The Dominion TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1917. A CASE OF NERVES?

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3061, 24 April 1917, Page 6

The Dominion TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1917. A CASE OF NERVES?

It was ci-edibly reported not long ago that the Kaiser had informed King Gohstantine of Greece that ho could not co-operate with him or enmo to his assistance against the -Allies in Macedonia, and that his message concluded: "All I ask of you now is that you shall keep your throne." Constantine has made an unwise departure from the course thus laid down for him if it is true, as a message from York states' to-day that ho has ; served a .semiultimatum on. the Entente. The terms ho is said to. have laid down deserve attention. They are in brief that he will form a Cabinet acceptable to the' Entente if his continued' occupancy of the Greek throne is guaranteed by Britain and Franco; and in the event of his proposal' being rejected, he, threatens war. Constantine, it.* o uld seem, is prepared to dq. almost anything the Entente now demand, but only in return for a guarantee which its members very probably are not prepared to give. It is one of tho cardinal features of the Greek situation although Britain, France, and Russia are pledged to maintain the integrity and independence of Greece, they: are .in no way bound to maintain, any .particular monarch on the Greek throne. It is tolerably certain that Constantine would not havo made the attempt to force the issue with which he is now credited had ho not felt that his prospects of retaining the Greek throne were well-nigh desperate. It is a reasonable interpretation of his proposal as it stands that he has offered to meet tho present convenience of the Allies in return for an assurance of their support in the conflict with his own subjects which he anticipates at no very distant date. An immediate Mason-for believing that Constantine's proposal is dictated by. nervous fears and; desperation rests upon the fact that his means of backing by action tho threat with which the proposal is rounded.off are now extremely limited. The.position was very different only a few months ago. The ability of the Germans to extend their winter, offensive- into tho Southern Balkans had then still to be tested, and tho Greek Bx>yalist army remained afoot in Thessaly,' conveniently posted to attack tho Allied Army of the East in rear. A very great improvement, from the standpoint of..the' Allies, has since been effected, and this is true both as regards the general war situation an internal conditions in Greece. Tho state of affairs in the main theatres affords a fairly secure guarantee that Germany will not henceforth he ablo to send an army of any size into the Balkans. At the end pi last year she had two or three divisions on the Macedonian front, and as matters are going she is more likely to reduce this force than to increase it. In Greece, meantime, the Royalist army has been interned !n the Morea, which is in land communication with Continental Greece only by a narrow and easily-guarded neck of land. The Royalist army is in durance..'.,'. '.'.'■

It is true that the demands addressed by the Allies to Constantine and his Government have not in all respects been satisfied, and that the blockade has not been lifted! _but questions outstanding relate chiefly to hostile organisations, distinct from the army, and concealed arms. A statement issued in Athens by the Protecting • Powers in February remarked, amongst other things, that the Allied Control could so much the less consent that hidden arms should remain north of the Morea since these might be used T3y hostile organisations, which continued to exist in all parte of Greece, and especially in Thessaly, '.where they constituted a permanent menace to the Army of the East. Obviously, however, the menace is less.formidable than 'when Constantine had an army, as well as secret organisations, at his beck and call.' In considering the extent to which the power of this puppet of the Kaiser has been whittled down it is necessary to remember that more than half the Greek' population—2,Boo,ooo souls out of a total of 5,200,000— now openly recognise the authority of the Provisional Government, as against that of theKiNG. Furthermore, tho army which is bottled up, presumably quite securely, in the Morea is not Constantine's only military loss. Last year he sent off a whole corps d'armee to Germany, together with 240 heavy guns and large supplies of grain, munitions, and petroleum. By his own act, the defection of his subjects, and the action of. tho Allies, Constantine lias been stripped of all save a few remnants of his former power. Nominally he still holds tho allegiance of 2,400,000 Greeks, hut a system of terrorism, not always stopping short of murder and pillage, is needed to keep even this section of tho population quiescent. It has been said that if the terms of peace leave Germany so much as a brain to intrigue with, Grceco will bo. the field to which sho will instinctively turn. Constantine, of

course, i.a anxious l« vctain his thwjne and to continue his services to Germany, hut ho must feel that the ground Is slipping from under his tcet. Tlfe Provisional Government the support of a majority of Greeks, consisting largely of the virile people of the islands and Macedonia. It has raised an army, and is taking up the duty which Constantine basely rcjiudi-B-ted- In the ruin of his own power and the- rise of the rival power Constantine's 'fate, in all likelihood, is written, and from his point of view the situation is so much tltf} worse since the Entente not oruy has no incentive to interpose on his behalf, but would be acting directly against its own interests if it did. It is likely enough in these circumstances that Oonstantine is reduced to the bluffing that marks and befits the ruined and dishonoured gamester. It is even not impossible, though it is less likely, that he may venture one last desperate throw on his own and Germany's account. But it is prao- ' tically certain that if he does the principal result will be to hasten liis own deposition arid 'downfall.