THE DARDANELLES

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3024, 10 March 1917, Page 9

THE DARDANELLES

,; SHY OF A LOST OPPORTUNITY AM)' EXTRAORDINARY LAXITY KITCHENER .CRITICISED NO PLAN OF; ACTION LORD, FISHER AND MR. CHURCHILL

By Telegraph-Pras 'A6sociation--Copyrisht (Aus.-N.Z.-Cable Assn.—Reuter).

\ London, March 8. Tho report of. the Dardanelles Commission has been published. The Commission was constituted as follows:—The Earl' of Cromer, Chairman (since dead), Field-Marshal Lord Nicholsoiij Lord Justice Pickford, Admiral Sir William' Henry May, Mr. Andrew Fisher (High Commissioner for Australia), Sir Thomas Mackenzie (High Commissioner for New Zealand), Sir Frederick Cawley, M.P., Mr. J. A. Clyde, K.C., "M.P., Captain Stephen L. Gwynn, M.P., and Mr. Walter IT. Rocb, M.P. According to the undertaking given by the Prime Minister in the House of' Commons on July 27, the Commission was instructed to inquire into the origin and inception of the expedition, as well as its conduct. The inquiry also' extended to drafts, reinforcements, and ammunition, and covered the' Fleet as well as the troops. Narrative of Events. * •Dealing With the narrative of events at the Dardanelles, the Commission concurs with Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson (late First Sea Lord) that the bombardment on November 3, 1914, was a mistake, as it was calculated to ■plaoe the Turks on the alert. The order emanated solely from the Admiralty,'and the War Council was not consulted. On November 5 Mr. Churchill suggested an attack on Gallipoli, which would give the control of the Dardanelles and enable us to dictate terms at Constantinople. He admitted that ■the operation would be difficult and would require a large force. Lord Kitchener 1 agreed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communications, but said the moment bad not arrived. On January 2, 1915, the Bussians, somowhat hard pressed in the Caucasus, asked for a demonstration against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure. The Foreign Office sent a telegram, drafted by the War Office, stating that demonstrations' would be made, though it was feared that any action would not seriously affect the withdrawal of • the enemy troops from the Caucasus. Mr. Asquitli and Mr. Churchill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought that Lord Kitchener would reply, as the outcome of a, conversation, with him. Lord Kitchener, : writing to Mr. Churchill, said he had not troops to land anywhere. The only place for a demonstration 5, was the Dardanelles, but we were not ready for anything big for some months. ■ , Commission is of opinion thafc, although Lord Kitchener pressed for a demonstration, this did not necessarily involve an attempt to force a The proper conclusion seems to be that when the demonstration appeared necessary, Mr. Churchill thought it possible to convert it into an attempt to force a passage. As Lord Kitchener's new army was ready,- and ho had to provide for Home defence, he was unwilling to withdraw a single man from France. Mr. _ Churchill's views as to the success of a purely naval operation were more optimistic than were warranted by the opinions of experts. Therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the fleet alone; but the responsibility rested rather on Mr. Churchill, who later alleged marvellous potentialities for the Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effectiveness, he said, would revolutionise nn.val warfare. Vice-Admiral Sackville Cardon, replying to a telogram asking whether it was practicable to force the Dardanelles by shins alone, said lie did not think the Straits could be rushed, but they'might bo forced by extended- . operation's with large numbers of ships. Mr. Churchill replied.'/' The high authorities concur in your oninion." Admiral Carden snpnosed that the high author!ties meant Lord Fisher and Admiral Jackson. The former did not son tho reply, and the latter could nojb .■remember whether he-was-consulted.- Admiral Carden suggested the methodical destruction of the Dardanelles and Narrows : defences, and an advance into the Sea of Marmora. Ho estimated that it would take a month to.carry out the plan. Admiral Jackson agreed to the attack on the outor forts but ■ considered it was not feasible that tho Fleet could get through the Dardanelles alone. " ' A Critical Stage. ' The decision on February 16, 1915, to mass troops in the neighbourhood of tlie Dardanelles, marked a critical stage of tho whole operation. Tho Commission considers that inasmuch as time was all-important, no compromise was then possible between making an immediate and vigorous effort to ensure success by a joint naval and military occupation, or falling back on the original intention of desisting from the naval attack, if the experience gained during the bombardment wcro unsatisfactory. Lord Kitchener decided on .February 20 that the 29th Division, part of the troops which by th 6 decision of February 16 were to have- boon sent eastward, should not then bo .sent, and Colonel Fitzgerald, by Lord Kitchener's order, instructed the .Director of A aval Transports that transports for that division and the rest of. the Expeditionary Force would not bo required. This was done without informing Mr. Churchill. Tho consequent delay of three/weeks in the dispatch of the troops gravely compromised tho probability of the success of tho original attack by tho land forces, and materially increased tho difficulties of the final attack. ■ . . .-V 3 ?',™ 1 ,°. iivcr ti™dti that by tho.time the Fleet had overcome tho initial difficulties the military force would have been ready. • Generally speaking the-Admiralty Staff preferred a joint operation. The Commission thinks that the War Council, 111 its action, was probably governed' oxccssivolv by tlie fact that the entry of the Dardanelles would have a profound effect on the course of tho war, and therefore neglected to ascertain whether it would bo advisable to -undertake a purely naval enterprise. It/ is highly probable that if Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher had objected upon technical grounds, the project would have been abandoned. Mr. Asquith stated that Lord Ilisher s mam objection was not based on tho naval merits or dements of the Dardanelles operation, but upon facie. Ho preferred another objective. : -

FIXING. THE RESPONSIBILITY .., THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EXPEDITION. The report of the majority finds thatlTr. Churchill initiated the attackon the Dardanelles in the War Council cm November 24, 1914, as an ideal method of defending W>t and Russin Lord Kitchener declared that troops were not available. The AVar Council's acceptance of this was unfortunate, because investigation would h :m. revealed otherwise. Thus a, naval action or none had to bo decided upon. Admirals Fisher and Wilson, both uf whom did not express dissent to tho projmsnj naval action alone, should have expressed their view if they thought tho project impracticable from a naval point of view. They did not object, however, because they regarded the operation as experienced only. The Commission thinks it was an obligation hrst on Mr Churchill next on Mr. Asquitli, and next on the other members of the War Council, to insist on a clear expression of export opinion on a naval action alone, because the chances of a surprise amphibious attack offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and ill-advised to saerihco them by a hasty and purely naval attack, which could not itself .secure, the desired objects. Th e evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr. Asqiulhs statement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquiesced in tho ■■Dardanelles operations as long as he thought they would not seriously interfere with his plans elsewhere It may bo ■ that, convinced that tho demands made oil tho Fleet for the Dardanello s prejudiced his alternative schemes, lio resigned. Although Lord l< ishor, in h is evidence said he was dead against a naval operation alone, ho did not at tho time express any such decided opinions. ,The actual decision arrived at by the AVar Council on January Id, after hearing Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill, while Lord Fisher, Admiral Wilson and General Murray remained silent, was couched as follows: "A naval expedition will be dispatched in February to take Gallipoli, with Constantinople as its objective. . The Commissioners consider, in view of the opinions of naval and inilion the spot, thai the decision to abandon the naval attackafter the bombardment or. Mi.rch IS '.7as inevitable, and point out that there was no meeting of the AVar Caunrli between March 19 and May 14, while important land operations vrero being.undertaken. "We think that before suchi op-rations were commenced the AVar Council should certainly have reconsidered i ho whole position In our opinion the Premier ought to have swnrr.ovw' a meeting of. the AVar Council for that purpose, and if lm dici Knt sumr/on it, tho.other members of the War Council should have pressed for such :i inoeeting. AVc think- this was a serious omission. AVp are of op-.TiUm that Lord Kitchener did imt sufficiently avail himself of the services o. p his General Staff ' with tho result that he -undertook more wot!: than vres possible for ono man to do, caiisin;; confusion and want of eftoiency. A\ o are unable to concur with Lord ' Fisher's view that it washis duty, if ho differed from Mr Churchill, to maintain silence at the Council, or resign, or both. Wo think that any adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of the public services. Although tho main object was "not attained, certain important political advantages were secured by the expedition, but whether thoseadvantages were worth the loss of life and ■treasure involved must remain a matter of opinion. Amazing Want of 'Coherent Plan. ** "It is impossible to read all tho ovidenco of tho papers without being struck with-tbo atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which characterised the AVar Council's proceedings. It is almost inconceivable that sayonc, whether military, naval, or civilian, could have imagined that Constantinople could, bo captured without military help on-a, somewhat large scale. In the caso of tho Dardanelles, the reduction of tho forts presented difficulties more hazardous than Port Arthur,- or AVai-hei-AVei, while (ho narrow waters lent theinseTvos to defences by mines and torpedoes interfering with navigation. With regard to Mr.'Churchill's presentment of the enterprise to the War .Council-.and the Commission, without impugning his good faith, it seems clear thai he was carried away by a, sanguine tempera--1 niont and a firm belief in the undertaking. The evidence shows that he ob-

lamed( Ins experts support to a loss extent tlian ho imagined. It is also ■leva- Uint Admiral Cardeii-greatly undereetimated the Turks' opposition fhe opinion that onoo the ebips got through, tiiopost ~,1 ,r V- 1 ™|M cease to be important. Moreover, he and otWs, noi r IV^T"m G r y, ~»fi d «f«y a revolution in Constant "opio «Jiea tho J'lcet entered the Sea of Marmora ■ ■n-»meZ»? kI T ° f was gradually dropped, on MTv 1 f Z'i U ?, dnf H™ ° J K m , llita 7 attack - Lord Kitchener "J 1 ? f'-f, 1 ' th / fc ho reahsed that if the Fleet,failed, the Army would nf Mini t '.wftW February Iff he informed a meeting ol Ministers that he had decided to dispatch tho 29th Division AcuteX ciißHons look place at the War Council between May 16 and 26 and iTrd K I KHehonnr l ! %f '".T ™ 3 - *MHp-difference ™ May 20 between Lord Di\'i on Vr : ; , Churel l l, V J o^ t0 tl,e decision not to send tho 29th mdC '/ Y<*™™ hold that a naval division, with the Australians thoußht Hnf ?l Ti fr™ , -Egn*. wal* be adequate. Lord Kitchener still ffiinl.Su t° i e ?"*T' ld g l **?"&■ ■ General Birdwood, on March 5, nn-BT Md Klt F hcl !, er * hat lt Wi »s very doubtful if tic Navy could ft Th Pa A Sn i ge - T S f Sted - In any c ' ase - ifc ould teke » considerable \i J i v Admiral s forecast was too Banguine. Then Lord Kitchenpr do thon fe PatOh tbe 29th Divisbn ' weeks of valuXwwa; Kitchener's Responsibility. Lord Kitchener was mainly responsible for these decisions, although; if lie Had been alive, he might have been able to throw new light upon them. ■ fullv rp, r f;" S f i,T 11, * 1,28 °l e Bituation 6hould ™t have been more ' al kitchener and his colleagues. There were only two , CtSl lo i ß of - P restlge the attack on ! pW ,I Vf bo d 'y t0 face tho risk ivould have been involved e sewhere by a determined effort to force the Dardanelles by a rapid comneitt, 'I In + , greafc etrength Unfortunately, the Government adopted action hn/i ,1 ' I™}* m Gove "™ent vacillated, and the moment for noXn PAr pi e {", r , ks Wel - e e ?i"- bletl to strengthen their rSfrl,;; tPHS I^- 1,15 ' in attaching importance to the delays ■ LZ7I g }° 2 ? th ? mslo T n - , Even when Sir lan Hamilton was mi i tlZ,% V S d T T n UTe , ilom , Lol ; don, al,a conrer sed with Lord Kitchener, ifcvaa then abundantly clear that the scope of the operations had hot bee. " fully decided upon. Sir lan Hamilton, in his evidence, dwelt stiwly on d l*™ Z\? IDfonnation Y% War Office staff. No scheme llafbeen S-nnt n f P 't «re were "° wat t r su PP'y arrangements, and there was a grea.t want of staff preparation Lord Kitchener still clung to the idea of'getimL^nn 2 w T-VT ,ht ft-f?-i S , lr J ? u H « milt » w™t out with that ■ ffiolll He , t . ook r L( "-dKitehener , s telegram that the passage .of tho eri& Ue K s .7, Bt he forced as peremptory. AdSniralde Eoebecl,' in his shvT+>, n R realised that it would only be possible for the Fleet to Soa 1 0 /, Marraora J f a revolution broke out in Constantinople, '™V woul , d have to again. It would have been difficult tIXTuW !I f etrM 7««rt;to*osowiiP l the Straits.. Tho Commission Ml™ , ] "* was ,. c , , . e " that.Admiral de-Roebeck's opinion had been greatfrero abaiJd P considerations and the loss of prestige Jf. the attack Sir lan Hamilton on March 19, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that lie was reluctantly convinced that the battleships were not likely to force a pat t'l A-i ? Arm 3'. ls . to Participate, tbe operations should not assume the.siAsidiaiy form aijticipatei" Owing to' Sir lan'Hamilton's and Admiral de lloebeck's presentations, on March 23, the operations were postponed unti adequate military forces.had assembled. The Commission finds that a though the attempt to force the Dardanelles was a failure, it was fairlv successful ,„ reheving the pressure on Russia, while it delayed the' ear & " unmobilised ga " a . l ° War, mi Upt a, large force of Turks a long Xe x ' MINUTES BY OVERSEA MEMBERS ' .'■ . Mr. Andrew Fisher (High Commissioner.for Australia) attached a minute, dissenting from the .view the report takes. He disagrees with" the view that the-naval advisers should haye.expressed their views to the Council whether asked or not,.if they considered the Council's. project impracticable from the naval point of view, and also with the Commission's iuabil- ' ity to concur with Lord Fisher's view that he should either have maintained silence or resigned. Mr. Fisher expresses the opinion that it would seal •?i °1 res P° nsl °le government if State servants snared responsibility with Ministers. : . . . ...... .

Sir Ihonias Mackenzie, in a minute, declares that it would be premature to report or express' an opinion on the general'results. Sufficient evidence had not been taken to enable a decision to be formed on the objects attained. • It would be necessary for a complete inquiry into the subsidiary operations to be made to secure the true'perspective. He agrees with Mr. I'ishor on the point respecting experts giving their views unasked. ■

GENERAL CRITICISM OP THE HIGH COMMAND RUDIMENTARY FACTS OVERLOOKED. The report reviews the general working constitution of the Higher Command:— ■ ° From the commencement of the war until November 25, 1914,. no change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations. v This machinery consiste d of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of .Imperial Defence, with the War Office-and the Admiralty acting as executive agents. It niust have been, obvious from' the first ihat it "was Jar too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war, and it' is regrettable that this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak ot tho war. _ Thus, for four months, when events of tho' utmost importance were occurring, the machinery for the higher operations was both clumsy, and inefficient. Eventually an. improvement was effected] The Cabinet appears to have, been generally informed of, any. important .decisions taken by the War Council, but not until executive steps' had '.' been "taken to give whole or partial effect to the decisions of. the' Council. This was what had happened over the naval/and military operations at the Dardanelles. Some of the members of Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going : on. The .Commission was convinced' that had the naval members of the board been regularly and collectively consulted on the largo questions of war policy during the present naval campaign, so me at least of the events which' tho Empire is bitterly deploring would no t have happened, and that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords is enlarged and definite there is no adequate assurance that similar disasters will not recur. •■'. Kitchener Too H Ighly Centralised. Regarding the administration of the War Office, the Commission thinks thati thero was a regrettable devolutio nof authority. The responsibility on which the War.Office was based was ignored by Lord Kitchener. All the evidence points to tho fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult, his subordinates, and gave orders over the chiefs of Departments. He centralised 1 the whole administration in his own hands, when an Order-in-Councitat a iater stage in the war restored the power of tho Chief of General Staff." Sir Beg-' inald Brado (Secretary of tho War Office) was of opinion that this was due to Lord lutchener not asking, or disregarding, the advice-of the' General • Staff. Lord' Kitchener pushed centralisation to extremes. ';■ Though if"had proved eminently .successful in the Sudan, it was unsuitable for-lar<*e-scale operations, and threw work on the hands of one man which no-.-individual-could successfully cope,with. . ■ • ; ..-•..••■ Testimony Reviewed. ■■■'■ ■•{'- % ■ ■■■ ■■ ■ ■■■■ Mr. Winston Churoill, during Bis examination, said: "I -.often ' heard Cabinet .say it did not'wish. to. be told this secret' matter, ■ as x'the fewer who knew about it the better." These members were very rightly 'content to delegates the full powers of Cabinet to their' colleagues on the' War Council Mr. 11. M'Konna, in his evidence, confirmed this 'delegation: of power. A distinction has to be made between real responsibility devolving on .several Ministers who are members of the War Council. Mr. Lloyd George, Sir ■ Edward Grey, and the Marquis of Crewe exercised an' undoubted and very legitimate influenco;'but the main responsibility rested on Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill. The lattor,' in his' evidence,' said:.' "lii its early stages the war was carried on by Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and me; but I was on rather a different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr. Asquith or Lord Kitchener. If they said this or that whs to he done, that settled it." ■ • • . The Commission finds that this description of the working of the machine was substantially correct, save that M r . Churchill probably assigned'to himself a more unobtrusive part than he actually played. Thore was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. General Sir James Wolfe Murray, First Military Member of th 0 Army Council, stated that Lord Kitchener 'acted very much as.lus own Chief of Staff. General Murray had nover been asked to express any opinion. The Admiralty was different. Mr. • Churchill was not an expert, and Lord Fisher and Admiral Sir A.'\K. Wil- ' son acted as the experts. Lord Fisher' explained that neither he nor Ad- ". miral Wilson nor General Murray wero members of the War Council. "We^ : were experts, wlio only opened our ino u ths when wo were told."' They were: nover asked anything .about tho Dardanelles. Admiral Sir A. Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher's statements. Mr. Churchill, in evidence, declared that . his naval collcagncs hud the right and power to correct him or dissent from i.' his views, and wero fully cognisant of their rights. . ■ ' . ,• Viscount Grey stated that the War Council went entirely, in naval and military matters, by tho opinions expressed by the two Ministers. Mr. Balfour expressed the opinion that if tho* experts did not express themselves' ho would infer that they assented. Ho did not think they should, remain ; silent if they did mib agree with.the propositions. Tho military exports stood' ■ on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener was an expert. He, however, , thought that the 'member of Cabinet Presiding should have facilitated the; assent or dissent of tfie experts by asking them for their opinion. Lord Haldiine said ho would cxpecfc Lord Fisher, if lie had any objections, to have stated them: and he did not concur with Lord Fisher's view of the War Council. T!ie Ma:;juis of Crowe said he thought the political nicni' hers of tho Council did too much talking,' and the experts too little. ! Mr. Lloyd George also disagreed with Lord Fisher's view. None of the Junior Sea Lords were con&'ilteu about the Dardanelles. Commander Lambert expressed the opinion that the Dardanelles-was-a proper subject for discussion b.v the Admiralty Board. _ ''!■'■ On November 22, 1915, the Junior See. Lords submitted a minute to Mr. Bnlfotir that' Mm principlo that the supremacy of the First Lord is complete and unassailable had been pushed too far and tended to imperil the national safety. Mr. Chyrchijl agreed thai, tlfe four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, hut Privice Louis of Battenberg and Lord Fisher did not favour the idea. Tho Commission found tlf:it j\lr. Asquith was ill-informed as to the way the business of the Adrairaltv wp.s conducted, when he told the - Commission thafc the War Council was entitled to assume that any view submitted by tho First Lord was the considered opinion of tlie Admiralty Board. The above report was signed by all the members except Mr. Roch.

THE MINORITY REPORT GO-AS-YOU-PLEASE METHODS. In a lengthy minority report, Mr. Boch finds that tho forcing of tho Dardanelles was considered when Lord Fisher commanded ill tho Mediterranean ; later, wheii Lord Fisher was First Sea Lord; and later, in 1916, by the General Staff. Lord Fisher decided it was mightily Hazardous. • The General Staff decided against naval or military action. On December 28, 1914, Liout.Golonel Hanlioy (Secretary to tho Comniitteo of Imperial Defence) circulated a memorandum' to tho War Council, suggesting that Germany should be struck effectively through Turkey. In January, 1915, Mr. Lloyd George circulated a memorandum outlining a. far-reaching policy against Austria, in cooperation wtli tho Greeks, Rumanians, and Serbians, and also the withdrawal of substantial forces from Franoe._ Admiral Sir H. ,B. J.ackeon presented' to Air. Churchill a memorandum advising againsi' the possibility of rushing tho DardanelleSj and showing ihe losses involved in oven reaching the Straits.

Lord Fisher, Admiral Wilson, an 3 Admiral Oliver expressed objections to •■ : -.; the naval attack, but aftor a meeting of the War Council on January 13 commenced working out details for a systematic reduction-''of-the forts by a naval bombardment. Later, Lord Fisher toldiMr. Churchill that he would' not attend the War' Council. not like this Dardanelles affair." ''■'■> Whereupon Mr. Asquith wrote tb Lord Fisher, stating that he thought it im- r perativo that Lord Fisher should attend for half an hour before the meeting . ■ of January 18, for discussion. Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill, and Lord Fisher ' fiilly discussed the proposal. ''>.-.■ _ Lord Fishor's Resignation. Later, at the War Council, a dramatic incident occurred. After Mr. Churchill explained his scheme on the map, .Lord Fisher left the table. • Lord Kitchener followed, and asked Lord Fisher what he intended-. to do. ■ Lord Fisher replied that he would not return to the table, and intended to resign his position as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener urged' Lord Fisher that as he was the only dissentient, and as Mr. Asquitb had decided upon the venture, it was his (Lord Fisher's) duty to remain at the.. Admiralty. Lord Fisher, after further conversation, reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitch-' ener's entreaty, and resumed his seat. ' : On May 14, when the War Council decided to persevere with the scheme; Lord Fisher thought that his own great alternative scheme, which had been his main preoccupation during this period, and to which his mind and' energies Jl&d been almost exclusively devoted, was doomed. Ho said: "I am faced by the progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy.'-' On the he resigned his post. ■ Meanwhile, on March 12. Sir Jan Hamilton was nominated to command the Dardanelles Forces, leaving for the Dardanelles next' day. He was assisted by no Staff preparation, no preliminary scheme of operations of any. kind. .'lt wasr still assumed that the Navy would force the passage of the Dardanelles. The War Council on March 19 authorised Mr. Churchill to inform Admiral Do Roebeck to continue the Dardanelles operations as re thought fit. The War Council did not meet until May 14. i- Condemnatory Conclusions. The War Council concentrated its attention too much on the political ends to be gained by an Eastern offensive. The War Council never -had' detailed Staff estimates of men munitions, material, or definite plans showr; ing what military operations were possible. The War Council under'-csti- '. mated, without any real investigation, the strength of the Turkish opposition. The. War Council rejected, without sufficient consideration, all previous • expert opinions against a 'naval attack on the forts. Mr. Churchill failed to : present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers. Mr. ; Churchill failed to consult the Board of the Admiralty. Mr. Roch decides that important political advantages were gained by the '■ first success of the naval attack, and strongly urges that similar operations in future should be thoroughly considered by-a joint naval and military staff.