PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2751, 20 April 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The capture of Trebizond by tho Russians is a natural sequel to recent events in the Armenian campaign. For weeks tho northern sections of the Grand Duke's Army have been working their way along the Black Sea coast, and towards it by way of the Chorok Valley, north-' west of Erzerum;, and a few. days au-o the Turks were beaten and driven back in a battle fought near the coast, about 16 miles east of Trebizond. The capture of the port by the llussans was, therefore, to bo expected. How far the Armenian campaign will be affected as a result has yet to appear, but at an ■immediate view Trebizond must be reckoned a prize of considerable importance.' 'To tho Turks! it represented a sea-base of which they were probably able to make some use in that character almost to the last I days of their occupation. The Russian Black' Sea Fleet might havo been thought capable of histituting a close blockade, but one or two items of naval news received during the last week or- two—notably tho report of an excursion by the lau—have indicated that tho Russian was at best only partial, and not constantly maintained'. If the command of tho Black Sea is at all in dispute it must be due to tho presence of enemy sub : marines, since the Russians have a heavy predominance in surface ships. In any case Trebizond is of some importance as a sea-base. The harbour is not good; It is silted up to an extent which prevents the close approach of ships to the shore, and lies open to north-east winds.' It is, however, the best of a series of indifferent ports on a long stretch of coast-lirie. No doubt it will be used to a considerable extent by the Russians.in supplying their northern f<?rces v in Armenia. Apart from the possibilities of transport across the Black Sea from Odessa and other' potts, Trebizond is only a little over, a hundred miles away from the port of Batum, which is in railway touch with the rest of Russia. Using Ti-ebizond as a port and depot, tho Russians will thus bo fairly wall placed to checkmate tho attacks of' such enemy submarines as may be available in the Black Sea. .

.WiTHjevory motive '. for exerting fhemselvcs to keep Trebizond out ofthe hands of- the Russians, the Turks were favoured hy nature in defending the place. Trebizond is ringed about by mountain barriers through and over which the Russians had to fight their way, * handicapped by the length and character of their communications. The Turks were 1 , of course, much better off in this last respect as long : as they had Trebizond behind them. On all grounds the s 'irfunediate importance of tho Russian* succeiss in , the 'Trebizond arqa is pi'obablj as great.' or nearly so, as that of the .successes they have lately\wOn on their cei> tral front, - west of Erzerum,■ and further south, ' where they are advancing towards the' Upper Tigris.

If they have done nothing else by capturing Trebizond, tho Russians have done much to safeguard their communications with TransCaucasia against attack from the; rioi'th. Very possibly; this was tho principal object they, had in view. It is as likely as not that the northern sitcccss may make its effect chiefly felt in the meantime at the other ond of tho front, where tho Russians; have advanced beyond Lake Van, and are headed for tho Upper Tigris. There are'several reasons calculated to induce the Russians to concentrate their chief energies' iii this" southern region for tlie_ time being, so far hs offensive'.action is concerned. This will bo best realised by, looking at a map of Turkey in Asia. -At the moment the Armenian campaign is being fought on the cehtre <and fiutiks of a front having a total length of over two, hundred miles. The northern flank rests oh the Black l Seaj and the southern flank is. some distance south of Bitlis, which town lies opposite the south-western extremity of Lake Van. The central fighting front is about 50 miles west of Erzerum, which now constitutes the Russian advanced base. : .At a general view the Russians are better off' in the matter of commimicai-ions than the enemy, and this, advantage is, of course, increased by the capture of Trebizond. Tliere .is a Rood road between that place and Erzerum, and the Russians already .had the advantage of a railway running up to, the Trans-Caucasian frontiM at Sarikalnish, 70niiles bast of Erzerum. As. matters. stand, tho Russians thus have fairly good supply lines behind them, and ai;c in a position to concentrate Strength on any desired section of' their front' with fair facility as communications go in Armenia;

The Turks, pn the . other hand; are how illriibst entirely deperitlerit upon road comihunications except in the south, and have no rneans of rapidly transferring troops north or south, from one section of the front to ' another. The fighting •areas on tho Black Sea .coast ahd West of Erzeriim are more than 500 inilcs east of Constantinople (much raoro by road), and little more tiiah a third of the distance is travorsed by a railway fl-om tho capital. In tho south-the Turks are. supplied bj» the Bagdad railway, which extends at present as far as Nisibin, unbrokenly except for two gaps, west arid, cast of Adana, which are bridged by'_ motor transport routes. Nisibin is just over a hundred miled south arid, slightly west of Bitlis, so that in the south the Turks are at no serious disadvantage iii the matter. of communications. The Turkish forces in this _ region, however, are separated by impassable mountairis from, their, comrades in the ceiitrarand iiorthei'n fighting areas, and Nisibin is of value as a baseonly as regal-ds the southern operations.

It is obvious that atty advance by the .Russians would involve som'o sacrifice of the advantages in regard to communications they at present hold; For an offensive-defensive they arc splendidly placed, but any advance westward would be apt to give the Turks an opening for a dangerous lliink attack. Recently the Turks tried to break, the Russian centre in order to get at tho communications behind Erzerum. The attempt broke down badly, but the Turks would be able to launch a similar enterprise in the south, with rather better prospects of success) if tho Russians How attempted an extended advance along the Black Sea coast. It is most unlikely that the Russians will attempt anything of the kind, for it would mean advancing under increasing difficulties as regards transport and supply (even, when full allowance is made for the value of Trebizqud as 11 base) Unci tMlli-l iil«i olitail Ipjs of the powor to'transfer troops from

north to south,.- or vice versa, as necessity may. arise. I'urther than this, it would leave the enemy frco to concentrate in the ono area—tho southern—in which his lines of communication are reasonably good, with a vow to reaching and cutting the Russian communications.

The broad position to bo that tho Russians are well placcd to, hold tho enemy in the north and centrc, and are free to act with vigour in the south. Tho capture of Trebizond may not have cloarcd the way for an advance along tho Black' Sea coast, but it has seen red and strengthened the Russian northern flank. Tho ccntral Russian forces, also, have recently demonstrated their ability to withstand assault in the region west of. Erzerum. , The 'Turks arc not likely tQ be able to bettor their past efforts on the north and central fronts, and can no doubt be hold in both areas without undue strain. For this and because the cnomy is most formidable in the south, it will be the natural policy of tho Russians, if they mean to unbrokenly prosecute their offensive campaign, to put forth their main efforts on she southern front. Wo, do not know as yet that they are prepared to thrust the enemy right back uppn his railway base at Nisibin, but this would seem to be their natural courfe, unless they prefer, meanwhile, as they possibly ,may_, to revert for a time to the conditions of a holding campaign. It doubtless counts afc an incentive to a' further advance in tho south that there would be a possibility of severing the Turkish communications with Mesopotamia, but it has to bo recogniscd that even as matters stand the Russians are inviting attack by a great part of Turkey's total military strength, and that the Bagdad railway is a very important afeset in tho enemy's hands where a deoisive conflict in southern Armenia is concerned.

«** * Even at its present stage of development the Armenian campaign must /bo exerting a powerful influence upon events in _ Mesopotamia, but the latest news in hand from tliis latter theatre is not good. In the flooded country on the south bank of the Tigris the' British lines have been forced, back in places for a distance of from five hundred to eight hundred yards. „ This means the loss of only . a comparatively small part of the ground won by tho British troops some days ago, but there is ovidently no immediate prospect of an\ advance. .

« » • Latd messages regarding Trebizond contain much interesting detail. Tho Russian Fleet is shown to have played an important role in the attack. Generally it is shown that the Turkish resistance was of the most desperate character, and it may be. expected that the effect of the defeat will be correspondingly ( great. Account must, of course* be taken of the moral effect as well as of the change effected in the purely military situation. If there is any truth in the reports' lately made public about the intefnal state of Turkey, the'fall of Trebizond will-be felt as a crushing blow, and ho doubt the event will tend materially to dispirit and dishearten the Ottoman troops. The Russians are shown to' be enterprisingly developing their advantage, and hopes are entertained of displacing the Turks at Erzingan, 90 miles west of Erzerum. The Russians, it is ..reported, are not only improving roads, but are pushing on the construction of a railway from Sarikaniish to Erzerum. There is nothing in this later news to Suggest any departure frotn the opin' on that it is on their southern flank, if anywhere, that -thfe Russians, are likely to press the offensive in the immediate future. • hi * * *

Reports are .somewhat conflicting at the moment of writing in regard to late events at Verdun. The l&test French reports in hand aver that the enemy succeeded bnly to the extent of penetrating first-lino positions, at one point, in his latest offensive east of the Meiise, and that jportion of the lost ground has already been recovered. The Germans claim a more important success; involving the capture of more than 1600 unwounded prisoners. Possibly the German report is of later date than others in hand. Unless it is, it is seriously' in conflict with those issued by the French, which are to the effect that the enemy gains in the latest effort were insignificant, despite the fact that troops belonging to five different Germans divisions were engagecl in the assault.

Meeting denials in regard fo the number' of French prisoners talceii it Verdun, the Germans prortiise td gazette the names of officers arid men m their hands. The proof offered is of little value, since'the, Germans could easily swell their list of alleged prisoners by adding the names of dead soldiers whose bodies were ieft behind in areas evacuated by the French, , •** » • America's last word to Germany in the sUbmarind controversy lias been so often promised, ahd so often withheld, that a degree of scepticism in regard to the latest reports on the subject may be pardonable. For what they are worth, however, these reports 'are distinctly suggestive. In the first place, it is again stated that Count Bernsjorff has informed the United States Government that Germany will in no circumstances give up submarine warfare, b.Ut is willing to make amends for any violation of international law. This is equivalent to saying that Germany is determined to go on murdering Americans and othersj but is willing'to, apologise aitei'wards, and perhaps pay compensation, in rcspcct of any Americans she murders. On top of this we are told that President Wilson has. decided to lay the whole submarine issiirt before Congress immediately, and that a breach of diplomatic relations with Germany is regarded as inevitable. This certainly suggests that matters arc coming to a head. The President is -houlid to seek authority.before proceeding to any such extreme step as a rupture of _ diplomatie relations, because it is a step which riright conceivably lead to war. A decision on his part to lay the submarine issue before { Coiigress would therefore bo ii suggestive indication that such a rupture is in actual prospect.

Tho Rev. J. AV. Shaw, -of. Dimedin, who was a chaplain on the Maheno, fi peaking of tho ietiiin voyage,- said tho most seriously injured were the most choctful nild tlio easiest to get 011 with.' A farm labourer, from Canterbury, who had lost both his legs, was tho > bright man in the ship. Ho liad particularly had hiclt, for his worst injury .occurred wlien ho was in tho dressing station Getting a slight wound attended to. The saddest cases oil tho ship, arid those which received the Ibiist sympathy, wens those wlioto minds had been absolutely ruined.