PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2966, 2 January 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A great deal of fighting is reported in Rumania, but in its broad features the position shaws little change. In battles along the ■Moldavian frontier and south of the Trotus-Sereth line, from the Transylvani'an mountains to the Danube the Russo-Rumauians have at some points lost, and at others gained, ground, and the balance; certainly seems to be against them. It will be noticed, however, that tho Russians have recovered a town on or near the main railway north- of Rimnicu Sarat. In another sector the Rumanians defeated an enemy offensive and captured a number of prisoners, apparently on the Moldavian frontier. A message which was. received yesterday was open to thp interpretation that tho whole Rumanian Army had- been withdrawn, in order that it might bo reorganised and fully equipped. Evidently the withdrawal is nob Complete, for in to-day's reports Rumanians are mentioned asjak-] ing part iu the operations on more than one section of the front. The same reports suggest, however, that the Rumanian troops at present in the fighting lirie are in small strength compared with'the Russians, 'to whom the main burden ofi defending what remains of Rumania has for the time been delegated.

It is stated by the Petrograd correspondent of a Paris newspaper that the Russo-Rumanians completed the evacuation' of the Dobrudja on Saturday last; This is apparently not corrrect. At all events the latest Russian and German official reports in hand indicate that the Allies are still holding a limited, but important, area in tho' northwestern corner of the Dobrudja—a tract of something less than a hundred square miles of lake country, enclosed in an elbow of the Danube. The south-western extremity of this last foothold in the Dobrudja is marked by tee river port of Braila. ■ The Germans report to-day that ..they have pushed back the Russians on the Braila bridgehead, and the capture of the town is possibly in near prospect. It was foreshadowed a week or two ago. But even if Braila goes a possibility remains that the Allies may retain possession of Galatz, a river port about a dozen miles north of Braila. 'If they are to do so it is essential that they should continue to hold most of the scrap of territory left to them in the DobrudjaZ If they lost this the euemy would bo separated from Galatz only by the breadth of the river, and the place would, of course, at once become untenable. The fate of Galatz is only incidental to a larger issue still open in the Dobrudja. So long as the Allies retain a footing on both" sides of theDanube, even in a limited area, they are much better placed for an ultimata return offensive than if they were cvorywhere driven beyond theriver. The enemy, of course, will make every effort to gain oomplete command of the Danube before calling a halt in his invasion, but it is still possible that he may fail:

The main question outstanding in the Rumanian 'campaign—whether tho Allies can hold Moldavia and incidentally retain a foothold on both sides of the Danube—has yet to be subjected to a decisive test. To be over-confident in the matter might bo to invite- a disappointment. But, without ignoring the fact that the campaign still has its tbrcitcniu'g aspects, it should not bo overlooked that it has its, redeeming features as well. The 'Allies fcavo not been able. to.prevent r,bo overrunning of a great part of Rumania, but they have been able u> deprive the. enemy of what, but lor their action, wojild have boon (Lie most important 'fruits of his success. By Bussia'a aid and its cwn efforts the Rumanian Army has bopn saved from destruction. It ; s only less important that comprehensive measures- of removal a'n:.l destruction have deprived the ouemy of the great stores of grain and petn. loum which ho hoped to obtain in uNiraania. As regard the oilfields, destruction seems to have been_ carried to a point which will reduce tho supplies of Rumanian oil capiuted by or availablo to tbo enemy to insignificant proportions. This presumably is tvnical of the m-ia-surcs taken in regard to other commodities than oil. Tho sacrifice of wealth entailed is great, but it will

either bo borno by the Entente or ultimately made good, under pressure, by the enemy.

But for the calamities which l-.avc descended upon the civil population of Rumania it would be possible to regard the overrunning of Wallachia with comparative unconcern. Wo may take it for granted that tho Germans undertook the campaign in tho hope of destroying the. Rumanian Army and caDturimr supplied, and these objects have not been attained, and are not likely to bo. Talk of the moral effect of the invasion of Rumania might easily bo overdone. The strategical importance of the enemy's success in tho region of the Danube is at an immediate view considerable, but it will bo determined ultimately by the turn of events oh the main- Eastern front and in the- Carpathians. Command of the Danube will not be of much use to the Central Powers if they are unable 'to keep Genebai/ BeubiljOFf's armies out of Lemberg and Kovcl. or to prevent tie Russians breaking , into north-eastern Hungary.

i,. , • » Phevailii?O opinions in regard to prospects in tho 1917 campaign appear to be adequately summed up by Lord Sydenham, who is an authority of no mean standing- on military questions. He remarks that the Germans have learned .that safety is no longer to be found in the most elaborate defences,_ and that by an efficient combination of artillery, infantry, and air service operations the Allies can attack on a far larger scalo than in 1910 with the certainty of'success. This'estimate of , the position seems to be warranted by the experience of the Somme offensive, upon • which so much now light was thrown by Sib Douglas Haig'b dispatch,. and by what is known of the rising preparations of the Allies. The best indication of what is- possible in 1917 is to be found in what was accomplished on the Somine and at Verdun in 1916. As to the Somme the Commander-in-Ohief's dispatch makes it perfectly clear that the offensive not only reduced the enemy to immobility an.d subjected him, despite the advantage of his fortifications, to heavier losses than he was able to inflict, but so weakened hia line as to bring him within measureable distance of collapse and a disastrous retreat. "When the weather unfortunately broke," Sir Douglas Haiq states, "there was no doubt that the enemy's power of resistance had been very seriously diminished." This carries a plain suggestion that given a further period of good weather the Allies would have broken through the enemy's line, and forced upon him the retreat to which he has shown himself so desperately unwilling to resort. When the contest is resumed in full vigour the Allies will be much stonger, and the enemy will be weaker. These are facts which , very obviously make the outlook for 1917 hopeful.

Popular approval will undoubtedly extend to the promotions iri the higher ranks of the Army which are announced to-day. Sin Douolas Haig is made a Field-Marshal, and Generals Rawlinson and Gotjgh, upon whom fell the immediate responsibility of directing the British operations on the Somme, have each been advanced a step.

Well-deserved honours have been conferred , upon a number of New, Zealand officers, amongst' them Sir Andrew Russell, who commands the New Zealand, Division, and Briga-diek-General Chaxtor, in command of the Now Zealand section of the Anzac .Mounted Division which is now in the full tide of a successful campaign against the Turks on the eastern confines of Egypt. New E&sJanders will take pride also in the lisi) of awards of •. the D.5.0., Military Cross, and other decorations, in which recognition is paid to the valour and devotion, of officers, non-commissioned officers, men,'and nurses of the- Dominion -establishment. .. ■

Feoit one point of view the Kaiser's army,order, in which he asserts that during 1916 his army and navy were victorious in '. all theatres on land and water and that they will also be victorious in 1917, is extremely interesting and signi-' ficant. Its immediate interest, of course, is in the fact that it is absolutely , false. Probably even within the circle of the Teutonic league the fact has been very imperfectly concealed that for its land and sea forces the year 1916' was one of heavy and' terrible defeat. ■ To the whole world outside that circle the fact is, of course, familiar. That in these circumstances, and with overy prospect of the Teutonic disasters of 1916 being vastly exceeded in the year now opened, the Kaiser should feel it necessary to lay.such childish fables before' his soldiers and sailors is a significant indication of his poverty of resource. It cannot bo supposed that the Kaiser enjoys retailing falsehoods in this fashion, and it is certain that he would take a very different tone if he were confident of tho determination of his army and people to unflinchingly continue the war, at ■ all costs, and in spite of all the sacrifices it entails. Having this confidence he would not talk of a year of defeat as a year of victory, or seek to raise false- hopes. He would instead make a straightforward appeal to his people to fight if necessary to the last ditch. It may be quite frankly admitted that if such an appeal were made and responded to in Germany she would be a much more formidable foe- than she probably is to-day. That theKaisek evades tho well-established, facts and elects instead to set his name to ridiculous untruths prove* conclusively that he feels it necessary to maintain to the last possible moment the illusion of German invincibility, careless of the fact that by this policy he is storing up trouble and disaster for tho not very distant future. Considered from this point of view, the Kaiser's army order will not appear as merely a sample of ridiculous bombast, to be passed over with contemptuous indifference. In fact, it is something much more important. It is an open confession by the German Kaiskr that it would be unsafe to place the truo facts of the war before tho German people. Remembering that in aIJ likelihood it will bo impossible to postpone I.Ik; day of tul! revelation and awakening for the German people foe more than a few months it is manifest that.this implied confession is in the highest degree significant. Referring recently •" Lo ' the measures adopted by Germany in order to provide for 'the extension of front caused by tho intervention of Rumania aud to strengthen the Attstrians in Galicia, tho military correspondent ,of tho Morning Pose

dealt ■with the reduction in strength and increase in number of the German divisions. "It may well bo wondered," ho writes, "how, the Germans, alter the heavy losses sustained in their attacks at Verdun, have contrived to meet so great additional and increasing liabilities. That they have had some difficulty in meeting them may have been inferred from the appearance of Turkish divisions in Galicia, a remote from their natural sphere of action. . . . The Germans are said to have adopted another expedient for eking out their available forces, by reduc: ing the infantry components of their divisions. A reduction of the number of battalions with each division from tho normal 12 to 9 or 10 would enable between, 40 and 50 additional divisions to bo formed without making now demands' on new levies, except for the artillery. It might seem at first sight that little_ would be gained by thus manipulating existing numbers - ; but the method evades the difficulty of creating fresh cadres, and, provided the units were kept up to strength, the smaller divisions would be moro efficient than were the old ones when, as has often happened, their units fell below the established strength. Moreover, for stiffening purposes, whero the German artillery is probably not the least important asset, the slight deviation from tho normal infantry strength would probably not have much effect, while the increased number of formations would materially facilitate the redistribution of forces which haa been necessitated by the recent extension of front." ' It will bo observed that the Morning Post correspondent, in common with some other authorities, holds that the Germans actually gain something by spreading a given strength of infantry over a ■ greater number of divisions. If the advantages attending such a policy are actually appreciable, however, there does not seem to be any reason, unless perhaps a shortage of Eenior officers, why the Allies should not follow suit. What authority the Morning Post correspondent hae for the fs-. Bumption that the Germans have been able'to fully equip their new divisions with, artillery does not appear, but in the factor of artillery the Western Allies certainly have a pronounced superiority.