SIR IAN HAMILTON'S BELATED DISPATCH

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2663, 7 January 1916, Page 5

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S BELATED DISPATCH

THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO HIS RECALL TO LONDON By Telegraph—Prose Association—OoDyxielit (Rec. January 6, 11.25 p.m.) i 1 t London, January 6. I Sir lan Hamilton's dispatch dealing with Gallipoli covers thirty-eight pages, double columns, of the Gazette, of which fourteen are appendices, showing the orders commanding and covering the disembarkation and the attacks. ' Dealing with the failure at Suvla, Sir lan Hamilton says it was due to the divisional commanders not pressing the attack. After the failure, Sir lan Hamilton asked for 50,000 reinforcements, also for 45,000 to bring up the establishment, and to enable him to clear a passage, to Constantinople. Lord Kitchener replied that it was impossible to comply witli this, and later cabled asking for an estimate of the losses in the .event of evacuation. "I replied chat evacuation seemed impossible, and thereupon I was recalled to London." The Situation Early in July. Sir lan Hamilton states the following to be the situation early in July:— "The battle of the 6th to Stli -May'showed that neither the northern nor southern forces was strong enough to figlit a way to the Narrows, cabled on May 10 asking for two fresh divisions, in order to prevent the attack degenerating into trench warfare. I cabled on May, 17 saying that if we were left to face the Turks on our own resources, I should require two additional army corps. Owing to Russia giving up tho idea of co-operating on the- coast of the Black Sea several Turkish divisions arrived at tlie Dardanelles. Wo were, therefore, just as weak in June as a month earlier." He recalls the fact that Lord Kitchener in June promised him'three .regular divisions, two Territorial divisions, and infantry, and that their concentration would bo complete by August 10. After rejecting tlie possibility of an advance from Capo Holies, the <lisembtirka>tiou of the Asiatic side was followed by a mavcli on Chanak. The possibilities were the landing at Enos in order to seize the neck of the istlnnus of Bulair, or reinforcements of Australians and New Zealandcrs combined landing at Suvla. Bay. Admiral De Roebeck's naval objections to the landing at Enos were well nigh insurmountable.- Owing to submarines all reinforcements had to be brought, up from Mudros to Helles and Anzae by niglit in fleet mine-sweepers and trawlers. The landing at Bulair would have added fifty miles, which was too severe a- strain on the capacities of the flotilla. It was impossible to guard agjinst submarine attacks. At Enos the enemy would have time to organise a formidable opposition from the troops at Thrace, therefore he determined to storm the dominating height, Hill 305, with the capture of Midos and Gaba- Tepe as a sequel. From the very first lie had hoped the landing force under Sari Bair .would enable us to strangle the' Turkish communications, but the hopes had not borne fruit; nevertheless, the Australians and New Zealanders rooted themselves verv near tho enemy's vitals. Their tenacity and courage still held open the doorway whence one strong thrust forward would give us the command of the Narrows.