PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2973, 10 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

To-days news of tho Rumanian campaign shows that the position is more than over critical. The Battle ! oi the Sereth is now in full, blast, and the enemy continues to make headway.- The chief event reported at time of writing is the capture by the enemy of the railway town of JJocsam. By his own account he t ?°*,^ eai *y folir thousand prisoners at this place and several guns Dqcsam is on the central trunk railway _ which runs north from Wallachia through Moldavia, and stands at a distance of eight miles from the nearest point on the hereto. _ It is stated in a Russian comimmqve that enemy attacks on the herein have been completely unsuccessful Read in conjunction with M. Marcel Hwin's statement about the development of an important Russian offensive on the Soreth line, this looks like good news But if duo account is taken of such detail reports as are available, the immediate outlook . will appear rather less hopeful. Very probably what the Russian message really means is that on a portion of the front between the Danube'and the central railway, on which Focsani stands, the enemy is now attacking the actual lino of the Sereth, and is attempting a crossing. The Russian withdrawal to the north bank of tho Soreth, which is indicated in this message, would bo a natural sequel to the late developments of the campaign. Days ago it wasj shown thai) tho Russians had been]

forced back to a front parallel with the Sereth, and at a. distance of eight miles to the south. This margin the enemy at once. sol. himself to reduce, and ho did reduce, it, notably by the capture of Brailn. This was a state of affairs which could not last. The Russians could not possibly continue to tight a purely defensive battle against an enemy superior in artillery, with a deep and rapid river close behind their front To attempt such a thing would have been to court disaster. In tho circumstances they had only two practicable nllernatives: to launch a counter-offensive or to retire beyond tho river. Apparently they chose tho latter alternative, and have up to the present made a successful stand on the north bank o£ the Sereth, with tho river between them and tho enemy. * * * * The defeat suffered by the Allies at Focsani and the loss of that place may compel them to retire behind the Sereth and tho Trotus on a further section of the front. As yet, however, they hold a narrow belt of territory south of the Trotus, in South-Western Moldavia, where the line of battle extends through tho foothills of tho Carpathians to the main range. The battle, at a general view, appears to be developing iii much the same fashion as was reported yesterday. At some points, north-west of Focsani and elsowhere, the Allies, by bringing up reinforcements, were enabled to attack and check the enemy. But the latter continues to forge ahead towards his immediate objective —the river lines upon which tho Allied defensive is based—and prospects- of any early counteroffensive by the Allies, intended to drive the enemy back in the open country, south of ,t<hc river-lines, have already diminished practically to tho disappearing point. We do not know what grounds M. Hutin has for his assertion that the Russian offensive on the Sereth is important, and for his implied rejection of the German view that it is only an "extricating offensive." But tho facts of the campaign as they are visible seem for once in a way to uphold tho enemy view of the mattei\ On the . eastern section of their front' the Allies have undoubtedly retired _ behind the Danube. It is practically certain, as has been noted, that they have also retired behind tho Sereth between the Danube and a, point somewhere east of Focsani. This would moan that more than half their front between the Black Sea and the Carpathians now follows the north bank of tho Danube, or that of the Sereth, and that they aro better placed than they havo lately been for a defensive stand. But it would mean also that thoy have no immediate intention of attempting a counter-offensivo. As matters now stand the Danube and tho Sereth arc obstacles to the enemy's further progress northward which ho will perhaps not easily surmount.- But they are obstacles also to a southward movement by tho Allies. Launching a counteroffensive now tho Latter would have to either force tho passage of. the rivors they lately crossed in retreat or operate on a narrower and less convenient front than was availablo to theni a week or two ago. On tho facts as they appear we aro justified in believing that M. Hutin is probably wrong in thinking that tno present Russian offensive has any more serious purposo than that of covering a retreat.

' The considerations just touched upon have a wider application than as they boar upon tho immediate plans of the Allies in Rumania. I Tho arresting aspect of the campaign at tho moment is not that the enemy is continuously, though slowly, extending his success, but that he is in a fair way to gain a strong defensive lino and at the same time the shortest available front between tho Carpathians and the Danube. It is possible that, tho natural strength of the TrotusSereth lino, continued to the Black Sea by the Lower' Danube, may enable the Russo-Rumariians to bring the enemy to a halt. But it is not | to bo forgotten that Maokenskn may conceivably bo content to sit down, with the Trotus, Soreth, and Danubo as moats protecting his front, and dotach portion of his troops for (service elsewhere. It is this possibility which keeps alive tho danger that tho Allies may havo to deal with a, formidable enemy offensive in Macedonia before they havo eliminated tho risk of a treacherous attack by the Greek Royalists. There is reason to believe that in his Rumanian venfcuro tho onemy is pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp, and that tho decisive success he. seeks will continuo to olude him. It is not absolutely certain that ho would suffer equal disappointment in Macedonia if within the next few weeks ho transferred to that theatre a considerable part of the strength he is now using in Rumania. All this is vaguo enough, and it is impossible to form any definite conclusion on tho subject in tho absence of specific information as to tho force at' General Sarrail's disposal and tho actual position roachod in Greece It may bo said, however, that the statement made by one correspondent to-day that Germany is intent upon conquering all Rumania and is taking measures accordingly is not necessarily bad news. A great deal of confidence may be placed in the ability of the Russians, upon whom the main burden of the Rumanian campaign rests for tho time boing, to spin out an indecisive contest until the time arrives for more positivo action. And it is perhaps better from the point of view of the Allies that tho enemy should assiduously persevere in his Rumanian venture than, that ho should discontinue it in favour of a Macedonian offensive.

Some of the so-called ultimatums presented to tho Athens Government have turned out to bo of tho blankcartridgo variety, but according to a Reuter correspondent the Allies have presented a new Note to Greece, which is "practically a 48 hours' ultimatum." The text of tho document and the measures by which it is proposed to enforce it are not disclosed at time of writing, but it is Certainly desirable that additional pressure should be brought to bear upon Greece. Constantine has for weeks resisted the demand that heshould canton his army in Peloponnesus, and he has apparently not rendered satisfaction for the treacherous attack made six weeks ago upon Allied detachments which landed at Athens. This, however, docs not nocessarily mean that tho Allies are still allowing themselves to be baffled and befooled by the Greek monarch, as they were until recently. Strictly enforced, as it is now said to have been for several weeks, the blockade is a very potent weapon, and it is doubtful at least if any, better .weapon is available,,

IC it is possible to blockade and starve Greece into submission in a limited period nothing would be gained by resorting Lo military action. It is much Better that the B.oyalist army should be compelled by blockade pressure* to retire into Peloponnesus, where it could he easily and securely held in durance., than that it should be hunted down in the difficult mountain country ol tho provinces further north. There may bo scope, however, for using naval force to accentuate tho pressure upon Greece already imposed by tho blockade.