The Dominion.

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2555, 1 September 1915, Page 4

The Dominion.

WEDNESDAY,. SEPTEMBER l; 191 D.' THE DARDANELLES PROBLEM ; , " 0' '.. ■ —■ • ' Some idea Of the immense importance of tho Dardanelles campaign may be gathered from the summary of a. remarkable article' by Paul RouaBACH, a -well-known writer on German foreign policy, which will be found in our cable columns of yesterday, 'Rohcjbach contends that tho decision of the war will be found in the Orient, and . expresses the opinion that tho success of the Allies afc the' Dardanelles, would mean the eaid of German .world politics, and the elimination of Germany as a world power. ißohqbach is explaining the position from the German l point of view for the benefit of American readers. This should bo borne in mind; but his interpretation of; German opinion regarding the Dardanelles problem is supported; by another cablegram giving the purport of a conversation between a neutral correspondent and a German which took place in Berlin. The German asked whether English people realised that Germany regards "the Dardanelles as one of the most vital parts of the ,war.'' The correspondent asserts thait his impression is'that'the ideas of the English public in reference to this matter are vague and uncertain. "Englishmen," he says, "do not attach the gigantic to tho enterprise which the Germans do." The people, of New Zealand aie watching the progress of the operations in this theatre of war with the intensest terest. We know that our own men are figiting there with a bravery wEich could not be surpassed, and reccnfc events have shown us that they have . a tremendously difficult task before them. We can see, in a broad find general way, that the capture of Constantinople would prdbably prove one of'the great turning points in the : struggle; but can wo . honestly say that we,understand the full moaning of the ' Dardanelles campaign or the prccise position it occup'les .in ' thc general strategy of the war'? We know enough, however, to convince us that the soldiers who JiaVe gone from our shores are participating in operations of the greatest political and military consct. qucnco. In tho course of a recent survey of the War-the'New York Evening Post tells its readers that the Dardanelles campaign must not: bo thought of as an isolated venturo. It is ."a far-sighted move r ment which, if pushed 'to success, may p'rovo far more important than any battle fought in Galicia or-in France." Tho Dardanelles campaign is un-.. doubtedly the great "subsidiary operation" of tho war. It is_ something more than a spasmodic blow at the" encniy which might succeed oi fail without having any appreciable effect on tho ultimate result. It is a vital part of t-h'o whole war scheme. In the latest volume 6f his History af the War, Mb. BuoiiaU explains tho difference bet veen a "subsidiary operation" and a "divergent operation." The first is a term of praise, tho second of .blame. A "subsidiary operation" forms part _ of ; fthe_ main campaign, and success in it directly subserves tho main objective of the war. A "divergent operation" has no. relation to the main effort, except that it is directed against the same enemy, and success it is quits consistent with utter failure in the chief campaign, and docs not necessarily bring the issue ono step nearer. Difference of opinion may, exist a-2 to the character of tho op.er-

ations and.the adequacy of the naval anil military forces, cm ployed at the Dardanelles, but Mil. Cuuhcnii.L carries conviction when he states that "there never was a great subsidiary operation of war in which a more complete harmony of strategic, political, and economic advantages has combined, or which stood in truer relation to the main decision which is in tho central theatre." AVhat, 'would be the effect of the fall of Constantinople 1 It would simplify Russia's military problem and open • a channel through which she couid obtain additional war munitions; . it would strengthen Russia's financial position by enabling her great accumulations of wheat to bo exported; it would probably bring tho tottering Ottoman Empire' down.with'a crash; it would vividly impress upon the Balkan States the wisdom of joining with tho Allies; it would almost completely isolate Austria and Germany from tho outside world and provide tho Allies with a new', line of attack. These plain facts explain the anxiety of Germany to give more effcctivo support to Turkey than she is at present able to do. The neutral correspondent already referred to states that the Germans regard the Dardanelles expedition as a' "mad project" which cannot possibly succeed.' But this statement ill accords with Germany's desperate efforts to keep Turkey from collapsing. PAur, pßohgbach taktfs a much more rational view of the situation when he declares that Germans realise that the ultimate result,, victory or defeat,' depends on Germany's ability to preserve the strength of the Ottoman Empire and its connection with Berlin. ■ ' < '