PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2732, 29 March 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Ships are being sunk by ' enemy submarines at a rate which recalls the days of August aud September, 1915, when the von Tirpitz campaign was at -its height. X statement issued by Lloyd's shows that since March 16, when • the Germans announced that the campaign was in full swing, twenty ships have been sunk, in addition to the packet steamer Sussex. To this total there must presumably be added some or all of the ships whose destruction is announced to-day. At the prevailing rate, a total of thirty ships of all kinds may easily be reached for the first fortnight of the campaign under its new conditions, fhis as numbers go would be almost on a par with the period mentioned, the last three weeks of August and the first week of September, 1915, in which the campaign reached its height. Ships of all sorts—British, Allied, and neutral—were sunk during these weeks at the rate of 16 per week. The remarkable- feature in the present revival is, of course, the intension evidenced of treatinr neutral ships in the same fashion as those of the belligerents to whom Germany is opposed. Though eight,of the twenty ships mentioned by Lloyd's were neutral, the novelty does not rest merely upon the number of ships destroyed. At . past periods neutral shipping has suffered heavily at the hands of German submarines. For instance, in July, 1915, eight neutral ships were sunk in two consecutive days, and in the following month nine were sunk in six consecutive days. But the character of the recent neutral victims (notably the fact that the list includes two Dutch passenger liners), and the circumstances in which they were destroyed, unmistakably mark a new departure. Though it is a matter of degrees in crime, there is a big difference between torpedoing neutral cargo steamers and passenger liners like the Tubantia and the Palembang. Evidently Germany has determined to treat neutral shipping exactly as if it were that of an enemy.

At the moment, the outlook for British, Allied, and neutral shipping is bad. The losses which have lately been suffered are by no means insignificant. But past experience of the submarine campaign has shown that to. get at the essential facts it ,is necessary to view results over an extended period. To know that so many 'ships have been sunk in a given time is not by any means to know everything about the current progress and results of the campaign. For instance, apart from the effects detrimental to Germany, the recent outrages arc likely to produce in the neutral countries concerned, we do not know what price Germany has paid for her late haul of submarine victims. That a price has been paid is certain, for the greatly increased activity of the submarines has not been accompanied by a suspension of the British anti-subma-rine campaign. Under the policy of the Admiralty, dictated by practical necessity, no announcement is made regarding the number of German submarines accounted for. But there is the very strongest evidence for believing thatyj past periods of maximum activity by the submarines have been marked by a maximum loss of submarines. This and other opiate

were strikingly exemplified by a naval writer, Mi). A. H. Pollen, in an article published some months ago. Isr.o Pollen points to a letter written by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Balfour) on September 5, 1915. In his letter Mb. Balfouk explained the alacrity with which Count Bernstokff had begged America's pardon for the Arabic murders, not by any tardy'recognition of _ the danger of driving America into war, nor by any sudden repontanco of bloodguiltiness, but merely by the prosaic realisation that this particular form of criminality did not pay. The stako they were playing for, the damaging of our merchant marine and the terrorising of peaceful seafaring folk, was clearly not worth the candle, in the shape of scores of German undersea boats sent relentlessly to the bottom. ■>■**»» i

The curious thing about this letter of Mb. Balfour's whs that it was written at a time when the destruction of ships _by the raiders had reached the highest rate registered since the campaign commenced. As Mr. Pollen remarks, the First Lord's statement was clearly incompatible with_ what was then known to the public, and time was needed to make his meaning plain. There were facts known to the Germans, in regard to submarines unaccounted for, which put a very different complexion on the state of affairs; and there must have been further facts known to Me. Balfouk, which the Germans would learn later, which would modify the-picture still more disastrously from the German standpoint. Me. Balfouk's statement was more of a prophecy than an interpretation, but it was the prophecy of one who knew. e»* . » It was assumed, and reasonably, that if the Germans had made all preparations possible for the rapid and extensive production of submarines, the number available would multiply with increasing rapidity in the months from April to July, 1915.-. The question, then, was whether' the British counter-offensive would overbalance- the growth in submarines. Measuring by the number of ships sunk up to the time when Me. Balfour wrote, it appeared that the "blockade" had more than kept pace with the counter-offensive. Subsequent events showed that this was far from being the case. After the four weeks in August and September, when ships, were sunk at' an average of 16 per week, the weekly and monthly rate of ships destroyed ! declined rapidly to relatively insignificant proportions, and reached a !low, though fluctuating, level, at which it remained until the present period of activity was reached. I There is some evidence, too, that the submarines from September onwards were'_ withdrawn altogether from especially dangerous • areas, such as the Straits of Dover. All this relates to the seas around Great Britain. Tho submarine campaign in the Mediterranean is in a class apart.

Certain inferences seem to be warranted by the facts above outlined, which have a distinct bearing upon tho submarine campaign to-day. Nothing but the loss of submarines will account for the falling off in the campaign from September onwards. It is a reasonable assumption also'that Me. Balfour did not speak as confidently as he did about the failure of the campaign without knowing that the heavy destruction of ships at the time .was costing the Germans a correspondingly, or more than correspondingly, heavy loss in submarines. If this had not. been the case; if the Germans had been without paying a proportionate, or more than proportionate, price in submarines, he could not have spoken of the campaign as a failure, because it wotild not have been a failure. It is as definitely established as anything can be, except on absolutely direct evidence, not only that the Germans were compelled to slow down their campaign because loss of submarines made it unprofitable, but that the proportionate 'loss of-submarines'*at least kept pace with the increased destruction of ships in the days when the campaign was at its height. Bringing these conclusions tb bear upon current events, it would seem that the Germans are not likely to be able to maintain the present rate of destruction of ships for any length of time. This opinion would have to be modified if it were found that they had contrived either to largely increase the strength of their flotillas or to so improve the later submarines as -to make them less liable to be trapped. But we havo no evidence of either one thing or the other. Scare stories about a fleet of 200 submarines are not evidence. We know that the construction of submarines takes time and skilled labour, not to speak of materials, some of which may not now be plentiful iin Germany, and wo may safely assume that German construction resources were taxed to the utmost in support of the section of the campaign which failed and declined last year. Tho_ known difficulty of providing trained crews, and the still greater difficulty of providing submarine officers, imposes definite limits upon the possible increase in the underwater craft.

What Germany may have accomplished in the way of improving the submarine we do not know, but her boats when the war began were below British standards. It is reasonable for the time being to sup-, pose that she has actively resumed the war on peaceful shipping under much the same conditions as obtained last year. As to strength of submarines, she may have accumulated a limited reserve during the months of comparative inactivity which preceded the present revival. If these arothe prevailing circumstances it is'likely that the recent heavy "bag" of merchant ships has not been gath. ored in without such a toll being taken coincidently of the raiders as will set a definite limit to their campaign. There are indications that the submarines are again operating in-fcho dangerous areas from which they were withdrawn in the months following September, last year. If they are, it is more than likely that the British Navy is again netting a haul of "tinned fish" to set against the British and other ships that are being destroyed from day to day.

The liner Minneapolis, the most important recent victim of the enemy submarines, evidently • met her fatc_ in the Mediterranean, since portion of -her crew has been landed at' Malta. She belonged to the Atlantic Transport Company, and, being diverted from her usual running, was presumably on Admiralty service. The probability is heightened by the fact that there is as yet no mention of passengers. The Minneapolis may even have boon in commission as au auxiliary cruiser.

No notable development is disclosed at time of writing in the main campaigns. There is still a lull at Verdun, save for bombardment, llussian and German reports are in conflict in regard to operations in the Baltic Provinces. The Russians report some further progress in their offensive, and in one area, at least, where the Germans also claim a local success.

Ambbioa has not yet shown (in news in hand) what she intends to do about the latest murders of American citizens on,the high seas. At present there are conflicting reports. One alleges that the Government will resort again to temporising negotiations with Germany. Another states that if the Sussex is proved to have been torpedoed, Pkesident Wilson will lay the situation before Congress with a view to breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. This last seems the only course open, unless the President intends to retreat ignominiously from his assertion of the right of Americans to travel on any merchant ships they please.

A detailed official report of the naval raid on Schleswig-Holstein has yet to arrive, but it has now taken fairly definite, shape Apparently, while the British squadron remained on the coast,. German ships within reach were compelled to shelter bel hind the North Frisian Islands. The Germans, repor.t that they pursued the British ships when these withdrew, but claim no success in the pursuit and admit that one of their torpedoers has not yet returned.' They assert, however, that in the operations on the coast an English destroyer was damaged by their aircraft.