PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2754, 25 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

.The idea that the Germans may be on the. eve of launching a new offensive in the Western theatre receives very little support in the dispatches from correspondents at British Headquarters which -are quoted to-day. They describe, it is true, a state of extreme tension on the Flanders front, but it is suggested that this does not necessarily point to an impending German offensive, but may mean that. the enemy is himself under the apprehension of being pdwerfully attacked, and feels it necessary • to confront the British line with a strong defensive concentration. The picture thus given of conditions ruling in the main theatre can only be accepted tentatively as yet, but each passing day that leaves the Germans still short of their objective at Verdun, and relatively inactive elsewhere on. the Western front, strengthens the impression that they are in fact at a loss; and that their resources arc unequal to the strain of such an • effort as the situation demands. An opinion to this effect is, of course, powerfully supported by the trend of events at Verdun. To date the Verdun offensive is the most colossal failure of the war. For what it / is worth as a strategic position Verdun still defies assault. Only,the outworks'of the, place—extensive outworks, it is true—have been mastered by the enemy, and we may believe that if ho succeeds in . penetrating the French defences much further he .will do it at the cost of heavy additions to a sacrifice of men and material already out of all proportion to anything he has' gained or is likely to gain. * » * «

It is 110 longer possible to doubt that if the Germans had foreseen the fate of their stroke at Verdun they would have withheld it, and selected some other objective for an offensive effort. Whatever their actual hopes may have been, it is quite certain that they did not look forward to finding themselves, after more than two months of the most sanguinary lighting of the hardly_ better placed than when their offensive opened, though very much poorer in fighting power. According to Me. Warner Allen, the Germans never hop/fed for more than a moral victory at Verdun—such a victory as would have been involvecf in the occupation of the fortress area. To this he adds that Verdun is not strategically more important than, say, Nieuport, which is the pillar of the Allied northern flank on the Flanders coast. If Mr. Allen is right in this matter, the Germans have 110 more cause to be satisfied with their position to-day than if they indulged in the larger hope of effecting a great piercing -and turning movement likely to give them a decisive victory. If they aimed at nothing more than the occupation of the fortress area, then it may bo taken for granted that they -hoped to achieve their purpose by a sudden overwhelming blow, and that the continuation of the offensivo when their initial effort had failed amounted on their part to a choice of evils. ■

Emphasis has rightly been laid upon a contention that the attack on Verdun, costly and ill-rewarded though it Ims been, docs not sum up the offensive of which Germany is still capable. /But in its revelation of the defensive resources of tho Allied organisation the Verdun offensive supplies Germany with tho best possible argument against attempting an extension of her Western offensive. It is quite conceivable that an attack in Flanders, pressed with the necessary disregard of cost in lives or otherwise, might succoed to the point of flat tening thc famous Ypres salient, and might even make further inroads into the Allied But Germany has signally failed to master the lesson of Verdun if she is not able by this time to realise that seeking such barren victories is only a method of courting disaster. The French have shown themselves capable of all but stemming an attack in which Germany has .poured out her strength like whter. It has taken the Germans more than two months to advance just about twice as many miles in the utmost extension of their attack on the narrow Verdun front. At the same time, while the enemy has squandered lives 'and material, ■ the French have carefully conserved both. There would certainly be no cause for anxiety if the enemy elected to extend the struggle oh these lines in the Western theatre, but present indications are that even Germany at bay is unable to face such a prospect.

While it would be foolish not to recognise the magnitude of the task by which the Allies, are faced, it may be claimed that the war outlook is opening in some directions in distinctly , promising fashion. This is perhaps least true of the situation in the 'Western theatre. Immensely strong as the Allies are .proving themselves, their prospects in the further development of tho grim struggle for supremacy must be measured to an extent by what they have themselves achieved in defence, as well as by the essential failure of the German offensive. .It is one thing to stem such attacks as the Germans are making on Verdun and another to break a road to the Rhine. If tliQ Germans presently abandon their Western offensive, a striking indication will, of .course, be afforded of their waning power, but if the. Allies were restricted in following up the advantage thus implied to direct assault upon tho enemy's Western front, the nrospect would certainly not be ono jo he regarded with easy confidence. Happily, the Allies are not so restricted. The final collapse of the enemy's Western offensive will not necessarily bring the Allies to the point of being able to sweep victoriously forward to the Rhine, but it will at least impose upon tho enemy tho necessity of concentrating powerfully in defence against the imminent prospect of such an effort by tho Allies, and so potently affect tlio balance of strength in other theatres, and pave the. way for action under more favourable circumstances than can be anticipated for a time in tho Western theatre.

It is the happiest feature in the situation of the Allies that they are very far from being under tho necessity of _ staking their fortunes upon attacking tho enemy where he is most powerful., Possibly it is an unduly conservative view that if tho land war were confined to the main theatres in East and West and the Austro-Italian' frontiers, the Allies would be committed to a, very long struggle, with victipry only in distant prospcct, but in any case it is certain that the prospects of the Allies are vastly improved by tho fact that they are in a position to attack the enemy where ho is unlikely to be able to offer any such formidable resistance as in the main theatres. This undoubtedly is true of the south-easfern theatre, the importance of which is daily becoming more obvious. Doubts as to tho wisdom of'detaching force to the' Balkans and the Near East generally have already been pretty thoroughly resolved. ' Both the Western Allies and the Russians have demonstrated in convincing fashion that, they are not crippled as a result of sending troops to tho south-eastern theatre, and on facts they appear it may fairly be said that the outlook in this theatre is full .of promise, i

The vigorous Russian offensive in Armenia, though its direct effect confined to Turkey, notably paves the tfay for an Allied advance through the Balkans. And this is an enterprise which with reasonable good fortune should culminate in an invasion of the Central Empires on their weakest flank—the Hungarian plains beyond the Danube. Comparatively little has been allowed to leak out about the plans of the Allies in regard to their army at Salonika, but it .is not now in doubt that an. offensive -is contemplated, and on a big scale. In the hands of the Allies, Salonika has been converted not only into a field fortress but into a great military depot. The port accommodation has' been greatly, extended in keeping with the general development "which has been in progress for months. Writing from Salonika some time ago, Me. G. Ward Piuce interestingly discussed the prospects of the coming offensive.' Of the likelihood of its being undertaken he spoke in guarded terms, but later information on this point, as has been said, is as nearly as possible conclusive.

TIIO country ahead (wrote Mr. Price) is about the most difficult that could be found through.-' which, to make an advance; and tho enemy is already firmly established astride of every road and railway (there are few enough of them) wjhich w'e couid use; but General Sarrail is an old officer of the French Alpins (Alpine ltegiment), and there is no risk of failure through an underestimation on his part of tho obstacles to be overcome. But for this advance to be reorganisation of the force here is necessary, and iiaS already been begun. An adequate supply of mountain artillery is required, and the transport system of the army needs to be adapted for use in a mountainous and roadless country. Tho larger units of tho force at least must have enough pack animals to bo self-supporting, for the wheeled transport by road and rail will be unable to follow thom into the sphere of their operations for more than a comparatively short distance. Three-fourths of tho French force here, it may be said, are already organised on this basis. At first sight the plan of a. frontal attack iipon the entrenched enemy in a mountainous country appears to be a dangerously hazardous undertaking. Bui this disadvantage to tho Allies' attacking force may be reduced, by opening the offensivo against the Germans and the Bulgarians at four or fivo points of their lino at the saiuo time. Lateral communication along their front will bo practically impossible for them; they will be prevented from concentrating their forces for resistance; and whatever contingents of tho Allied Army are successful in breaking tho oncmy's local resistance will constitute a monaco to his-line of communication and thereby relievo the pressure of resistance against other sectors of the attack.

It is now • more than two months since the foregoing survey of the

position was written, and by this time the preparations of the Allies must be far advanced towards completion. Mr. Pkice speaks of Germans and Bulgars being posted in defence of the military avenues through the Balkans which must bo traversed in an advance from Salonika, but recent reports indicate that the German force now established in Macedonia is small. Tlifc prospects of creating a powerful diversion in the south-eastern theatre are correspondingly brightened, even apart from* the -likelihood that Rumania and Greece may beforo long throw in their lot with tho Entente.

In all likelihood, however, an advance from Salonika will, be _ only one of a number of elements in tho development of the Allied campaign in the south-eastern theatre. Events taking a favourable course, the Russians will co-operate by a powerful offensive in , Galicia calculated to producc the conditions which will induce Rumania to depart from her present neutrality. Bulgaria would then be between the upper and tho nether millstone, and the way would bo clear for the larger developments which are at least reasonably in prospcct. The Austro-Germans, of course, have tho option of throwing additional forces into the Balkans, but hero their diminishing resources and the strain to which they are being subjected in. the main theatres may bo expected to tell. It is most unlikely that they can effectively reinforce Bulgaria and Turkey without dangerously weakening their armies in Russia, the Western theatre, and the Italian theatre, , « * » * *

Meantime, the Russian campaign against Turkey is, developing prosperously. Some further progress has been made west of Erzerum and south-east of Trebizon'd, and though the Turks are concentrating heavily, they seem nowhere to have gained any advantage. The somewhat extravagant view is propounded by the Echo de Pai'is that the Russians may aim at continuing their westward drive to the Bosphorus and Constantinople. This would-entail an advance through x somc hundreds.,of miles of country badly roaded and lacking in railways, and would leave the Turks in possession of the Bagdad railway leading up towards the Russian southern flank. In the circumstances it. is much more likely that the Russians will establish a strong defensive line across Armenia, and strike at, and along, the Bagdad railway, towards Aleppo, than that they will embark upon the remarkable enterprise outlined by tho Echo de Paris. 'As the campaign is developing; it will evidently leave "Turkey little reserve strength for service elsewhere,' more especially as she is under the necessity of garrisoning various points at which she is more or less open to attack.

So far as Mesopotamia is concerned the' immediate position is still critical. It is certainly not improved by the fact that another British attack on the north bank of the Tigris has, failed to penetrate the Turkish defences. There are poor prpspects of a British advance until the flood waters have subsided, which at present represent so important an asset to the Turks in their defence, by enabling them to fight on a very narrow front.

As news stands, a rupture of relations between Germany and"America is all but inevitable. Possibly, however, the German newspaper comments, which bulk largely In the news, do not accurately represent the facts of the position. The German official reply has yet to be made, and the remarks of the New York Evening Post indicate that hope of a settlement has not been finally abandoned in America. According to one report, the United States Ambassador, at Berlin has been warned to safeguard Americans in Germany and Allied countries in the event of war, but it seems somewhat improbable that such an instruction would be issued at the present stage.