AND THE SPIRIT OF PESSIMISM.

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2618, 13 November 1915, Page 3

AND THE SPIRIT OF PESSIMISM.

Sir, —Exactly 122 years ago, in 1793, the National Convention was appointed to manago the affairs of t'lio infant French Hcpublic. Every patriot was filled, almost to the bursting point, with tlie now wine of Rousseau's gospel of Equality. Any idea of pre-emiiienco of position, of privilege, or even of ability, was intolerable. To them this ideal was the embodiment of Truth and Reason by which t'lie world would bo regenerated and saved. The gospeLonust be spread at all risks by every availablo force. So, with an empty treasury but with boundless faitli in their mission, they plunged into war against the whole of Europe. \

Malian recounts that oil© of tho first acts of the Convention, on the outbreak of war with England, was to dismiss from the ships of war all tlio trained gunners. They argued that it was contrary to t!he prime principles of Equality that any citizen should be considered superior to another. All wore equal; why,, then, should not all be equally capablo of shooting? .Sucli folly is almost incredible! Yet in one form or another, though in varying degrees, this doctrine forms the chief weakness in all democracies. ■ .

For instance: Acitizen is accused of a crime, or two citizens have a serious dispute. How is the matter settled? A jury of twelve men is empanelled to try the case. How are they selected? Presumably ..the ends of justice would demand ;that' ;these men should 1 be chosen as being men of honour, acumen and sound sense. But, no! democratic idealswill not entertain tho idea of any inequality among citizens. They, are chosen, ' therefore, at random; and Ithere is nothing to prevent matters of life and death' being decided bv men,whpm you would not trust to look after n clutch of bhickens. Are wo then, after a.' century of democracy, much wiser than.the mnd patriots of 1793? These insane theories of Equality may be pretty playthings in times of piping pflace., .'.Tliey' do comparatively little hr<rm,/and merely provoke the smiles of the philosopher; hut,.when tho State Is in danger, when the'enemy is hammering -at iSie door, it is a very different thing.'. .'Then they constitute tlie very greatest danger which can beset a democracy. ;

, When every petty admiral or general of : the ttreet corner considers himself to have the Tight and tfie ability to criticise the management of a-campaign, and to foster amongst his fellow citizens unwarranted emotion of pessimism or optimism, then we see and feel tho evils of. having built our castle of Equality on the sands of There are various kinds of amateur critics; some, harmless, . some * the reverse. "For instance, there is the citv clerk, who. with Napoleonic shrug, folded , arms, and heavy frown, informs you that he is "not satisfied with tho British Navy"; 'p.hd the excitable patriot who finds outlet for his patriotism by waving flags, anathematising the Kaiser, or practising petty persecutions on our unfortunate prisoners. Few of theso carir any weight, land their optimisms and pessimisms, may bo dismissed with a smile. The' really dangerous critics are thoso whose' opinions, carry some weight, either' because they have made great reputations, for themselves •in some branch of • public service, or because' they are'employed by 6omo leading journal, by .whose reflected light they shine. Everyone 'knows the oininenco : and ability of men liko.Mih^r ; aiicl,Crgj-. mer, and, when tliey condemn tlie strategy of the war we have to take their words seriously. So with Repington and Ashmead Bartlett. They aro admirable war correspondents, and must he respected accordingly. But it must not be forgotten that none of them'is in a position to know anything whatever' of the strategy of this vast war. Very few. outside the tieneral Staffs of the armies of the Allies'can know or can be permitted to know. They aro merely bystanders. They see tricks taken and lost. They can know nothing of the cards held by the'players. How foolish, then, it is for even these great jnen.to allow themselves to join in abuse of ..the' players when aJiy trick is lost. Before the game is over, many tricks will be lost or won._ But the party that sec'urcs tho odd trick will be the winner. '..yi..'

If there is reason to suppose that our commanders are incapable, change them by all means. But to .6cream at each slip is as fatal a policy as can be imagined, for it disheartens the fighters and leads to failure. Can you expect a captain to steer his : ship through a dangerous passage, if the stewards and. the cooks and other inexperts throng tho bridge and oifer their .useless advice? '.None cf these great nien are military'experts, nor can they know the strategy of .the campaign. It would be foolish, therefore,' to allow ourselves to bo depressed by their inexpert criticisms.

Tlie worst; sort of critics, however, have been-the disappointed'war correspondentsj- and especially thoso connected with tlio -powerful ring of journals which have fallen under the control of American capital. There has been with them a distinct flavour of spite, and one cannot help concluding that they are tryftig to pay off Kitchener and J off re for their policy of rigid censorship. They have tried to persuade the public that there was a desire to keep it ill the dark, and that a less close censorship would have disclosed nothing material to the enemy. There, too,' 'comos tho unwillingness io put trust'in .the loaders; and here again I repeat: "If the leaders aro bad, dismiss them: tut if they are good, trust them." Would they have us play our game with our cards exposed for all to see, while the more judicious enemy conceals his? It looks as if they thought more of get. ting copy than of tho, safety of the country—more of profits than oF patriotism'. There is no doubt that a slack censorship did us great harm in the Boer War, and it is an interesting fact, mentioned by Berthier and Marbot, that Napoleon leariit all he wanted to know of our strategy and of tho distribution of our troops from the columns of tho London "Times," of which he was a constant reader.

May I utter-'a ■word of warning to those of us who are liable to T>e led away by tlie stirring accounts of battles and heroic deeds sentiby war correspondents ? We mnsfc not imagine, because lie is a brilliant word painter, or because he was'present at any particular battle, that therefore ho can sot up as a critic of tlie great war strategy. Probably ho lias been far too close to the battle to be able to form much idea of even that battle. Battles are nowadays spread over great areas, and the nearer a man is, the more ho may know of the actual fighting, but the less of the tactics and strategy. A man may writo] glibly of liolocaiists, and hecatombs, and decimations, of hurricanes of shells and tempests of artillery; ho may pilo superlative upon superlative, but ho is not thereby to be considered an expert critic. It has becomo the custom lately to speak of the Gallipoli" campaign as a failure. I submit that, without a knowledge of tho causes ami facts, no one is in a position to pass ail adverse criticisin. It is onlv when history shall havo gathered up all tho threads, after our victory shall have boon won, and tho odd trick garnered in. that, anyone will be able to iudge fairly and surely. For God's'sake, let us have an end of this tempest of grumbling cablegrams. It fosters n spirit of pessimism, which is just the disease which Germany hoped would attack our democracy, and on which sho calculated. If wo persevere, and bp dossodty, and bravely as we.

are now doing, wo shall assuredly win. We may lose many a trick, but wc shall win tho rubber all right.—l'ours, etc., G.E.A.