PROGRESS OF THE

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2757, 28 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE

As it stands, the latest official report in hand dealing with the recent fighting cast of the Suez Canal indicates that a British Yeomanry regiment was captured by the enemy. The statement is made in the cable message that the Worcestershires, one of several Yeomanry regiments engaged, were captured owing to, their horses being shot. This must await confirmation. If the whole regiment, or as many of its component units as were engaged, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, it is likely that some further reference would have 'been made to the matter. Very possibly some words have been dropped from the cablegram, and the statement intended may have been that some of the Worcestershires fell into the hands of the enemy in' the circumstances named.

This apart, the report shows that a body °f « lc enemy a thousand strong is still established at the Katiyeh oasis, 27_ miles east of the Canal. This, in itself, counts for comparatively little. There is no evidence that the enemy enterprise .was more than it has hitherto appeared to be—a raid by a flying column which succeeded to the point of driving in the extreme British outpost in the northern section of the Canal defensive zone. The inclusion of a thousand Germans in the raiding force is an' interesting detail, biit it may mean nothing more than that the Turks were unwilling to embark upon such a hazardous enterprise without the active participation _of their taskmasters and allies. Unless it is closely supported by stronger forces, the enemy body remaining at Katiyeh should ,be in some clanger of having its line of retreat cut by a landing on the coast further east.

Reports in hand tell of much activity in the Western theatre, biit of no outstanding event. The events described are chiefly of such a character as may be expected to cloak greater developments in preparaThis is notably true of the continued stir of aerial fighting, in which tho Allies seem to', be much more than holding their ' own. A notable event in this category is the achievement of a French gun aeroplane, which struck with a shell' a Zeppelin flying at'a height of about 13,000 feet. Some of the more powerful gun-planes are too heavy to rise freely or rapidly in manoeuvring against a Zeppelin, but the French have apparently evolved a type which combines a oertaiS power of armament with speed and handincss. It is not stated, however, that tho shell took effect.

At time of writing-no very notable addition has been made to reports of the Gorman naval raid on tho Norfolk coast The Germans have fulfilled expectations by furnjshing an imaginative account. Their claim to have 1 sunk a destroyer and "two patrol boats is met by the British Admiralty ■ announcement that no British ships were sunk. The elaborate story about the King Stephen is, of course, a purely political effort. It is now probable that the raiders reached their, ports without being brought to action by a- British squadron. They were sighted off the Dutch island of Vlieland—that is to say, when they were about half-way home—and to intercept them beyond that point British ships would have to enter an which mine and submarine defences have been raised to their- highest pitch of development.

The latest news from, the Caucasus is good, but not sensational. Read alone, the statement that the Turks are endeavouring,.to' concentrate between Trebizond and Erzerum wouH be misleading, for in actual fact the enemy forces in Northern Asia Minor are now located some distance west of Trebizond, and a long way west of Erzerum. -A better indication of tho position reached is given in the report that the Russians, by a series of splendid assaults, have captured the mountains and valleys north of Baiburt, that is to say, along a front of between 50 and 60 miles, extending generally south from the Black Sea coast in the neighbourhood of Trebizond. Baiburt is 65 miles west and a little, north of Erzerum.. The Russians, in these northern operations, are at present establishing themselves on one of the natural mountain ramparts which are numerous in Asia Minor. Whether they intend to advance still further west is for ■ the time an open question, but a firm foothold in the mountain country south of Trebizond . is, of course, necessary to give them secure possession of that port as a depot and base. Without prejudice to the fact that, an.extended advance westward through Northern Asia Minor is not likely to be attempted by the Russians in the immediate future, it may be expected that they will still continue to press forward for a distance in this region. Mention has been made of a possibility of turning the Turks out of their advanced base at Erzingan, where they are said to have effected a heavy concentration. Erzingan is ninety miles west and a little south of Erzerum, and the idea lately put forward, was that the Turkish army in the Erzerum area might be outflanked and displaced by a Russian forward movement further north. An opinion that the retention of Erzingan by the Turks is dependent upon the result of the fighting further north is supported by the news that they arc chiefly concentrating' at present between Baiburt and the sea.

For a number of reasons the events -Of this campaign which the Russians are developing so successfully in. Armenia merit close attention. Tha campaign is already important as engaging a great part of the- remaining military strength of the Ottoman Empire. More than this, it seems to be paving the way for a concerted attack upon Turkey which may prove in the event to be overwhelming. Tall talk about a westward drive to the Bosphorus and Constantinople only serves to obscure the true bearing and real importance of the Armenian campaign. Its actual prospects are impressive, but they point in a somewhat different direction. We may assume with some confidence that the Russians, for the time being, arc Intent upon nothing more ambitious in their northern operations than to gain a defensive line which may ultimately 1« established well to the west of the longitude of Trebizoad,

Holding a series of strong positions across the Armenian plateau, and with their problems of. land transport eased by the use of Trcbizond as a sea base, the Russians could afford to invite all assaults the Turks might care to make upon them., At the same time, the Russians, so established, would bo free to develop their offensive campaign where there appears to be a prospect of doing so with the greatest advantage.

#On visible evidence these conditions are best mot on the Russian southern front in Armenia, west and south of Lake Van. Less prominence has been given to the capture of Bitlis by the Russians than to the capture of Trebizond and some other events in the campaign, but it'was nevertheless a highly important achievement. It gave the captors command of one of the principal passes through the ■ great Taurus range, which divides the hill country _of Armenia from the Syrian plain. The Russians have thus overcome one of the chief obstacles to an advance on the Bagdad railway, which as yet nins east from the north-eastern corner of the Meditei> ranean to a railhead at Nisibin, 110 miles south and slightly west of Bitlis. At an immediate view the idea of a movement by the Russians against the Bagdad railway maj' seem only less fantastic than that of an advance along the Black Sea ooast to the Bosphorus, but a- number of considerations make it necessary to withhold, or at least suspend, such a judgment. One of these considerations has been recently touched upon. It is that so long as Turkey remains an organised military Power, she will be able to most formidably resist the Russians in the region around, and ahead of, the Bagdad railway railhead at Nisibin, The Russians cannot strike forward in the north without laying themselves open to a powerful counterstroke in the south by Turkish forces working ahead of the Bagdad railway. If they contemplate a- continuous development of their offensive campaign, the Russians aro practically bound to launch their principal stroke in the south. It further supports this opinion that action on the lines indicated would lenditself to concerted action by the British forces at present in contact with the Turks in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. ■

The problems and perils of an enterprise in which the Russians would set themselves to strike across Asia Minor towards the Mediterranean are not, of course, to be minimised. It is no light matter'for an army, trusting to lengthy road communica* tions, to pit itself against an enemy with a railway.at his back. Other factors are operating, however, which considerably modify the position. It is to be admitted at once that while existing conditions continue in Mesopotamia and in Egypt, no decided move by the Russians in the direction of Nisißin is reasonably to be expected. At the moment a small British force in Kut-el-Amara is besieged, and'larger British forces are held up on the Tigris, below Kut-el-Amara, chiefly because .'widespread floods have temporarily given the enemy an immense advantage in defending the river . line. At the same time a powerful British force in Egypt is stationed on the line of the Suez Canal. The essential fact at the moment is that the Turks cannot reckon-upon the continued _ inactivity of the British forces in Egypt or. upon holding up for any length of time the .columns arrayed against them in Mesopotamia. X'or the time being they are able to hold their own in the latter theatre with limited forces, and are meeting really serious pressure only in Armenia, where they are presumably employing a very large proportion of their available reserves. That they do not themselves count upon a continuance of exist* ing conditions is shown in their recent actions—their. desperate and costly counter-attacks, upon the Brit, ish Tigris columns (of which further particulars are given to-day), and their attacks upon British outposts east of tho Suez Canal. These activities are plainly indicative of Turkish anxiety for the future—a state of mind for which ample justification exists, since it is .to be expected that the return o'f better weather will introduce a period of activity and movement on the Tigris, and it is not to be supposed that any strong force of British troops will long be kept inactive on the Suez Canal. .

A forward movement in Mesopotamia may very possibly give the signal for a Russian advance from the Bitlis region towards Nisibin. This place not only serves the Turks as a„. railway base for their operations in Southern Armenia, but is a vital_ point in their communications with Mesopotamia. Thus, although the_ Russians in Armenia and the British in Mesopotamia are widely separated, there is scope for concerted action on their part. Campaign developments may be affeoted by the operations of the Russians who have penetrated to the western part of Persia, opposite Bagdad, but these forces are almost certainly small. As to the extent to which the position in Asia Minor is affected by the presence of a British army_ in Egypt, there is a clear possibility that the Turks may ultimately have to choose between leaving in Syria and the Sinai Peninsula forces badly needed to defend the Bagdad railway aud so weakening their southern army as to leave the British free to undertake a new attack upon the railway from the sea. The line, which-is vital to tho Turks both in their Eastern and in the campaign against Egypt, closely approaches the coast at the north-east-ern extremity of tho Mediterranean, and is essentially open to attack. Aleppo, • where the Bagdad a railway branches east and the Syrian railway south, is some seventy miles from tho coast, but further north the main line comes much nearer to the coast, and branches run to the coast at the ports of Mersina and Alexandretta.

Given an ample defending force; the Turks would be able to make good use o'f their railways in repelling an invasion of the coast line, but the possibility exists that they may find themselves powerfully attacked from different directions, and in no condition to concentrate effectively in defence of any one threatened point. A great deal, of course, depends upon the number of effective soldiers that Turkey is still able to place- in the field, and while exact information on this subject is lacking, there is no reason to suppose that the Turks- have anything like the numbers at command that have been announced by Enver Pasha. The truth seems to be that the Turkish regular army has been in greatpart wiped out, and that the train-

ling of new levies has been limited land impeded by very serious difficulties. The defeats she- has lately sustained afford definite evidence ot Turkey's condition, and lend an air of probability to current reports indicating that she is in danger of economic and military collapse. On the whole, there are reasonably good prospects that the Allies.may be able to hasten her downfall, and so materially clear the way for action in the Balkans, whioh would have a direct and important bearing upon the main campaigns.