PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2998, 8 February 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Events are now developing on tho West front in a fashion which suggests that it may not be long before- the grand offensive is again definitely under way. Following up their late success cast of Beaucourt the British have advanced northeastward of Gueudecourt, a village situated due south of Bapaumc, and they have also captured a thousand yards of tronch in the neighbourhood of Grandcourt. This' last achievement is particularly noteworthy. Grandcourt stands just south of the Anere, about a mile east of Beaucourt, which. is on tho north bank. The striking feature of tho affair is that the thousand yards of trench taken from theenemy near Grandcourt were, in the words of Sib Douglas Haiq's report, occupied unopposed. It is manifestly a strange thing that the enemy should thus tamely resign a defensive position on a vital seo tion of his front. Two explanations aro possible. One is that tho captured trench line near Grandcourt was mado untenablo by the recent British advance beyond Beaucourt. As information stands, however, thcro is nothing to support this theory and it seems more likely that tho easy capture resulted from the enemy's practice of thinly manning his forward lines, in positions under bombardment, with a view to minimising his losses. During tho last few weeks reports have come through of a number of raids on various parts of the- front in wJiich British detachments penetrated deeply into the enemy- line and ultimately withdraw after destroying dug-outs and other defensive works. _ Apparently the cuciuy has been risking such incursion's rather than expose any largo number of men to shell-h'rc in his forward trenches. He will find it necessary to change this policy, howover, if he discovers that his weak-ly-held trenches aro liable not only to bo raided, but to he occupied and retained in sudden attacks. • * * « An official report from Mesopotamia tells of continued progress in the methodical attacks that aro leading up to the investment or capture of Kut-cl-Ainara. Tho British forces aro now facing Kut-ol-Aimira across the Tigris on three sides of tho river loop inside which the little town stands. The Bhiitt-cl-Hai en tors tho Tigris opposite tho south-western face of Kut-el-Amara, and to-day's news is that the British have occupied the wholeof the south bank of tho Tigris as far as the Hai junction, and in addition an extent of ground west of the Hai. The liquorice factory mentioned in one of the cablegrams stands on the south bank of the Tigris, opposite Kut, and about t>oo yards north-west of the Hai junction. From the factory the line extends west, which suggests that tho Turkish entrenchments extend across a loop of the Tigris immediately west of tho smaller loop in which Kut is situated. A bridge of boats which spans the Tigris five miles west of Kut may mark tho western flank of the present Turkish line south of the river. Assuming a continued pressure of attack the position must be regarded, from the Turkish standpoint, as precarious. The troops which are attempting to stem the British advance west of Kut aro fighting with tho Tigris immediately behind them and are in clanger of being penned up without hope of retreat. Not long ago a Turkish force got out of a similar predicament further east by quietly crossing the river in boats at night, but a repetition of the feat may be difficult. Kut-el-Amara is already exposed to converging artillery fire. On the north Tiank of the Tigris the British are still held up by enemy entrenchments about 14 miles below Kut, but if they succeed in crossing tho river anywhere in the region of tho present fighting (westward of Kut) tho enemy's defence, as it is at present organised, will be completely overturned, and ho will bo compelled to retreat up river. The Tigris at Kut is about eighty yards wideband a crossing should not present insuperable difficulties.

The weather, a very important factor in Mesopotamia, should for some time favourable to active operations. Early in February last year the heavy rains which had fallen during January ceased. Gold drying winds blew from the desort and there was frost at night. Climatio conditions remained favourable until the beginning of April, when the Hood season opened which usually _lasts through April and May. During these months the Tigris is fed by the melting snows of. the Armenian hills, and overflows its banks and spreads over the adjacent country. In February and

March last year the British forces were greatly impeded by defective transport arrangements, and the floods, when they arrived, materially assisted the Turks in 'their tiefence of river-bank positions b a low Kut-el-Amara. This year thtrd may be another story to tell. Since the failure of the aclv.vnce on Bagdad and its sequel there has been a tendency in some quarters to depreciate the Mesopotamia!! campaign, and even to condemn it as involving a. diversion of force to a distant theatre, where no very important objective is in immediate sight. This, however, is a narrow and short-sighted view. The Mesopotamian enterprise has its place, and that a not unimportant one, in the general scheme of the Allied Eastern campaign, and even at its present stago of development it is holding in play an appreciable proportion of Turkey's available strength. If the Mesopotamian operations involved tho transport of men and material from Western Europe their conduct would entail an almost intolerable burden and one that Britain would probably not be justified in taking up. In fact, however, the main base of the British army in Mesopotamia is not Britain, but India—a much more convenient base. The army consists in large part of Indian tiroops which are being recruited in increasing numbers with tho loyal co-operation of the great majority of the rulers and people of India. It is likely that tfie Mesopotamian Army is a great deal stronger now than it was in the early part of last year, and that the 'enveloping movement against Kut-el-Amara and other positions in its neighbourhood has already created an imperative demand for Turkish reinforcements. i> * * * The detention of a strong Turkish force in Mesopotamia is an end in itself, but beyond this prospects arc now opening in the Balkans which if they are realised will give added importance to the subsidiary campaigns, in Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Egypt. No one of these campaigns, looked at alone, holds out prospects of decisive results. But given a well-organised Allied offensive in the Balkans, the subsidiary campaigns will at oncecontribute to its success and themselves present enlarged possibilities. Dangerously pressed in the Balkans the Germanic Powers would in ordinary course look to Turkey to take up a considerable part of the burden of defence in that quarter. But if • Turkey is already heavily involved in three widely separated portions of her territory—not to speak of the possibility of an' attack upon tho Bagdad railway in the region of Alcxandretta—she will be in no condition to render her allies effective aid in the Balkans. At the same time a successful Allied offensive in the Balkans would be a big step towards eliminating Turkey as a belligerent. Pkospects of such an offensive being launched and developed are certainly improved by late events in Greece. Present indications arc that CoNSTANrau has been abandoned by his German taskmasters, and that his submission to the Allied demands fully secures and safeguards the rear and communications of General Sarkail's army, which is reported to have been considerably reinforced. Tho outlook 5n the Balkans was recently reviewed in tho following terms by the military contributor to tab Forlnighllu Review: Reinforcements are now being scut to Macedonia, Rullieient, let us hope; not only to Bavo Monastir from a counterattack, but to enable Goncral Surrail to )i»lit his way to tho Danube. 'What the enemy did in tho autumn of ]!)15 wo can ilo, it wo have tho will, in tho spring of 1917. Tho Allied Powers havo ■ plctlscd thomsclvcs to' restore Serbia to tho Serbians, and the pledge must be fulfilled. AVhat hip been lost by diplomatists ciiu b« recovered by soldiers. Ncgativi! strategy; counts for nothing in vyar; It would bo bettor to evacuate Salonika than to go on marking tirao there. ■Troops lonked np in. oiitronched camps lose their moral. It is always easy to produce an array of specious arguments for doing nothing, and this is where the "Higher Commands" have gone wrong. There is yet time to save a situation which would never liuve arisen it' tho conduct of tho war ou the side of the Allies had beon' lnurlccd l>y tho siiiuo unify of command anil co-operation of effort which aro the secret of our enemy's success. Since these observations were made the outlook in the south-eastern theatre and neighbouring areas ol war has distinctly improved. Tho enemy has been brought to a halt in lliiraania, Turkey is grappling with increasing difficulties, and prospects of a powerful attack by the enemy upon the Allied liuc in Macedonia have receded. Taking account of Constantinij'h surrender and of thi! rising stir of activity in the main theatres it now seems unlikely that anything of tho kind will be attempted. Tho prospect appears instead that the next month or. two will witucss not only the resumption by tho Allies of their goncral offensive in tho main theatres, but a powerful and determined effort ou their part to recover all that they have lost in (Southeastern Europe.