PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2691, 10 February 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Something of what Russia has accomplished in the period of grace since her beaten but indomitable armies arrested the progress of the invading Austro-German armies at the beginning of winter is told by' the War Minister in a statement published to-day. There is a tone of firm confidence in General Polivanoff's review of the position which is no less welcome than his definite declaration that the munitions crisis, which for a time paralysed the Russian armies, no longer exists. It is of course a matter of common knowledge that during the last few months Russia has been able, wi-th important aid from abroad, to complete the training and equipment-of great additional reserves, and upon this fact some impossible expectations have been built. There is little enoiigh in General Polivanoff's statement to bear out some of 'the fancy stories that have been told about the magnitude of Russia's winter preparations, but, it is nevertheless rich with promise for the fuThe grave gaps made in theRussian armies by the terrible fight-' ing of last spring and summer have been filled, A permanent, reserve of a million and a half recruits has been established, from which drafts of trained men will at all times be available to make good wastage or furnish reinforcements at any point where they may be needed. 'Taking also into account the great strides which have been made in the internal production of shells and other munitions of war a sot of facts is presented which should mean nothing less than that the days of German progress in Russia are over and done with. There was a tendency in tho early days of tho war to oxpeet impossibilities of Russia. It has not,

entirely disappeared, and is altogether to be deprecated. But the facts set forth by General Pom vanoff amount to a very definite, assurance that Russia has'surmounted the first great obstacle barring her path to ultimate victory.

Expectations of a decisive campaign this year may conceivably be unduly optimistic, and it is wise to entertain them only tentatively. But there is no reason to dpubt that Russia enters the active period of the second year of war very much stronger than she was at the end of 1914. She has not only strengthened her field armies and enormously developed the war industries which arc of equal importance, but has done much to eliminate the widespread corruption and incompetencc which weakened and crippled her national Crippled and hampered as she was last year by her lack of preparation Russia brought the invaders of her territory to a standstill before they had achieved the decisive object at which they aimed. Their prospects should not be bright in the campaign soon to open in which the Russian armies will fight at no disadvantage as regards numbers and equipment and at a much less serious disadvantage than in the most critical days of last year in the matter of communications.

Made as it is with authority, General Pomvanoff's statement should serve as an antidote to such drab views of Allied prospect's as are expressed to-day by Colonel Repington. He is of opinion that the Germans may only "rattle" the Allies on the Western front and then seek to overwhelm Russia by a stroke at Pctrograd. The answer to thi.s seems to be that the Germans failed in most desperate efforts to reach Pctrograd last year, when the Russians were in desperate straits and the preparations of the Western Allies were at a much less advanced than they have now 'reached. It is likely that the prospect of a great German offensive on either main front would be rather welcomed by the Allies at this stage than cause them anxiety, and that 'heir real anxiety turns rather upon the problem of smashing the German defence. Of the campaigns in lhe Near East also, Colonel Repington takes a very pessimistic view, Lut his gloom is based upon such .-c----markable assumptions as that 100,000 Bulgars are likely to hold up twice their number of Allied troops at Salonika, and that a Turkish attack on Egypt is likely to divert 600,000 British troops from the principal theatre at the decisive hour. It may be conceded readily enough that if such conditions as Colonel Repington postulates governed the operations in the south-eastern theatre the outlook there would be bleak enough, but happily the contingencies suggested by the military writer in question arc based on the dismal assumption that the Allies have no plans of their own, and will be stupid enough to conduct the campaign to suit 1 the enemy and not as their own judgment and knowledge ad-

The Adriatic is evidently still a debateable ground in naval operations. Eeports arc in hand of a minor engagement in the Southern Adriatic, in which a British cruiser and a French destroyer, covering the retreat of Serbian detachments, engaged four ' enemy destroyers, which ultimately 'fled towards Cattaro. Next day enemy submarines attacked the Allied vessels further south, off Durazzo, but were put to flight. The extent of naval freedom enjoyed by the enemy in the Adriatic is at first sight remarkable considering the ability of the Allies to bring greatly superior forces to bear. The explanation probably is that the Allies are concentrating ,upon antisubmarine measures on the approaches to Salonika and in other areas of the Mediterranean to which the German undcr-water craft are now devoting their chief attention. The relative neglect of the Adriatic is an additional indication that minor importance is now attached to. the land operations in Albania.

Allied reports dealing with operations on the Western front tell only of normal incidents of siege Warfare, but the Germans claim that on Sunday night they recovered a position they had lost south of the Somme, the area in which their recent local attacks culminated. This would imply that the fighting in this section of tne front is of a'give-and-take order, but it must be confessed that the absence of reports from the Allies rather lends colour to the idea that they may have suffered a local reverse. The eccentricity of a censorship which allows,tho fragmentary German report to come through, unaccompanied (at time of writing) by any Allied account, is too obvious to ball for comment. There is no reason to suppose that the Allies have suffered any defeat of importance south of the Somme, but it seems quite likely that they have lost some ground which they are anxious to recover.

A type of report somewhat rare in British practice is issued in reference to the operations in Mesopotamia. General Townshend, it is announced, is holding Kut-el-Amara as a point of strategical importance, General Aylmer's operations are intended to support him there, and no withdrawal is contemplated. If this is spoken without guile it looks like the sort of thing that might almost as well have been loft unsaid. On present appearances the withdrawal of the advanced, columns on the Tigris may yet nrove to he the lesser of two. evils. Their communications cannot well he made secure, and the enemy is at liberty v for the time, to bring an overwhelming force against them if he feels so disposed. On the other hand, if the advanced positions can bo held until the enemy is largely occupied elsewhere, ICut-el-Amara will form a most important base fpr future operations.

A rumour is current in London thnt the First Sea Lord of the. Admiralty, Sir Henry Jackson, is retiring, and it is stated that the Admiralty refuses information on the subject. If there is anything in the story it porsibly_ means that Lord Fisher is returning to the post in which he was succeodcd by Sir Henry Jackson! There are again rumours that Lord Kitchener contemplates leaving the War Office in order to take up other duties. The suggestion that Sir "Wm. Robertson may assume professional control of the War Office, a civilian taking over the portfolio of Secretary for War. is interesting. While the rumours rest on no particular authority thov are in some respects piling ible. Two possibilities may be wortli considering where Lord Kitchener is concerned: that his nresence in the. Near East may be deemed essential, or that participation in the international counsels of the Allies may henceforth make such calls upon his time as to make retention of bis,

present office impossible. If any such change were made there is no doubt that the suggested promotion of Silt War. Robertson would command confidcnce and respect.

Attempts to estimate the total of German casualties in the war are beset by many difficulties, and within limits one estimate must be considered as likely to be accurate as another. The estimate by Colonel Repington, which appears to-day, goes beyond these limits. In some of. its detail factors ami in its final result it is extraordinary, and its accuracy must bo regarded as correspondingly improbable. It may be observed at the outset that Colonel Repington sets down, the total of German casualties during eighteen months of war at less than the total the Germans themselves admit for the first twelve months of the war. In addition he credits the Germans with a percentage of recoveries—that is, of men returned to active service at the front after spending a period in hospital —more than twice as great as they have themselves claimed. Evidence upon joints is contained in a German official "report issned in September, 1915, which was recently cited by Mr. Hilaire Belloc, in Land and Wafer, as having been extensively used by neutral .experts as a basis for their calculations of enemy wastage. The report gave the German casualties up to July 31 (that is, for the first year of war) at 2,G40,0C0. Colonel Repington sets down the German casualties for eighteen months of war at 2,627,085, which is to say that hi his opinion the casualties were slightly fewer at the end of eighteen months of war thVn the Germans admit having suffered in twelve months. . The same official German report, according to Mr. Belloc, gives the return of men to the front as one-third of the casualties, but Colonel Repington assumes that 75 per cent, of the men wounded_ and sent to hospital return ultimately to the firing line. It may be mentioned also that his figures would imply a German monthly average of temporary and permanent losses of approximately 146,000, whereas the enemy report quoted would make the monthly average under these categories 220,000. Proceeding on these lines it is not surprising that Colonel Repington reaches the conclusion that if the Germans hencaforth lose 250,000 menper month .thoir power of reinforcing will not end until September.

Other weaknesses in Colonel Repington's computation might be exposed by a more detailed examination, but it may suffice meantime to 'emphasise the fact that it is as a whole unconvincing and plainly errs on the side of under-estimating enemy 'losses. It is said to be based on exhaustive investigations of • Geranany's man-power, but in point of fact-such an investigation is hardly possible at this time. Estimates of enemy losses must of necessity be based largely upon detail evidence collected on the battle fronts, upon reasoning by analogy from known particulars of Allied losses, and upon a critical examination of enemy casualty lists as distinct from accepting them at their face value. Absolutely oertain results are not to be reached by such methods, but Colonel Repington's estimate may pretty safely be set aside in favour of others indicating that the exhaustion of Germany's effective reserves has been much more nearly approached than he is prepared to admit. It would be foolish to overestimate enemy losses, and no good, is done, especially with neutral nations, by going to the other extreme.