PROGRESS OF THE WAR
An ofhcial report dealing with the I operations, in Mesopotamia has some ; father Unexpected features, It will be remembered that the British forces now hold thj) south bank of the ligns to n point five miles or more due west" of Kut-cl-Amara, while the lurks on tlio north bank occupy entrenchments at Sannaiyat, about 14 miles downstream from that place. For a distance of about twenty milesj as the crow flies, tho opposing armies face each other across the Tigris, each holding one bank. The success with which the British hg.vfo lately been pushing westwai# along the south bank suggested tp,t they were preparing to force 'the passage of the Tigris and cut across the enemy's communications on the north bank. Doing 60 they would compel him to evacuate all his positions between the point of crossing and Sannaiyat. To-day's indicates,_ however, that this -£ilan of operations is not deemed w;ac.ticab!e. It is stated that since thfe" British forces cleared the bend west of Kut on the south bank of the river, all their efforts have been concentr&ted upon taking the Sannaiyat position. This entails a frontal attack upon tho strong entrenchments in which the Turks (successfully resisted attack in tho final phase of tho attempt to relieve General Tovjtshend at Kut-el-Amara. On April 23 last year, British forces under General Gorringe carried the first and second trenches of the Sannaiyat position, but were driven out of them again by a Turkish counter-attack. The present attack, in which thus far two lings of trenches have been captured and consolidated, is being made under happier auspices, but is nevertheless opposed by formidable difficulties.
I _At Sannaiyat the Turks are estabI iiahed on a front of about two miles, 1 with on 6 flank resting on tho river ! and the other on a wide tract of j marshy ground extending to the : north. Under tho flood conditions which are described in to-day's report—the result of heavy rains— even this front may have been contracted. The difficulty of forcing a. narrow passage of this character, in a locality in which the enemy has had ample time to construct successive lines of entrenchments, is obvious. The enemy positions are exposed to enfilading 'fire from the south bank of tho river, but up to the present no great profit seems to have been derived from this circumstance. A British attack on Sannaiyat on February 17 was unsuccessful and it is evident that the two lines of trenches now held were gained in hard fighting. The flood conditions which are at present hampering operations may not be of long duration. The regular flood season, when the Tigris is swollen 1 'by x the_ melting of the snow in the Armenian mountains, opens usually at the beginning of April.
Why it should be necessary to attack the, enemy in his aavantageo'usly sited positions on the north bank instead of working round them from the south is for tne present a matter of conjecturc, but it will probably, prove that factors of transport supply the explanation. Ono passage in tho report received to-day states_ that the flooded' state of the Tigris is hindering opera- , tions "and making tho supply of the troops on the left (north) bank 1 a matter of some difficulty." If the river wcro now as formerly utilised as the main line of transport it would be no moro difficult to supply one bank than the other. Tho message aB it stands carries a plain suggestion that tho British are now depending chiefly on a land transporfc routo on the south bank of the Tigris. Possibly the railway which is under construction has been carried into the near neighbourhood of i?- £shting area. The lines upon which the campaign is developing are understandable if it is assumed that* while the British have constructed an improved transport route (railway or railway and road) on the south bank, the Turks have improved their communications on the north bank. There has been 110 word of any Turkish railway. construction south of Bagdad, Tr P' aC6 was connected with Kut-el-Amara by a fairly good road when the campaign opened. A comparatively limited amount of road construction on either side of Kut-el-Amara may. thus have placed the lurks m the position of being able to very rapidly concentrate force at any point oh the river at which a crossing is threatened. In that caeo the crossing of the river from the south bank might be a very formidable undertaking. Evidently it is regarded as i&ore difficult, for the time being, than the forcing of the strongly defended , bottle-neck at oannaiyat.
A late message brings nows of a considerable extension of the British offensive movement along the Ancre valley. Sir Douglas Haig j states that the onemy evacuated important positions as' the result of unceasing pressure. North of the Ancre the attacking troops pushed forward, on a front of a mile and a half south and south-east of Serro and south of the river they advanci ?u n a £ ont '°t a mile an d entered the village of Petit Miraumont so gaming ground on the flank of n x'l ar f?* r Vl^a £ e °f Miraumonfe. At Petit Miraiimont the British are Just about two miles east of the positions east of Be-auc'ourt- which they held at the beginning of January.
Permanent link to this item
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19170226.2.23
Bibliographic details
Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3013, 26 February 1917, Page 6
Word Count
895PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 3013, 26 February 1917, Page 6
Using This Item
Stuff Ltd is the copyright owner for the Dominion. You can reproduce in-copyright material from this newspaper for non-commercial use under a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 New Zealand licence. This newspaper is not available for commercial use without the consent of Stuff Ltd. For advice on reproduction of out-of-copyright material from this newspaper, please refer to the Copyright guide.