PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2753, 24 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

From eveijv point of view , tho landing of a strong body of Russian trpops in Franco is a notable evont in the war.. As an evidence that the Allies'are ready to ipool resources in the common cause it is.conclusive. In this respect it is a splendid answer to the mingling of braggadocio and peace feelers with which the German Imperial Chancellor lately regaled the Reichstag. The transfer of Russian soldiers to the Western theatre is the best possible proof that the- Allies are united in a determination to fight on until they have won such a victory as will reward their exertions and sacrifices. This apart, the Allies in their latest move have turned . their command of the sea . enterprisingly to account. Surprises on. a big scale are rare in modern war, but it is probable that such a surprise has now' been sprung upon the Germans. In any case the "spectacle of Russian soldiers reinforcing the Western battlefront is one the enemy is bound to regard with troubled misgivings.

• Naturally nothing is. said about the route by which tho Russians travelled, but it .is practically certain that they journeyed by ' sea frorn Novo 1 Alexandrovsk, on the Arctic Ocean. This port is not. yet connected up with the.Russian railway system, but tho line which will ultimately link it up with Petro-grad-is completed from the northern end as far as the north-western extremity of the Whito Sea. ' From this point _ communications havo been maintained .during the winter with Archangel by means of sledge and motor transport, and Archangel is the northern terminus of a double line of railway. Not long ago it was reported that the White Sea was expected to be open t.o shipping about the _ middle of this month, but unless tho .prediction was bettered Archangel can scarcely have been the port of departure of the Russian troops who have already arrived in France. It is much more likely that they boarded their transports at Novo Alexandrovsk, aa they might easily have done at any time during the 'winter.

I In its practical bearing the transfer of N llussian troops to Franco opens Mjp a number of questions which time and events -must answer. As an effective placing of Allied strength _ the transfer is a matter for unmixed congratulation, but it .suggests also that France is beginning to feel ■ the strain of twenty months of war so far as. the supply of men is concerned." Upon this point there can bo no positive knowlodge, because the French military authorities do not publish particulars of their war losses, but France has thus far borne so great 'a part of the burden of the war in the Western theatre that it may well be believed that her available reserves of men have been seriously reduced. It would be easy, however, to over' emphasise this aspcct of 'the position France is not so badly off for men but that she has been ablo to detach a fairly large force for service in tho Balkans, and there is no reason to supposo that any unforeseen call has been made upon her resources since the Salonika expedition was determined upon. Tho possibility of some such attack as tho Germans have made upon Verdun must have been foreseen, and all that in known about tho struggle at .Vardun indicates thnA it has alter- 4

fed the balance of forces in the war I considerably to the disadvantage of the Germans, It may bo assumed with some confidence that French and British resources would suffice indefinitely so far as the defence of the Western line is concerned, but the .prospect that lies ahead of tho Allies is not that of a continued defensive campaign, but of offensive action on a greater scale than the war has yet witness* ed. This being so, tho transfer of Russian troops to tho Western theatre may have been judged not only desirable but necessary. ! * * * »

Admitting! so -much it is still true that the new departure brightens Allied prospects. Thanks to their enormous strides in the development of war industries, the Western Allies have reached the point where they are better off. in material than in men, or are approaching. that point. Exactly the opposite is true of Russia. Whatever she, has done, by importations and by internal. production, to repair the deficiencies in equipment and supplies which cost her so dear in 1915, she must still bo far from being able to equip as many soldiers as she can raise and train. The r cablegram which announced the arrival of the Russian's in Marseilles | stated that' their equipment ■ was complete, but equipment is a somewhat lfiose term. If the equipment of the Russians were in all respects complete, one of two excellent reasons for transferring them from the Eastern to the Western theatre would be _ non-existent. The actual position, it may be assumed, is that soldiers whom Russia could - not send into the fighting' lino for lack of some vital details of equipment will be supplied in France with what they need and so become available as an addition to the effective strength of the Allies. We are not told the extent of the Russian reinforcement, but on the.general facts of the war it is likely to assume | considerable dimensions. The:, first contingent to arrive may be only an instalment. As matters stand an impressive demonstration is -givon of what the pooling of resources means. It is riot only a matter of bringing men and material into, effective combination in the 'Western theatre. _ Very possibly the French and British forces now located at Salonika could not 1 have been sent there but for the prospect of such aid as Russia is now rendering in the Western theatre, and it becomes increasingly probable that offensive action by the Allies in the Balkans will powerfully influence the future trend of the war. ■ * * * ■ *■ .

No material change is reported at Vordun, Attacks and oounter-attacks aije reported on both sides of the Meuse, and the final result, as re-' ports stand, is that the French retain substantially unimpaired the line upon which they offered a protracted resistance. The latest French semi-official review lays emphasis upon the fact that Genehai, Petain is doling out his resistance and is also carefully conserving his effectives in tho partial offensive by which he is maintaining his line. Even so, tho policy of - persistent counter-attacks at present in vogue must entail a certain sacrifice, but with this _ exception the patient policy outlined is that which has

been pursued throughout in the .defence of Verdun. 1 It looks for immediate reward to inflicting much greater loss upon the enemy than he is himself able to inflict. Tho Allies can afford to pursue this policy at Verdun for some time yet if their general plans make it necessary to do so. East of the Meuse, particularly, the . Germans are still at an early stage of their task. Even should'they sucoeed in mastering the line against which their assaults are ate present directed, there are other formidable

lines-in rear. From tho German point of view the outlook is sufficiently unpromising to give an air of likelihood to the report that the aged Marshal von Haeseler (he is 80 years old) has been recalled to Berlin as a scapegoat. "

There is both goo 1 and bad news from Mesopotamia. The Turks lost so heavily in the recent attack on the British line south of the.Tigris that they evidently paid an altogether disproportionate price 'for the limited extent of ground gained. That they attacked in very strong 1 force is not necessarily a bad for .it suggests that they look anxiously to the future, when the subsidence of the floods will 'give greater freedom of action to the British columns which are now labouring under heavy difficulties.' For the time being, however, the floods are increasing, and a certain amount of anxiety must be felt for, General Townshend and his garrison at Kut-el-Amara. Turkish reports that the food supplies of'ths garrison are running short may not be worth muoh, but the siege of liut-01-Amara is now lengthening out in, its fifth month, and there seems to -be no immediate prospect of relief. '

A - week or two ago it was reported that some sort of commercial agreement had been concluded between Gormany and Rumania,; but the report was almost at once denied. _ It is now repeated, with the addition of somo comments by Rumanian newspapers to the effect that the agreement is purely economic in character, and has no political significance. German newspapers, on" tho othor hand, assert that the agreement means, thai Rumania has definitely sworn allegk anco to Austria and Germany. This is on all grounds so exceedingly improbable that it _is fairly safe to dismiss jtho assertion 4s born of tho kind of wish that fathers thought. Until Rumania actually takes the field, hor adhesion to tho Allied cause cannot be taken for granted, but that she has "definitely sworn allegiance," at this stage, to tho Central Empires is unbelievable.

An interesting account of Rumania's past negotiations with tho Entente is givon by Dr. E. J'. Dillon, who claims to base the account on what actually passed between Bucharest and the capitals of the Entente Powers. The central idea of Rumania's strivings, jie"says, was to achieve national unity, together with defensible military frontiers as far as appeared feasible, and to obtain. in advanco explicit assurances that the Entente Powers, if victori-

ous, would admit her claims without demur or delay. Under the Ru-

manian demands, the territories oc-

cupied by the Rumanians of Transylvania, tho Bukowina, and tho Banat (this / last an extensive district lying immediately north of tho Danubian frontier of Serbia) were to bo united under the sceptrc of tho King of Rumania. The demauds

cover a strip of territory contiguous to Belgrado and if it were granted to Rumania _ Belgrade could thcn.no (onger remain the Serbian capital. In effect, Rumania demanded efary bit of Austro-Huaearian territory

which is inhabited by her kinsmen or belonged to them in bygone days, but Dr; Dillon denies that Rumania asked for the restoration by Russia of any portion of Bessarabia. goes on to state that in their first phase " negotiations between Rumania and the .Entente were interrupted by no serious hitch, and culminated in a loan of five million pounds being advanced to Rumania in January, ,1915. In the following month they ceased, and were not resumed-until April, when Rumania was invited to resume discussion with Russia. By means o>f an exchange of Notes, an arrangement had been come to by which Rumania was to have "the country inhabited by the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary," in return for her neutrality, and . on condition that she should occupy it with armed force before the close of the war. •

Rumania, Dr. Dillon declares, has been guilty, of no breach of faith. She has merely abstained thus far from taking up ah option which she was at liberty to take up or forego as she might think fit. Tho Russian retreat in Galicia, of course, had its Rumania, hut Dr. Elillok is of opinion that her co-operation ' might have been secured "before now, but for failures in Allied diplomacy. Hisfinal conclusion is that Rumania has' made lip. her mind, and will take her place among tho Allies as soon as opportunity serves. As things now stand, he says, Rumania's participation in the war is a military, not a political, question, and it is quite as much to our interests as to

those of Rumania' that it should' be considered exclusively from this point of view, and not unnecessarily accelerated. ' ' «' » • This estimate of Rumanians atti-

tude is to an extent confirmed by a statement made.by 31. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, .when he addressed the Duma on an historic occasion in February last. "During the period under review," he said, "Rumania has continued to main-

tain the state of neutrality which she has chosen. The Entente Powers

! havo adapted themselves, to this situation, being convinced that mania will not betray her own interests, and | that. when the hour strikes she will' know how to realise her national unity at the cost of her own blood." 1 The weight of evidence evidently supports a belief that Runiania is simply biding her time to make common cause with.' tha Allies. Her present inactivity affords scope for reports like' that transmitted to-day, but it has sonable explanation in the consideration that her natural time to strike will come when the Allies move out from Salonika .' and the Russians are ready to prcsß tho offensive on their southern front.

If it is true, the report that M. Venizelos is about to return to the Greek Chamber of Deputies at the request _of King Constantine is highly significant, as indicating the direction in which events are trending in Greece and in the Balkans. It will be remembered that M.. Venizelos and his party abstained from contesting the last elections as a protest against King Constantine's assumption of autocratic authority. If the King now asks his former Minister to return to the Chamber of Deputies, the only reasonable explanation of his aetion is that he meditates a change of policy, arid J the restoration of M.- Venizelos to j office. M. Venizelos would hardly! have accepted the King's invitation, ae he is'said to have done, unless assured of liberty to carry out a programme involving intervention.'