The Dominion WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1916. GREECE'S AWKWARD PREDICAMENT

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2661, 5 January 1916, Page 4

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1916. GREECE'S AWKWARD PREDICAMENT

e The King of Greece is extremely anxious to make the British Press and public believe that he really is a man of honour, and that his pledge of benevolent neutrality will always hold good. He complains that he has been, and still is, misunderstood in Britain. It is quite certain that a cloud of suspicion has gathered round his name. These suspicions may prove to be quite unjust, but they are the natural and inevitable outcome of the nicely-balanced attitude ho has'taken up in connection with the war. British people expected, and not without reason, that when Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers, Grecee_ would have come in on the other side. But Greece made no move, and she was within her rights in keeping out of the fray. Many competent authorities consider that she made a mistake from the point of view of selfinterest; yet at that stageshc could maintain her neutrality without loss of honour. The_ position was, however, very materially altered as soon as Bulgaria decided to become an active ally of the Central Empires, and attacked Serbia. At this juncture Greece was compelled to consider her treaty obligations to Serbia. These obligations had to be fulfilled or repudiated. The question of national honour was now involved. The leading Greek statesman, M. Venizelos, and the majority of the nation, were in favour of war, but King Constantine blocked tho way. He discovered, or thought he discovered, in the wording of the agreement wi'th Serbia a loophole by which Greece could escape from tho obligation of coming to the help of the Serbians; but, whatever tho truo interpretation of the treaty may bo, there can be no doubt that Greece was morally bound to give assistance. The King, however, contended in the most persistent manner for a policy of neutrality, and in order to counteract the efforts of the war party ho has taken serious liberties with tho constitution of his country. "When one remembers that the Queen of Grcecc is the Kaiser's sister it is very hard to resist the' belief that German influences have been at work. It is not at all surprising 1 that, King .Constantine ha* been mis-

understood in England, or that a widespread feeling exists that it would be dangerous to place too much reliance on his promises of benevolent neutrality. A nicely-balanced policy of self-interest, coupled with an intense desire to be on the winning side at all costs, is sure to give rise to doubts, suspicions, and misunderstandings. It must be admitted that Greece is in a very awkward predicament. King Constaxtine is entitled to a certain.amount of sympathy. There is nothing heroic or inspiring about his policy, but thers is something to bo said in its favour. He is candidly playing for safety. If ho supports the Entente Powers and Germany wins he knows that Greece will get no mercy, and if he should actively assist the Central Empires lie realises that Britain could blow his coast towns about his ears and put a speedy end to Greek commerce. In these circumstances he thinks it wise to remember that he is the brother-in-law of the Kaiser and the cousin of King George, and not to allow his friendship with Britain to be so demonstrative as to provoke the open enmity of Germany. He prefers discretion to valour, and thinks that it is in the best interest of Greece to stand aloof. The whole position in the Balkans.might have been different if British diplomacy had been firmer and s.urer. There is some truth in the view recently expressed by Herr von Rath that the Allies missed a great diplomatic opportunity at the time when the Germans were being flung back from Paris and the Russians were invading Galicia and Hungary. These advantages were not as they might have been, and the right moment for influencing the Balkan States was allowed to slip by. If the Allies had then shown the iron hand beneath the velvet glove King Constantine might have been persuaded to give his support to the policy of M. Venizelos. Though the Kino has played some strange tricks with the Constitution, it would be a mistake to assume that he has lost the confidence of the nation. The bulk of the people have confidence both in the King and in M._ Venizelos, the national hero. This may bo quite illogical, but public feeling is not governed bv logic. The Kiro is more of a soldier than a. politician or a diplomat, and is very popular with the army. 'He has proved himself for the time being at least more powerful than. M. Venizelos. He has played his cards with great astuteness, ancl no one knows how many more he may hold in his hand. The fact that he is anxious to gain the goodwill of the British public may be taken as a hopeful sign. The Allies must accept his assurance' as a man of honour that his pledge of benevolent neutrality will be strictly kept, but that should not weaken their determination to take every precaution necessary for the protection of their own interests, Tliey havo left too much to chance in the past. They cannot forget that in the case of Turkey and Bulgaria fair words were followed by foul deeds. They cannot afford to make any more diplomatic mistakes. Greece is overrun with German spies and German agents, and German money is being freely spent. The Allies cannot shut their eyes to these plain facts. They must be prepared for any emergency, and while grateful for the benevolent' assurances of King Constantine, thc.y must place themselves in a position to frustrate the unscrupulous schemes and sinister devices of the enemy.