PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2645, 16 December 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

"Splendid daysare coming, when the Russian armies will advance daily." So says General Russky, the Commander of the Russian northern armies; and side by side with this definite promise of great and spirit-stirring events, there is a message from the correspondent of the Baily Mail, at Rotterdam, predicting action on a grand scale by the Western Allies before the winter ends—probably as soon as a hard frost makes the ground passable for artillery and infantry. Similar predictions have been made before by correspondents and commentators on the war, and have not been realised, and in itself the'prediction of the correspondent mentioned might count for little. But it is striking, coming as it does at a moment when it appropriately rounds off and supplements the more authoritative prediction of General Russky,' and there is much in the conditions ruling in the_ two main theatres to suggest that it may prove to be an intelligent anticipation of events. There is no reason to doubt that the interview with General Russky, from which extracts arc cablod today, is genuine. An able and distinguished commander, he is also one who has permitted himself an occasional departure from the reticence which is habitual with the leaders of the Entente armies. Some months ago, while the German offensive in the Baltic Provinces was still being pressed in full vigour, he declaredi in a public statement'that it was no longer in tho enemy's power to break through the Russian defence and advance on Petrograd. Acceptance of this expression of opinion at the time when it was made involved an exercise of faith, but it is amply justified to-day, when the enemy's offensive in the Baltic Provinces has to all appearance completely broken down. The Germans are now said to bo settling down in winter quarters on blockhouse lines, somewhat retired from the most advanced positions they had won, and the Dwina line, from Riga to Dvinsk, remains in Russian hands. Grounds are, therefore, not wanting for regarding the statement attributed to-day to General Russky as charged with meaning and promise.

It is to be noted that General Russky's statement contains no explicit promise of a winter offensive by the Russians. His remark that the offensive would be easier for both sides when the waters were frozen over stands apart from his buoyant declaration that splendid days are coming when the Russian armies Will advance daily, but there is much teason to believe that they bear a close relation. ' There are familiar reasons for believing that the Allies will be in no haste to make their supreme bid for final victory, but postponement of the grand offensive aiming at the final overthrow of Germany and her vassal States does not exclude the probability of action by the Allies during the winter intended to pave the way for such an offensive. In the most conservative interpretation General Russky's statement contains a promise that the Russians will very soon approach the task of recovering some of the ground they have lost as a result of the enemy's frenzied efforts to gain a separate decision in the Eastern theatre, and such action by Russia would almost of necessity involve a policy of vigorous aggression by the Allies on the Western front. • * # » It is impossible on the information in hand to say what limits are likely. to be reached by the Allies in a winter offensive, but that the period is rapidly approaching when the enemy will be made to feel ttTe full weight of conducting a war on two main fronts can hardly be doubted. Hitherto, thanks to his interior communications and initial superiority in numerical strength and material equipment, the enemy has escaped the worst evils attending upon such an adventure, but the advantage of superiority in numbern and equipment has now passed to the Allies. It is nob certain indeed that the Russians are as well provided with artillery as- their adversaries, though they were evidently at ho disadvantage in this respect in the last great struggle in the Baltic Provinces, but that the Allies possess an aggregate superiority over the enemy both in men and material is undoubted. Of all the factors bearing upon the luture of the war that of manpower is the most important. As General Rushky has said: "Ail will ultimately resolvo itself into a question of men." The factor 'of man-power has a decisive bearing the ultimate outcome of the Var. It ban! a direct bearing also upon such operations as tho Allies may undertake in the immediate future. The numerical superiority of the Western Allies is unquestioned, and according to Genkhal Russky, Russia also now has the superiority in numbers of equipped men. There was a time when Russia, kept unarmed soldiers behind her fighting lines ready to take 'up the weapons of the fallen, but these days aro past and done with. In {uldUlon to l.|ie Allied rccognliwd .sujierionts, iii wwtm tUaxe is musL

reason to believe that the Central Empires have either closely approached or, already passed their maximum effective strength in the field—thaf; thclir effective reserves arc so far depleted that their total strength in tho field is already declining, or about to decline. Mr. Hilaike Belloc, examining the position in detail, and working, as he claims, upon a considerable body of evidence which is unimpeachable so far as ultimate possibilities are concerned, holds that the point of decline in the enemy's effective strength cannot well have been reached earlier that last month, and that in the most exfiremo estimate it cannot be reached later than the end of January, 1916.

. Maintaining that these estimates are undoubtedly sound, Mr. Belloc admits . that the enemy may still keep up his numbers in the field, as' distinct from his effective strength, by arming men who are unfit by reason of age, youth, or infirmity, to bear the strain of service in the field. During the last day or two it has been reported that the enemy is taking just such measures. Germany, for instance, is reported to bo calling up her medically unfit men to serve in what' is described oa the working service, and Austria is said to bo summoning to the colours boys who will not attain the age of 16 until next year. It is pointed \out by Mr. Belloc that measures of this kind, though theymay resorted to in desperation, cannot increase the fighting strength of armies, and the observation is' obviously just. To supplement effectives by ineffectives, to draft into armies men who are liable to break down in batches under the stress and trials of campaigning, is not to increase strength, but to dilute it. The point should perhaps be considered that Germany may have foreseen the position now reached, and adopted the policy of using up a proportion of her inferior human material from an early period of the war while retaining a proportion of her effective men for a later call. Except as 'operating within narrow limits, Eowever, such a theory will scarcely bear examination. •It has at all times been the German aim to strike for the speediest possible victory, and under such a policy to conserve effective strength while making use of inferior material would plainly be to invite failure and defeat.

When all is said, the opinion that the Germanic Empires have reached, or almost reached, the point of a decline in effective strength, no doubt rests upon evidence which is not absolutely conclusive. It is, nevertheless, strong. In addition to the statistical evidence upon which Che opinion is directly based, it re-; ceives support from the turn of events in the war—the failure to drive home tho offensive against Russia, the marked failure of the enemy to make any effective retort to tho successful September offensive of the Western Allies, and more recently the failure of the Au6tro-Ger-mans to throw as large a force into the Balkans as might nave been prch fitably employed in-that region. Now bhat the Allied Army based on Salonika has apparently effected a safe retreat into Greek territory, and is likely to remain posted in readiness, for a future offensive, it can be plainly seen that by employing larger forces the enemy might have won a much, more decisive success and secured a much more advantageous position in Near East than he is r ? a^a * n as matters stand. In tho matter of numbers, it is, of course, obvious tha,t the enemy has secured some advantage by his Near Eastern adventure. The Bulgarian Army represents a material accession of strength, and something may be accomplished in the way of equipping new levies in Turkey. But the total possible gain to the enemy fn this way is not of major importance measured by, the standards 'obtaining in the main 'theatres.

_ The broad oonclusion is evidently justified that conditions favour such a winter offensive by the Allies as is predicted to-day. The enemy, greatly weakened by his past efforts, is subjected to an enormous strain in-defending his two main fronts against enemies who are daily growing in strength. The Russians have much leeway to recover before they will be in a position to embark upon a counter-invasion, but they can fight their Relatively weakened enemy with greater advantage on his present lines than on the frontiers of East Prussia and Silesia. In considering the possibilities of a winter offensive it must appear that free movement is much more likely to be witnessed in the Eastern theatre than on the Western front, but if the Western Allies are able to materially develop their present policy of shattering and_ weakening the fortified line m which the Germans have permanently sunk so much military capital they will be no less definitely moving- towards victory than the Russians when they find themselves advancing again towards their western frontier in the fashion foretold by General Russky.

Comparatively little is added at time of writing to tie story of the Allied retreat from Serbian Macedonia, except the statement, in a message from Salonika, that a German and Bulgarian force has entered Greek territory, and this is denied in a Paris communique, which declares that the Bulgarians have not crossed the frontier. It is possible that the Paris report is of earlier date than the other, but the question as to whether enemy troops have yet entered Greece remains meantime in doubt. Othorwise matters remain much as they were. The Allied troops are safely concentrated in Greek territory, and there is every indication that they are being accorded a clear and unobstructed passage. From their action in hoisting tho Greek flag at Monastic and from reports like that relating to the reception of the Bulgarian Minister at Athens by Kino Constantine, the Germans. have evidently not desisted from their courtship of Greece, but the unimpeded development of the Allied operations making for the defence of Salonika strongly suggests that Greece 'is in safe control. Monastir is a bait, but even apart from the control to which she is subjected by the Allies, Greece is bound to consider'that Bulgaria may be offering Monastir with one hand and reaching out the other for Salonika.

A Bulgarian communique wh'ich mentions, amongst other things, that the pursuit has now stopped seems to bear out the French official report in which it is denied that the Bulgarians have crossed the Greek frontier. The Bulgarian report is in somo respects a notable document. In, its reference to the conquest of Serbian Macedonia it is more than tinged with vain-glory, and the asM'Ciun that tho French fought more Jjravak .than the British looks ■&,

little spiteful, and according to all the reports of the retreat which have been received, it is absolutely untrue. These reports agree in declaring that British troops fought and won the most critical battle of the retreat. There is a suggestion in the communique of a desire on tho part of tljie Bulgarians to write* finis to their Macedonian adventure, but since it is the announced intention of tho Allies to hold Salonika (and a report to-day says that they are landing reinforcements day and night) it seems more likely that the Bulgarians' great adventure is only beginning.