The Dominion. THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1917. GERMANY'S WAR POLICY

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2980, 18 January 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1917. GERMANY'S WAR POLICY

Suggestions havo been made in different quarters during the last week or two that Germany is on the eve of another big offensive in one main theatre or the other. The idea, presented is that she will not, merely push further ahead in tho south-eastern thcatro while comparative stagnation obtains in tho main theatres, but that she will stake her hopes upon an offensive, probably against Russia, when tho weather opens and the war is resumed in full vigour in all theatres. The authors of theso predictions studi.ously ignore the fact that before mid-sununer of last year Germany had carried her traditional policy of tho "unshrinking offensive" to its practicable limits, and to a point of manifest failure, so far as the main Jtheatros are concerned. Her initial plan of annihilatng the French and Russian armies in quick succession broke down. Tho spring and "early summer months of 1916 found her engaged in formidable and tremendously costly efforts to crush the resolution of'her'enemies, whom she no longer hoped to completely ovcrpowor. In this also she failed, disastrously. Those who believe that Germany will persevero this year in a policy of aggression forget in the first place that during last summer and autumn she and her allies were everywhere thrown back upon the defensive and suffered defeats in which their ultimate fate is clearly foreshadowed. Such, people assume also that the Germanic Allies will take the shortest road to defeat, and that assumption must bo regarded with a great deal of doubt. If the continuation of the war depended upon Germany's ability to organise »nd carry out great offensive campaigns its end, we may fairly believe, would be very near. Wo shall §ot' closer to the facts if we _ recognise that it is not upon their striking power, but upon their resisting power, that the Central Empires are now driven to rely. This fact is emphasised by Mr. Robert Crozier Long in an article in the current ,Forlniqhthj Review. "The theory of tho Avar of exhaustion," he remarks, "originally proclaimed in Entente countries as proof beforehand of Germany's defeat, is now being- twisted by German jvritcrs, and—judging by what I hear from well-informed neutrals in touch with Germany— by Germany's responsible leaders, into a reason why Germany must escape defeat. The German theory is simple and plausible: now that we cannot by decisive victory force the Quadruple Alliance Powers to make peaco in a hurry, let us hold what territory we have until exhaustion and hopelessness bring them to torms. . . . Naturally there is no hope of exhausting the Entente intp complete submission, though the economic resisting powers of all Entente States cannot be measured by that-of England. Germany's- expectation is that the world, for reasons not merely material, will have had enough of the war, and that victory will bo with the group whioh, when peaco comes, occupies the most enemy territory in Europe. To tho over-confident on our sido this calculation will seem baseless, but it is basoless only if the Quadruple Alliance has tho will to force the military issue instead of assuming that time can be left to take care of itself."

It is, in fact, quite well established that Germany has progressed by stages to a policy of "holding out"—a policy which will find expression not in exhausting and abortive efforts to crush her enemios, but in ;i| defensive stand against their attacks. Falkgnkayn's success in Rumania has been , hailed in Germany as part and parcel of a defensive scheme. TheXHamburg Naclirkhle.li speaks uf the invasion as a successful shortening of tho Eastern front, conveniently forgotting that tho Eastern front is antl will bo much loDgcr in 19)7 than it was during tho greater part of 1016. Tho partial conquest of Rumania has probably done very much less to strengthen Germany's position tha.u the German people have been led to bolicvo. It is undoubtedly from defensive and delaying tactics that Germany now has most to hopo, but in the conquest of Wallacnia an advantago of 'defensive position has been purchased at a price, that events may ultimately prove to liavo been excessive. Somewhat similar considerations apply to tho offensive in tho Southern Balkans which Germany is now perhaps on tho eve of attempting. Success in such an enterprise would bring her material advantages, but if her utmost hopes' were crowned it would not take her perceptibly nearer to victory in the war. She willstriko in Macedonia, if at all, mainly in the hope of

strengthening a weak point in her j circle, of defences, and depriving the Allies of a vantago-point for attack. At a general view the theory, of a war of exhaustion holds no such, comfort for tho Germans as it hold for tho Allies in tho days when thoy fought for timo, knowing, as Lord Kitchener put it, that they must increaso, and the enemy must decrease. The Allies fought, sustained by tho knowlodgo that development of their uncxploitcd resources would ultimately give them the military superiority they possess to-day. Germany has no such comfort. She knows the present superiority, of the Allies will increase as time goes on. Tho idea underlying her reputed plan of "■holding out" da that defensive, fronts can be made so strong that attacking armies will exhaust themselves in efforts to break through. Experience in both main theatres already goes far to ■ demonstrate that this idea is radically unsound. Against Hindenborq's declaration that if France and England continue their attacks thoy . will (exhaust their reserves of men, there is to be set tho potent fact that on the Somme and at Verdun the Allies mastered vital positions at lower cost to themselves than to tho defending annes. Evidence of this kind, together with the fact that the Teutonic armies are extended today on longer fronts than thoy held at the height of thoir offensive power, justifies a belief that it is within the power of the Allies, as the writer above quoted puts it, "to force the military issue," and that Germany's hopes of exhausting tlioir resolution arc as vain as were the larger hopes with which she entered the war.