The Dominion. MONDAY' APRIL 2, 1917, A CHANCELLOR AT BAY

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3043, 2 April 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY' APRIL 2, 1917, A CHANCELLOR AT BAY

vy. H ? speech by. the German' Impel, lai CnanceJlor which ia reported at some length to-day •' was awaited with eager expectation. It was expected that it 'would, throw some light, as in fact it does, upon mailers that have a very vital bearing upon the position and outlook in ,the.. war. Germany ' was bound to make a big effort to adjust/heraelf to the changed conditions created by the revolution in Russia, and if. possible to turn, these conditions to account. Humours- wore afloat a few days ago that Germany had offered Russia a separate-peace, but since , they were acoompaniod by a prediction that Hers von ' Bbthmann-Hollwso would make tho offer openly in the speech he ' just, delivered,' they do not seem likely to come to anything. It would not have been surprising; however, if Germany had ina.'ie the revolution in Russia the occasion bf another bid for an inooitciasive peace,., and circumstances might Conceivably "have made the effoifc more formidable than others [ .of the kind made in .the past In ['the sense .that 'it has revoaled no purposeful attempt by Gormany to t [improve her position by some new i policy departuro, the Chancellor's | speech has disappointed expectations. It is nevertheless on some grounds one of the most interesting pronouncements of the war, and one that will be'read in. Allied countries with' a satisfaction, equalling the coldness and hostility which have greeted it in Germany. Hekr von. Bethmjnk-Hollweq has thrown very little new light upon what Germany intends \to do, but it is : impossible to read his remarks without concluding that he and his Government arc very badly at. a loss, 1 and in particular that tho revolution in Russia is regarded by them as an unrelieved disaster. • The state of poverty, in ideas and outlook, vin which the Chancellor spoke, is most strikingly apparent in his references to Russia, which, combined with his refusal to contemplate even the beginning of constitutional reform in Prussia, have involved him not only in a .web of .transparent falsehood, but in an amazing tangle of paradoxical contradictions and inconsistencies. Absurdly enough, since the actual facts are familiar, he declares that the ex-Tsar and the bureaucratic party , now overthrown in Russia were responsible for the war, and that Germany feels warm sympathy, for the Russian millions /who have now wontheir freedom. By sotting this version of the matter against tho facts w© may realise how much the Imperial Chancellor is at a loss. The Russian bureauorais' haye sins onough to be laid at their door, but they are certainly nob responsible for this war. On the contrary, Russia under their control did her utmost to avoid war, and proof of their sincerity in the> mat-, ter is to be found in the fact that, though all the Allied nations were ill-prepared for war (in contrast with Germany's state of finished preparation), Russia was least prepared of all. The actual charga to be laid against the Russian bureaucrats is that a proportion of their number were, not hostile, but friendly, to Germany, and that they were prepared to sacrifice their own country in the interests of this friendship. In ruthlessly condemning and repudiating this group, the Chancellor is condemning the best friends Germany evor had in Russia. This may doubtless be taken to mean that he despairs of making i any further use-of them. Beihmann-Hollwkg's profession of sympathy for the Russian masses who havo won freedom from Tsardom and bureaucracy is an oshibition of hypocrisy almost comical in i its distortion of facts. When the German Imperial Chancellor • lifts i up his .voico to commend political

rafei'tu liiii'oad, he, in the sumo at-aatiHi (--onderuna the polixical state his own country. An' enslavea popia denied political freedom, autocratic rulers and. a governing but'uuucracy, committed to a restless (and quite unscrupulous) policy ot are the conditions existing 10 Germany which made the wan possible and inevitable. Buroly no man with a particle of humour in his composition could Have capped expressions of sympathetic approval of reform in Russia with a stern and unbending declaration that "the speeches in the Beichstag had not convinced him that there was a possibility of beginning a reform of the Prussian franchise"—a _ franchise, be it remenjbered, which is so illiberal that it might bo regarded almost as a relic, of the dark ages. A morestriking enample of the doublefaced in polities could noli bo desired than a Chancellor who is at once tho champion of revolutionary reform abroad and the ( champion of unyielding autocracy at homo. The! speech as a whole suggests not only that Germany soas'as little hope as possible of profiting by the conditions which have arisen in Russia, but that tho rulers of Germany are very much afraid that the example and inspiration of Russia may light the flame of revolution within their own borders. Their policy in these ciroumstances, judging by Beth-maiin-Hollweg's remarks, is to sit flown hard on the safety valve. The attitude of the German Socialist Party is the most significant political event, sinco the beginning of the war. For the first time the party' appears to be united in condemnation of the Government's policy, and in-a. recognition of the futility of seeking to. prosecute tho war with any hope of success, The Government is . stated to be now offering concessions of various kindß, bijl the very fact that it ha-s been forced to give way in matters on; V/hich it had declared it impoesiblo to'yiold, will encourage the Socialists and others to demand still more. What might have satisfied the Socialists and minimised ! internal troubles 12 months ago will, if granted to-day, be taken as a sign of weakness and strengthen the confidence of tho B/eformers in thoir J capaoity to enforce their demands | for the full powers and privileges ! denied them for so long. Whatever tho outcome of the critical political situation m Germany may be, it is clear that internal conare growing rapidly •worso. It is not 'merely political reforms that are being sought. If it were, they might bo granted and the trouble ended. What-the German Chancellor fears, and 'Tvhat the Kaiser no doubt fears, is that tho' German people and the German troops will be glad of any excuse to end the war,' and on present appearances the speediest and probably, tho only method in which tho people can" gain their ends is by following the oxample H-usais, has set them in overthrowing those in authority.