BRITISH AIR POLICY

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2752, 22 April 1916, Page 3

BRITISH AIR POLICY

AN EXPERT'SURVEY

EXTENSIVE RAIDING ADVOCATED

Knowing tho needs of tlie flying services, writes Mr. C. G. Grey, editor of "'ilic Aeroplane," and knowing tho available supply of aeroplanes and pilots, I have in tho past recognised the futility of agitating for aiv action which, under the circumstances then oxisting, was impossible, at any rato 011 a scalo which could mako it wortli while. To-day things havo altered very considerably. Bitter experience in war has taught us how to produce aeroplanes and engines of quality very superior to those which we have had in the past. The need for pilots has resulted not merely iu tho training of many more pilots, but in the establishment of numerous flying grounds at which it is possible to produce pilots in still greater numbers. It is consequently now possible for us to turn out sufficient aeroplanes and pilots to carry out bomb-dropping raids ,oli an effective scale—provided always that the organisation of building and training is placed in capable liands. Tho accessary increase of output can be attained. without iu any way depleting the supplies needed for the regular work of the Royal Naval Air Service, and of the Royal Flying Corps. In iact the increasod output rII round' should rather result iu increased supplies for shell regular work. All that is necessary to ootain the aeroplanes is an organised system of "speeding up," such. as is ill operation in American factories of all kinds. It entails, of course, making the workmen more, efficient, so that each man' does more work, but as proper speeding up means that the workmen will be actually less fatigued and will earn considerably more money, there is not likely to bo much objection on the part- of the men when once they understand the system. Tlie training of pilots can likewise bo speeded up if the high' authorities give their attention to the subject and eliminate ruthlessly all inefficient persons at present engaged in such work. Tha Need.for Numbers.. Given the required numbers of aeroplanes and pilots, 'the raids themselves must be organised efficiently and intelligently Ui tho oarly <tays of the war, wuen bomb-dropping was regarded rather as a. sporting etforc on the part of the indiviaual than as' a serious part of military.aviation, most raids were fairly tutile affairs. Once in a while a bomb, droppiug expedition had important results, as wnen an officer of the iI.Is.A.S. destroyed a new Zeppelin in its slie<t ac JUussoktorf, or wlien three It.N.A.S. officers did> considerable damage to the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen, or when an Ii.F.C. officer destroyed a Parseval airship and its shed near Brussels, or when two It.N.A.S. officers damaged sundry submarines in the Oockerill Yard at Antwerp. But, on the whole, bomb-dropping in twos c-i threes this way is generally waste of tuno.

If only one aeroplane appears at a timo over a German town or military station it is the mark for every gun in the place, whereas if thirty or forty appear at .once the.v divide the attention of the gunners and so aro far less likely 'to'.be-bit. ltetaliation, therefore, ia only worth while when it takes the form of a raid in force.'

The nest question \yhich arises is whether we can find such objectives for our raids as will have any immediate effect either .in aoceleratmg. the end of the war or in hampering or stopping altogether the airship raids on this country. Taking the matter of airship raids, it seems practically certain that retaliatory raids on German airship bases can at least make such voyages very much harder. It is fifteen months since the raid 011 Friedrichshaven, yet only one other raid, by French pilots, has been made there since. The l'rench have. been very busy on their' own affairs, as their flying service is none too large to provide "eyes" for. the enormous French armies and to carry out bomb raids on places nearer the fighting line, such as Metzj Freiburg, and so forth. It might well bo possible for our Air Service to arrange with our Allies to let us have an aeroplane, base near the Frajico-German frontier, from which to raid known German airship stations, such as Friedrichshaven, - Metz, and Freiburg. . Also from on tlie French front it'should even be possible to reach Cologne, Dusseldorf, and Essen, at all of which places airships are known to exist. And these raiding squadrons of ours could) carry on their operations without interfering in the least with the regular military operations of the French army and its aviation service. : . Points to Aim At. It seems probable, moreover, . that certain of the ships which raided the northern and midland counties recently did not conie direct from Germany, but left Germany in the morning, and came down in Belgium to refill with fuel and perhaps to take bombs on board before starting for England. It is .hardly likely that airships are now regularly stationed at.Antweip or Brussels, for though no really big raids have been made oh the airship sheds at . those cities, one or two lone-hand raids by British aviators havo done immense damage to airship sheds in Belgium. Therefore it is more probable that the sheds aro empty except when the ships call there on their way from or to Essen, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Mannheim, or any of the West German air stations. There would necessarily be large stores of hydrogen cylinders and of petrol at such places in Belgium, wliich would be worth destroying, bo that there would be plenty of work for several hundred British aeroplanes stationed at Dunkerque in merely breaking up airship sheds and storehouses in Belgium, arid in keeping them permanently broken up, so that they would be useless as places of; call for Zeppelins or any other airships.

There aro also immense possibilities for retaliatory raids on a big scale on bases in-Northern Germany. So far liack as Christmas Day, 1914, a little flotilla of three seaplane-carrying ships sent forth half a dozen seaplanes, which dropped bombs on Cuxhaven and Wifhelmshaven and on aeroplane sheds at tho mouths of the Elbe and Jade. Since then it seems probable that something has-been learned about the handling of seaplanes 011 ships, and, therefore, with proper organisation it should bo possible now to launch big raids against tlie airship bases 011 Heligoland and in such places as Hamburg. Wilhelmshaven, and Bremen, and even on Kiel itself. By proper co-operation with Russia it is also possible to reach the German airship basos in Schleswig. Holstein, sucli as Dondern and tho Baltic ports, and it is well within the bounds of practical politics to reach Berlin itself and the new Zeppelin factory at Potsdam.

But, as I have said, such raids are only worth doing if made with many machines at onee, and if perfectly organised. We have the necessary organisers in this country if they aro given a fair chance and a free hand. The difficulty is to persuade the older officers to give tho young men such chances and such freedom of action.