WHAT WE HAVE WON

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2990, 30 January 1917, Page 6

WHAT WE HAVE WON

THE GREAT RESULTS OF THE SOW (By Filson Young, in the "Daily Mail.") What exactly is tho result to date of the Somme olt'ensive? Has it really succeeded, or has it been, on tlie whole, a failure? And my very earilest impressions were on the whole depressing. Tho ground over which the advance has passed is such a scene c£ hideousness and destruction as surely has never been seen in the world before. Add to it the sum of priceless lives lost and wrecked, and you may well wonder what possible change of a lint* of a littlo bit of the map of France can possibly be worth it. But just as the map does not show:the horrors of such a series of battles, neither does it show all their fruit and advantage. And as one daily learns more, looks more closely behind tho veil of mere ugliness, mere negatireness, mere disgustingness, that lies over the whole thing, so one begins to not only the price that has been paid, but the profit thatlras been reaped.. I will not exaggerate it or attempt to estimate its effect on tho' war as a whole; that is all guessworks B\rt I will state as simply as possible what I believe to be the actual advantages gained. Strategic Advantages.—The two main? objects of the Somme offensive wer§ ttf' relieve Verdun and to kill many mors of tho enemy than he could kill of us.Both were achieved. Verdun was not only relieved, but the French armies were able to resume the offensive and push forward their line. As to losses, the Allies have put out of action, more than a class and a half of the whole German army; all the men,-that is.to say, effective and non-effective, who jcrin the colours during at least a year and a half. 11. Moral Advantages.—When you have not gaine3 a material victory it is best to be silent about moral results; they amount, in an affair of this kind, to precious little if they are not hacked up by solid practical achievement. But in this case, where we gained the two main objectives of tho-attack, they ara to be regarded as very considerably enhancing the value of its success. The Germans opposed to us on the front suffered in courage and determination as the battle went on.

Again, this is not surmise; it is proved, and is confessed by themselves in a thousand documents in our possession. The reason is not that they; wero not brave and determined men, but that they experienced the effects of a continuous artillery assault from a greater number of guns, firing an enormously greater amount of high explosive than was ever employed before by any army in the world. "We knew all the divisions opposed to usj wo know how often every one of them was in the front line; and we know the difference between their vigour of opposition on the second and the -first occasions. ■ They fought heroically, 6ut they could not stand it. This kind of shelling was utterly new to | them; and its result on them was, perhaps, new also in their experience—■ it was demoralisation.

Advantages in Material.—One of tha objectives of an attack like this is ta destroy the enemy's material. We! achieved that also, to such an extent that towards the middle of the battla he had to begin to economise. We have orders in our posession, taken,' from • captured officers, forbidding the constant calling for barrage fire on the part of divisional commanders, owing to the rapid using up of artillery ammunition. And there are five—in soma places ten —British shells waiting to reply to one German shell that comes across. -.■•.-.

IV. ;. Advantages to our own Armies.—i These, both moral and scientific, havej been considerable. Our infantry, once they knew they had the guns backing them up, showed a spirit keener and finer than they had ever shown before; as the advance continued their whole tone changed. "Whatever they suffered themselves, they knew that Brother; Boche was getting, and would continue to get, worse than he was giving. Ana, in the contentment of that thought they; fought, and knew that they were nob fighting in vain; suffered, and knew that they were not suffering in vain; died, and knew that they were nob dying in vain. Finally, the New Army was tried and proved. The Somme is the battle of the New Army—it is their victory. It was the achievement of an Army hastily extemporised, men and officers alike, from "a nation of shopkeepers"; it was opi posed to the most highly organised Army in the world. And it won.

There, simply put, are the main advantages of the Somme offensive. Its disadvantages, its countless individual tragedies, wo all know; but we" were prepared for them, we offered them, to gain these real and, as we all pray, lasting things.' "Writing on the very, ground, among the very groves of that sacrifice, I can say that 1 believe it to have been well worth while; and I have given my reasons. The New-Army is now (for men learn quickly in such' a- tremendous school, and the lives'of armies are short) a veteran Army; the pack has been blooded; and it will do greater things in the days to come. There is only one thing that reali? depresses Tommy, and that is strife and warfare in England. It does not interest him to read of political battles. All he asks is that- you should leavo the "strafing" to him, and let him feci that, if nowhere else on the tortured earth, there is peace and unity at home.