PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2983, 22 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A reported German concentration in Southern Alsace, along the northern frontier of Switzerland, continues to attract attention and to oxcite speculation. It is stated today that about 400,000 enemy troops have been assembled in the region between Basle and Lake Constance, where they aro conveniently plieod for aetion either in Alsace or in the Austro-Italian theatre, or to undertake the invasion of Switzerland, which is regarded in some quarters as a possibility. The enemy's actual object is for the moment purely a matter of conjecture. To-day's cablegrams quote a number of military experts and others who have attempted to road the riddle, but it -will be observed . that their comments and explanations, one with another, cover practically the whole range of possibilities. An invasion of Switzerland is said to be feared by the military authorities of that country, but such a statement is hardly likely to have been made with authority, ;and the fact that the Swiss Government has taken the precaution of considerably increasing the mobilised strength of its army does not necessarily moan that it seriously apprehends a German invasion. The expectation of great battles in adjoining territory would in itself supply a motive for the additional Swiss mobilisation.

Several other theories are advanced as possibly accounting for the German concentration. An Italian newspaper suggests that the troops assembling may be intended to act against Italy. A Berno message remarks that the Germans may bo contemplating an attack on the French in the Belfort sector, facing Southern Alsace. Another idea is that the Gorman concentration in Alsace is a feint intended to induce a French concentration in that sector, and create favourable conditions for a sudden Gorman stroke in Lorraine. Still another theory, and one that is at least as plausiblo as any of its competitors, is that the German concentration is chiefly defonsivo in character, and is being effected in anticipation of a French advance on the Rhine by way of Alsace.

What is known of the broad facts of tho war makes it seem highly improbable that tho Germans will open tho active period of tho 1917 campaign with a big offensive in the, Western theatre. They staked upon that policy in 1916, and though they were then stronger and in better case, relatively to tho Allies, than they aro now, the outcome was, from their point of view, disastrous. The _ German "policy took shape and ruinously collapsed, at Verdun. Its aftermath was witnessed in the great battles on the Sommo, in which tho Allies took a long strido towards victory, and in the recovery in a few days and at light cost of a great part of tho Verdun territory which the Germans had captured in months of terribly costly effort. In measuring tho enemy's prospects in tho Western theatre this year it is necessary to remombor that his experience last year was one of disastrous defeat. At Verdun he suffered colossal losses, and completely failed I to attain his objective. ' On the Somffla he was driven out oi im-

monsely strong positions, the conquest of which seriously weakens his front, and in the process suffered noavior losses than ho was able- to inflict upon the attacking armies. It will bo rcmemborcd that in his dispatch reviewing the offensive Sir Douglas Haig stated that, . . .

"there is sufficient evidence to show boyond_ doubt that the enemy's losses in mon and material are considerably higher than those of the Allies."

These woll-cstablishod facts go far to warrant a belief that the enemy has nothing to hope from a big offensive on any part of tho West front this year, and that ho is unlikely to invito a repetition of his Verdun disaster. A drive through Switzerland to an attack upon the Fronch flank might in other circumstances havo attractions for tho German high command, but such a scheme is not likely to find favour to-day. One reason for believing that Germany will not attempt to use Switzerland as a gateway of invasion is that she abstained from doing so when her offensive power, in comparison with that of her enemies, was far greater than it is at tho present stage of the war. A surpriso move by way of Switzerland is out of the question. Tho invasion, if it wcro attempted, would represent an extension of front in face of _ stronger and bettor handled armies, and would involve the addition to the forces arrayed against German of tho small, though not negligible, Swiss army. From tho military standpoint tlv move would be more likely to work out to Germany's detriment than to her advantage. It is to be considered, also, that indifferent as she is to all moral considerations where other nations are concerned, even Germany is hardly likely at this stago of hor fortunes to confirm her outlawry in the eyes of the world by a wanton invasion of Swiss neutrality.

On all grounds tho most plausiblo explanation of the activities noted in tho region of the Swiss frontier is that tho Germans aro apprehensive of a French thrust towards tho Rhine. The statement is credited to-day to Majok Moraht, a wellknown German military writer, that in Southern Alsace the French possess a sally-port which enables them to gravely menace tho German territory west of tho Rhine. This is perfectly truo as far as it goes, but Alsace may ultimately ho used as a sally-port for an attack threatening moro than tho German territory west of the Rhine. It is well within tho bounds of possibility that the Allied offensive this year may comprehend a forward movement in Alsace. The matter was briefly discussed .a week or two ago by a London Times correspondent with the French army. He remarked that the troops holding the lines in the Vosges and Alsace are within about twenty miles of the Rhine, waiting for tho moment when they will descend in flank and rear of the Germans falling back upon tho Rhino at Strassburg. "If,''' ho added, "the Germans commit the mad folly of trying desperately to find another way into France, say, behind Belfort through Switzerland, so much the worse for them. The Germans opposing tho French arc dispirited, and the French could advance if they wanted to, and bombard many Alsatian towns. But they aro waiting for something bigger." The extent of Alsace occupied by tho Frenoh is not groat, but as the correspondent indicates they aro well posted for an advance. On a section of tho frontier north of tho gap of Belfort they have advanced to the eastern fringe of tho Vosges range, overlooking the Alsatian plafn", and they are strongly established in the frontier mountains further north, to the point at which the battlefronti turns west across Lorraine to tho Mouse. Alsace unquestionably is an area in which the enemy is highly vulnerable.

Promising accounts aro given In unofficial messages of tho Allied counter-offensive in Rumania, but the only official reports in hand at time of writing tell of an Allk-d reverse on one section of the Sereth front. The Germans claim that Maokensen has captured a town on the Sereth, apparently in the region of tho central trunk railway, which is now at his disposal as a lino of supply from the south and west. A Russian message admits a retirement towards the Sereth. Neither report throws much light upon the magnitude and importance of the operations touched upon. The news may either relate to a comparatively small affair or may imply that Maokensen has obtained needed reinforcements and resumed the offensive.

An event happily rare in British experience the destruction of a munitions factory by fire and explosion, is reported to-day. Considering that the factory was devoted to tho work of refining explosives the casualty roll thus far announced is lighter than might have been expected, but it brings home the faot that the risks of war are not borne only by soldiers in the field. Tho munitions factories also have their heroes and heroines. Tho statement officially made that the destruction of the factory will make no difference in the output of munitions no doubt relates to the British output. Britain has long been in the position of manufacturing a surplus of explosives, and in part supplying her Allies.

Much criticism has been levelled at the Imperial Government for failuro to enforce a sufficiently stringent sea blockade, and there is no doubt that in tho earlier stages of the war the British blockade policy was in many respects open to oritioism. Progressively, however, the blockade has been tightened and according to a statement by Lord Kobert Cecii, (Ministor for Blockade), -which is published to-day, importations by the neutral countries adjoining Germany of food and other essential commodities have, during tho past year, been kept down to amounts rather less than thoy imported in pre-war days to meet their own internal heeds. The figures quoted by Loud llobrbt Cecil seem to bear out his contention that the enemy is no longer obtaining supplies from overseas. As to the effects which the blockade has. thus far produced in enemy .countries tho Minister was ablo to adduce no moro definite, evidoncc than 1 was already available from other sources, but it may, of course, bo taken for granted that these effects infinitely outweigh anything that tho enemy is_ ablo to accomplish by means of his submarines, or by | slipping a couple of commeree-raid- | iug oruisers through the lines of tho I blockading fleet.