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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The French attack north of ijhe Aisne is developing on a scalo of considerable importance, and has already achieved pronounced success. As reports stand, the attacking troops have mastered a very strong section of the German line and gathered in over six thousand prisoners. It was mentioned yesterday that the ridge extending west from Craonne was the. backbone of the German defence in tho area immediately north of the Aisne.' This ridge was the essential natural feature upon which the enemy_ based the selected positions in which he brought the Allies to a halt after his retreat from the Marno in Sep'tember, 1914. He has had more than two and a half years in which_ to labour upon these positions and improve them, so that, all things considered, the successful French attack takes a distinguished place amongst the major achievements of tho war. Available reports show that the French have gained the whole length of the Aisne heights with the exception of a short section of the ridge in the vicinity of Fort Malmaison, twelve miles west of Craonne. This limited foothold is all that remains to the Germans of a range of positions which gave them practically every advantage that a field fortress can confer. Beyond Malmaison, on the west, the Trench are driving into the apex of tho great salient formed by the German line in France. To those' who care to look into the facts tho German report dealing with the battle will appear a plain confession of heavy defeat. It is true that after paying a tribute to the unprecedented power of the French artillery, it alleges that attacks on a front" of 22 miles were "entirely repulsed." But this is immediately followed by the admission that "we occupy the northern slope of Chemin des Dames"—that is to say, the slopes descending from the crest of the ridge which is followed by tho Chemin des Dames road. The • report is framed evidently for tho edification and deception of that section of the German people which is unacquainted with the strategic , importance of the heights of the Aisno.

There is ample justification for the statement made by one correspondent to-day that the positions captured by the French had a place of very great importance in the enemy s scheme of defence. The effect of the French success is likely to be profound and far-reaching. At ah immediate view, a section of the-German lino which was immensely strong has been laid dangerously Open. Established on the heights of the Aisne, the Germans had practically every advantage that position and preparation could give them. Tho advantage of observation was particularly important on account of their general inferiority in the air. While the enemy had dominating and heavily fortified positions to defend, the French were at a heavy disadvantage in attacking with a 1 river close behind their front. A French force which attempted an attack north of tho Aisne (in the Soissons region) in 1915 found itself cut off from effective touch with the south bank and suffered; the heaviest losses. Similar misfortunes might have been suffered on a bigger,, scale this year if the Germans had brought strong enough forces to bear and had made the most of their advantageous position in attempting a counter-stroke to the Frencn offensive. In the event, matters have taken an entirely different turn. In the gallant enterprise which opened on April 16 and culminated, so far as one main stage is concerned, in the successful attacks of Saturday and' Sunday, the French have deprived the enemy of his pronounced advantage.of position and are now as well placed to develop the offensive as the enemy formerly was to resist attack or launch a counterstroke. Instead' of being dangerously placed, with high positions in front and a considerable river in rear, the French are established on commanding heights overlooking the country to the north—the valley of the Ai'lette and the Vauclere forest (beyond Craonne)—and facing towards Laon junction, about eight miles north of tho present battleline, which is a vital element' in the German communications.

One indication of tho extent 'to which the position has changed for the French and for the Germans is contained in the statement that German columns marching (presumably from the north) in the direction of Chermizy and Chamomile were caught and shattered by the French heavy batteries. The villages named stand about a mile north <of the Ailette. Until recently enemy columns moving in this locality would have been comparatively safe, but the French are now profiting by their latelywon facilities for extended observation. As .they now stand the French are, of course, splendidly placed to deal with the counter-attacks in which ,the enemy is here, as on the British front, vainly attempting to retrieve his defeat.

At a larger view tho conquest of tho heights of the Aisne alters the situation and outlook in tho Western campaign to an extent not yet to be accurately measured. _ Two facts which stand out conspicuously, however, are that the enemy's northern line is 'now dangerously threatened in flank, and that the situation of his armies in the Champagne and towards Verdun is much more precarious than it was when the Aisne heights wero still in German occupation. Laon, which, stands about midway between Reims and St. Quentin, on a direct line connecting theso places, is covered on tho west by a formidable range of. defences established on the massif of St. Gobain. But the reduction of tho Aisne heights removes tho most important obstacle to an advance on Laon from the south, which would incidentally outflank the St. Gobain defences. The Germans are much worse placed than they were to oppose an' advance on Laon, and a near approach to that place would almost certainly compel a general retirement of .their line extending to the north through St. Quentin and covering Gambrai, Douai, and Lille. As regards the enemy armies in the Champagne and further cast a

good deal depends on what tho Germans have done to extend and supplement the railways they found laid when they invaded Prance in 1914, Then, as now, the direct route from Metz into the Champagne was closed to the enemy at Verdun. As a result tho only main railway available for the supply of tho German armies mentioned was, and perhaps is, one which passes through Luxemburg and runs _at no great distance from tho Belgian border. This line runs up to Mezieres, about fifty miles north-east of Reims, and from Meziores ' a railway strikes south-west to Reims. As far as is known the principal railway supply-lino of tho German Champagne armies follows tho railway from Mezieres to Reims as far as Bazancourt (about ton miles north-east of Reims), and then tlie Somme-Py railway, running east through the Champagne, which tho Germans hold and use, though now by a very narrow margin, as a line of lateral communication. Putting the matter as briefly as possible, this railway route, instead of following _ a direct line, passes round three sides of a parallelogram.

•More direct routes by road arc, of course, available, and tho Germans have no doubt built some light railways, but unless they have carried out a. very heavy programme of railway construction tho position in regard to main railways must still place them at a somewhat serious disadvantage in tho Champagne and further east. In a full tide of battle or in retreat main railways are apt to be of decisive importance. The conquest of the Aisne heights which has laid open the flank of the enemy's northern line, has also done something to clear the way for an advance which would isolate his eastern armies and might conceivably sever their best railway communications. It has a' bearing on the matter that the Somme-Py railway, which might have been, and perhaps has been, extended from its known terminus east of the Ar£onne to a junction with the railways on the east, is so formidably menaced that the Germans cannot depend on holding it. In 'tho Eastern Champagne the French have closely approached the Somme-Py railway. Further west, towards Reims, and also north-west of Reims, they have made considerable headway towards conquering the hill groups which confer strength upon these sections of the enemy line. The'orderly development of the offensive is visibly increasing the prospect that the enemy may have to undertake a forced retreat, and at the same time may find that retreat fatally impeded.

Current reports dealing with the British section of the front relate chiefly to the continued and costly failure of the forlorn hope counterattacks in which the enemy is endeavouring to break the force of the British offensive. The latest-official report in hand at time of writing speaks of the defeat of desperate attacks made by the 'enemy upon his lost positions on the Hindenbub.g line, east of Bullecourt and elsewhere. There is no doubt that the British Army in its stationary battle is as definitely bringing victory nearer as are the French in their brilliant and highly promising achievements north of the Aisne, The task of the Allied armies, as one message points out to-day, is to wipe out the reserve of a million men which the enemy is believed_ to have had in sight at the beginning of the year. The estimate that about half of this reserve is already gone and that at the present rate of wastage it will disappear in a few weefs may be optimistic. It probably is. Since April 9 the Allies have taken close on fifty thousand prisoners, and at the outside this is probably not more than a 'fifth of the enemy's total losses in 'the intervening period, but it is possible that the total is still materially short of half a million. The fact stands, however, that the enemy's reserve is being rapidly cut down in conditions set and determined by the Allies, and the circumstances suggest that the statement that. Von Hindenbukg's plan is spoilt and that he has been unexpectedly compelled to use his reserve for defensive battles in France is strictly justified. The enemy is gaining nothing by his mad attempts to break and stem an.offenifiive which steadily increases in power. Each day of battle such as now rules, whether on the British front or the' French, cuts down his margin of resisting, power and increasingly jeopardises his prospects of retreat to a shorter line. It is more than ever difficult to believe that he would persevere in his present tactics if he considered an extended retreat practicable.

A STATEMENT by GENERAL ALEXIEFF, •which appears to-day, puts a more hopeful aspect upon affairs in the Eastern theatre than other recent items of news. He claimed to speaK for tho Army, he commands in denouncing the propaganda against annexation and indemnity, and it his confidence is not misplaced the attitude of the Army will do a great deal to correct and neutralise the political disorders which threaten to cripple the Russian effort. The test of the situation wilf come in that fighting on the Russian front which General Alexieff declares to be imminent. Some fighting is reported to-day, but it appears to have been, carried on mainly by the artillery, expect in Rumania, where attacks by the enemy were broken.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19170508.2.18

Bibliographic details

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3073, 8 May 1917, Page 4

Word Count
1,887

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3073, 8 May 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3073, 8 May 1917, Page 4

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