PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3019, 5 March 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Germany iis likely to have her hands so full in the immediate future that the fears expressed in some quaiters on behalf of Holland may prove to be groundless. At the same time, there is a good deal to support the opinion that the recent torpedoing of ' seven Dutch steamers was a deliberate attempt to goad Holland into war, and it is not impossible that a burglarious invasion of ' that country has a place in the plans Germany has formed to meet tho great attack by the Allies' which is now imminent. It may be 'taken for granted that Germany is quite unscrupulous in this matter as in others, and regards it purely from., the standpoint of n-.ateria! profit and less. Some of Germany's incentives to invade Holland are mentioned to-day in extrac-isi' from an article by LiEur. Dene Puaux, formerly foreign editor of tho Paris Tempi. LiKirr. Puaux mentions foodstuffs and gold, and the. value of the Dutch coast as affording submarine bases. Freedom to us* iho mouth of the Scheldt would iu itself bo regarded by Germany as an immensely important gain. 'As an addition, lo this list it may be noted that a successful invasion of Holland would materially augment! Germany's existing supply of forced labour. It wai upon this item of I forced labour that Lmin PmnchJ laid chief emphasis when he ex- ! pressed the opinion (in a recent interview with an : ' American correspondent) that the small neutral countries adjacent to Germany were in grave danger of being attacked.

Field fortifications and spadd work, Lord French remarked, are- of far move importance and value to-day than they have been at any previous timo in the history of tlio war. : If the manual labour thus cutailed can bo carried out bf impressing tho populations of countries whicli have been subjugated by hostile troops, this, of course, would add iinmcnßuly to tho strength of tho lighting fronts. There are many other ways in which tho populations of subjugated countries can bo used, and principally it is necessary to considor and determine the military value of impressed men on lines of communication. This also is of jDiucli increased importance in war to-daj'. Tt is difficult to assess this extra strongth in actual figures. The subjugation oC neighbouring neutral States, Loud French: added, would increase Germany's military powor in proportion as her strength has been enhanced by impressing the populations ■of the smaller countries she has already overrun.

Holland has a scheme of defence by inundation intended to protect a portion of the country, including the most important sections of the coast. The nominal war strength of the .Dutch army is 200,000 men, but in defence, of her neutrality Holland would probably put morn than twice that number of men in tho field. In addition Germany woukt have to reckon upon tho forces with which the Allies might be'expected to assist Holland if she were attacked. All things considered, Germany would bo likely to find tho subjugation of Holland no easy matter, but here, as elsewhere, shovhas a, big advantage in her interior communications, and in certain circumstances sho might brave the risks and difficulties of tho enterprise, hoping to win speedy success in an overwhelming attack. Burdened as sho now is, it is almost certain that sho is incapablo of diverting the force which would,be needed to invade Holland with hope of success, but tho possibility was Long ago recognised that Germany might undertake the invasion in conjunction _ with a retreat to tho shortest available line in the Western theatre—the line of the Meuse. A successful retreat to that lino might put Germany in a position to secure her northern flank, and augment her resources, by an invasion of Holland. It would at all events encourage her to attempt these things. The opinion is widely held, however, that it is now beyond _ Germany's power to shorten her line by a retreat to the Meuse without suffering disastrous defeat and loss. Upon the correctness or otherwise of this judgment, the fate of Holland, as well *s still greater issues, may turn.

Reports in hand from the Western theatre still leave some questions open concerning the enemy retirement on the northern part of tho Sommo front, but also throw interesting, light upon its detail features. In the first place, there is a report from Sin Douglas Haig stating that further progress has been made on tho approach to Bapaume from tho south-west and also east of Gommecourt, near tho northern extremity of tho line on which the enemy defences have been, penetrated in the development of tho Somme offensive. The Commander-in-Chief mentions also that enemy counter-attacks upon the British advanced positions south of Bapaume were repulsed. Unless it is assumed that the enemy retirement in the vicinity of Bapaume has been completed, this last item pretty thoroughly disposes of recent German reports that the retirement is being carried out under cover of weak rearguards. Dispatches from correspondents indicate that the British arc now within about a mile of Achict-le-Grand junction, and that_ they have extended their penetration of tho enemy line northward to a, point near Monchy-au-Bois, which stands about two and a half miles north oE Gommecourl'. It is shown also that while the enemy has been favoured fn his retirement by foggy weather, a recent interval of fine weather enabled the British aeroplanes to freely observe his dispositions. \

All tho evidence at present avail■ablc indicates that the enemy" is making a, merely local retirement, presumably with a view to improving the defensive strength of his line in the northern part of the domino area. Ma. Philip Gibbs mentions that prisoners taken near Monchy were ignorant of any plan of retirement-some had actually been told by their officers that talk about a withdrawal was a silly rumour. Near Monchy the British havo penetrated only the extreme

outer crust oE the original German defences, and it may bo assumed that if a retirement from positions further north is contemplated, it has yet to begin. At the other end of the front on which tho enemy retirement has been made and followed up, the British have made no recent progress against tho defences around Le Transloy. Up to the present the Germans have retired on a front of about 13 miles from point to point, and en the northern part of this front to a very limited extent.

As matters stand a less grandiose explanation of the cntniy retirement must be found than the one proffered by German writers—that fIiNDENBUKG is executing a plan in which ho aims at forcing a decision by effecting an extreme concentration. Up tp tho present the enemy has not attempted any material shortening of the AVest front which would enable him to effect an economy and concentration of fighting power. One German correspondent declares that Hindexdtjkg intends to terminate, trench •warfare, and adds that experience in Rumania and Macedonia proves the Germans immensely superior to the British in open fighting. This is empty talk. Tho restoration of a war of movement, certainly not_ likely to. be brought about otherwise than by their own efforts, will represent to the Allies the opportunity upon which their hopes are fixed.

Oxe of tho most informative messages cabled to-day_ comes from correspondents at British Headquarters, who state, amongst other things, that the enemy trenches recently captured are in very bad condition, and show an entire lack of careful preparation. This probably indicates tho real motive of the German movement to tho rear. No doubt the enemy found himself far too seriously bombarded and harassed during tho winter to dream of attempting to construct and strcrigthen a new defensive lino immediately in face of tho Allied offensive, and, as the next best thing, set himself _ to prepare such .-a line somc.miles in rear of. the front.upon which the armies were then in contact. Whether tho retirement involved in this policy has reached its intended limits is an open question, but in any case prospects, from tho enemy's standpoint,' are not rosy. As matters stand his line in the Soinme region is badly placed and vulnerable, and his retirement has intensified the danger of a damaging attack upon the flanks of his defensive positions north and south of the area in which it has been carried out.

Some of the most extraordinary comments which have been made upon late events in the Sommc region are credited to tho London Nation. It states that by falling back to tbe Arras-Kailly lino the Germans will probably regain the use of ten or fifteen divisions. At the front between Arras and Sailly (both places in tho hands of the Allies)' turns west in a bold salient, and, following this salient, has a length of about -27 miles. Arras and Sailly are 19 miles apart. The Nation apparently means that by evacuating this salient and holding a lino across its baso—which would mean at most a. saving of eight miles of front, and in practice, probably much less—tho Germans would release ton or fifteen divisions. Allowing for the fact that tho Germans have increased the numbor a of their divisions by reducing their individual strength, there may bo-MO enemy divisions, or a. slightly larger f number, available for tho whole West front, which has a total length of about five hundred miles. . That tho Gormans contemplate evacuating the salient between Arras and Sailly is likely enough, but to say that by shortening their front by something' less than eight miles they would release from a fifteenth to a tenth of tho total strength of their .Western armies is palpably, absurd. By its absurdity wc may estimate tho value of the Ration's general assertions that if tho Germans fall back to tho Arras-Sailly line tho only inference possible will bo that abler minds are directing the enemy than ever before, and that tho Germany which determined to hold Combles, Thiepval, and Poziercs at all costs was a weaker opponent than the Germany which abandons positipns only to be retained at prohibitive 'cost. Available evidence suggests that the enemy, instead of boldly embarking on a new policy, is simply doing what he can under pressure of hard necessity to patch a dangerously 'invaded line.

In a message, just rcceivod, the Germans claim to have,penetrated the Russian line west of Lusk to a depth of nearly a mile on a front of a mile and a half. If the report is accurate, it implies that the enemy achieved pronounced success in a local attack, but when operations are actively resumed in Southern .Russia it is likely that less will be heard of Lusk than of Kovel junction and the lateral railway (connecting that place with Lenibcrg) which is the vital link between the enemy armies in Southern Russia and those in Galicia. In their great offensive- last year the Russians failed by a narrow margin to reach this objective. They will assuredly make a most determined attempt to reach it in the campaign about to open.