PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 10, Issue 2906, 19 October 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Thb German newspaper articles from which some extracts are published to-day afford pretty plain proof that the German public is still being nursed in delusions regarding the war from which it is destined to suffer a painful awakening.' Such statements as that since von Hindenburg assumed the supreme command everything has licen going like a well-oiled machine, that the Allied pressure is evoking a counterpressure, which is developing, and that tho general position is everywhere favourable, to Germany, have, of course, no relation to reality, and can only, delude those from whom the truth is hidden. The Vosdsche 'Zeiiung makes out a particularly lame ca-se in its references to the Battle of the Somme. Even if it were true, as it suggests, that the Allies propose to postpone further action on the grand scale until next year, this would certainly not in l volve tacit admission that Germany has won the Battle of the Somme. But, in fact, the Allies have suffered no check. The pace of the offensive te adjusted to circumstances, but the most recent fighting has turned in every way heavily to the disadvantage of the Germans, and tho Allies are splendidly placed to further develop their offensive.

No doubt the Germans are anxious abovo all things to create an impression abroad, and particularly in the countries grouped against them, that the resisting power of the Germanic alliance is enormous, and than the task of bringing it to defeat is likely to stretch out indefinitely. In view of what is definitely known about the defeats he has suffered this year, the enemy should have' poor prospects of successin attempts of this kind—attempts intended, of cpurse, to create a favourable atmosphere for peace intrigues—but it has to be recognised that ho receives a certain amount of assistance from people in Allied countries who pursue a line of argument not unlike his own, though, of course, from very different motives.' Only the other day we had a message from London, in which it was declared that a long extension of the war was regarded as inevitable, that some critics were talking of a supreme offensive in 1918, and much more to the same effect. The probable duration of the war is a matter about which nobody can speak with much confidence, but the events of the summer and autumn certainly'do not suggest that Germany and her allies are capable of offering an indefinite resistance to the Allied attacks. _ We have had it stated by an English writer, as an evidence of Germany's powSr, that she has not voluntarily shortened any of her fronts. That she has not done so is the best proof in sight that she is seriously at a loss, and has no really extended outlook in tho war. If Germany had hopes of averting disaster by; lengthening out the pon-.

flicfc and tiring out her enemies, tor natural policy would be to lighten her military load, particularly in the Western theatre, where she is terribly handicapped by the length of her front in encountering the superior and rising power of the Allie3. She has refrained from this course, as yet, presumably because she fears the dangers of retreat or its effect upon her army and civil population. Whatever the' actual reasons underlying her policy may be, it is clear that the policy itself docs not improve her prospects of spinning out the war, but instead sets a definite limit to what is possible in that direction.

Theke is every reason to believe that the Rumanian Attache at Rome, who is quoted in one message today, gives a perfectly straightforward account of the campaign in Transylvania. Before Eumania entered the war, the view found many exponents that her natural policy would be to secure the strong frontier she now holds', and then fight a defensive campaign until the advance of an Allied army through tho Balkans, or an extension of the Russian offensive south of'the Carpathians, perhaps both, should enable her to embark upon a serious invasion of Hungary in powerful company. In the days immediately following Rumania's intervention the situation was somewhat obscured by reports that the enemy was evacuating a large part of Transylvania in order to gain a shorter line, but there is good evidence of the fact that the Rumanians from the first anticipated such an attack, as they are now meeting, and laid thoir plans accordingly. The point appears to be fully cleared up "in a statement from an authoritative Rumanian source, which was circulated by Reuter's Agency, and appeared in the English newspapers on September 7, just about ten days after Rumania entered the war. It is remarked in' this document that Rumania entered the war at a propitious moment, both for herself and for the Allies. Prepared to suffer heavy losses in forcing the Carpathians, she had, as a result of military strategy and of encircling movements, succeeded in winning all the passes of these mountains, with only trifling casualties.

Her- aim for the moment (the statement continues) is to hold strategical points in order successfully to face tho attack which the enemy will not fail to deliver. The pressure of the Allies on the other fronts had compelled a par-' tial enemy evacuation of Transylvania, and of tlus Rumania lias taken the fullest advantage. Now the Central Powers aro endeavouring to collect what troop? thoy can from all the fronts to fling against tho now foo in Transylvania. This is Tfhat was expected and what Rumania has prepared for, and tho combined Russo-Rumanian advance will, it is hoped, show the enemy that his attempts will be unsuccessful. Though winter begins early in thoso regions, there is nothing to interfere with railway communications. These roraain intact, and Rumania's Gupply communications aro secured, as she holds all tho railway, systems throußb. the pusses.

This seems to bear out' -what is said by the Rumanian official quoted to-day, arid W show that ho is doing no more than justice to the Rumanian General Staff. The power of the 1 enemy offensive has still Lo lx> tested, but tho Rumanians at all ovents were not taken unawares. They knew from the first that the offensive von Falkenhayn is now directing would, bo. launched, and thoy are the more entitled to credit for the swiftly executed operations in which they gained tho whole of the frontier passes. The latest report in hand at time of writing indicates that attacks on tho frontier at different -points, in Northern Transylvania; the Brasso region, and elsewhere have been successfully repulsed. It may be mentioned .that the statement already quoted 'refers, though not in very explicit terms, to Rumania's importation of warlike supplies from abroad. Much of the necessary war material, it remarks, had to travel half round the world before it could be delivered lo Rumania, and it would have been folly for Rumania to embark on a campaign of the character expected until she was fully prepared, or to intervene in the struggle until her intervention would prove of maximum value to the Allies. There is here a plain suggestion that Rumania imported material supplies in considerable volume before declaring war, and"it is so much the more_ likely that she is now in a position both to stem the enemy offensive and to lend effectual cooperation to her Allies in the Balkan campaign.

The position on the.Greek frontier shows no sensational change, but .'according to one correspondent the Allies are developing a general attack on the main Bulgarian line covering Monastir. The occupation of the Greek capital, on top of the measures recently taken, is suggestive. _ The Allies are evidently determined to completely disable the German faction in Greece, and it is all the more likely that a rapid development of the campaign against Bulgaria is contemplated.