the narrowed margin by which he still holds Loinberg and Kovel, and if possible inorcase it. One factor which may exert a material influence upon operations in Galicia in tho immediate future is tho weather. Last year the Russians were brought to a halt in the D.niestoo region- J

early in July by heavy floods, and tho lull which resulted from this cause continued for nearly a month.

Determined counter-attacks made by tho Germans upon the positions captured by N the French in the Champagne on Saturday appear to havo resulted in almost total failure. Tho Germans claim that in one of the two areas in question thoy reached their original lines, but the French, while thoy admit an ebb and flow of battle, report that the final result was that they maintained tho whole of their gains,in both areas. The British report another highly successful' raid oy naval aeroplanes on Ostond, Zcebrugge, and a number of Belgian railway junctions.